

Reza Shah: Puppet or Patriot?



**BRITISH INTELLIGENCE SECRET DOCUMENTS
REVEAL HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE**

Badi Badiozamani

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To the memory of my loving parents,

To Mehrangiz (Nassrin), Ghazal, Ilya, Nuriel, Ghazalle & Eulas,

To all those whom I love,

To those who promote Human Rights and freedom,

To all patriots.

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Finally, a special debt of gratitude goes to my family, including my wife, Nassrin, my daughters, Ghazal and Ghazalle, and my grandson Nuriel, whose unconditional love and never-ending support has been the nucleus of life and energy for me.

Preface

A friendly conversation between you and me

My dear friend, despite the fact that I have lived away from Iran for more than forty years, I would like to have a friendly chat with you.

Unlike my other book, *Iran & America: Rekindling A Love Lost*, which was a formal and scholarly book aimed at enlightening the American statesmen and public about Persian history and culture, with the goal of preventing a military attack on Iran, I wrote this book in a simple and sincere way, as if two very close friends are discussing an issue. This way, I hope we will be able to find the facts about a personality whom everybody believes had a fundamental impact (good or bad) on Iran. I also wish and hope that this book can spark the love for Iran in you and the millions of young Iranian boys and girls who will build the future of the country.

Further, I ask of you a huge favor: I would like you to put yourself in Reza Shah's place, at that time in history, and honestly and sincerely think and imagine that if you were in his place, what decision would you make, what action would you take. In return, you can e-mail me at badi@badi.net and opine and/or ask anything about Iran that you want to discuss. I promise I will gladly respond and share with you anything I know, because as long as I live, I will love Iran and Iranians, and my wish is freedom and relative prosperity for all Iranians of any ethnicity, religion and political persuasion.

The idea of writing this book came to me when, one day, among the books I had inherited from my esteemed and dear friend, Dr. Yahya Armajani, a history professor in the United States, I found a small book, *Commemoration: Gathering of Tribal Chiefs in Tehran At the Funeral of the Late Reza Shah the Great*. The book had been published in August 1950.



Since it included numerous photos of heads of various Iranian tribes and ethnic groups, I thought perhaps I should scan the entire book and put it online to eternalize it. This would probably give a chance to the grandchildren and great-grandchildren of these men to see and learn about them. Then I thought, well, what if the descendants, who are probably scattered all over the world, are not able to read Persian? I would translate it, I decided. I then asked myself another question: What if they have no idea who Reza Shah was and what he had done for the country? It occurred to me that perhaps millions of young Iranians under the Islamic Republic regime in Iran might have the same question. I then decided to write a longer book with more detailed information for the youth of Iran, with the hope that they might get inspired to liberate the country. That thought led me to years of research.

One of the valuable sources I found was the thousands of pages of historical documents of the United Kingdom government, which have been declassified in the not too distant past, and are available at the U. K. National Archives. I will have to say that many scholars, such as Dr. Cyrus Ghani and Dr. Houshang Sabahi had already spent a lot of time and energy on these documents, going through them and quoting them in their books. I utilized them as a guiding light, and I am grateful for it. What I have done in this book—and as far as I am aware, has not been done hitherto—is providing photographic images of these documents, as it is said, *'a picture is worth a thousand words'*, and *'seeing is believing'*. Out of over five hundred documents, I have selected about one hundred to be included in this book. I wish to ask for your indulgence for the low quality of the pictures of these old documents. That is the best that I could do.

I wish, after reading this book, we all will be able to reach a consensus on the following conclusion: In the multi-player political chess game of the world, in various periods of time, there have always existed some countries that have had the upper hand and have attempted to push their will on others: Russia and Britain, Russia and the United States, China and the United States. There have been, and will be, times when other countries such as Germany, Australia, Israel, Brazil, France, Saudi Arabia, Japan, India...forge alliances with the big powers and push an agenda collectively against other countries. Any country, where freethinking and selfless men and women, smartly and without emotions, study the world's political, military and socioeconomic situation, and with regard to the laws of their own country, lead their country to strike a deal beneficial to their own country with influential powers, will achieve peace, tranquility, security, economic expansion and prosperity for the country they love. On the contrary, if based on empty and elusive slogans void of wisdom and pragmatism, emotionally lead their country to a prolonged, useless antagonism against the powers to be, cause their own citizens an ever-present anxiety and paranoia of enemy attack, economic stagnation, joblessness and suffocating inflation. A good example is oil-rich Venezuela, where its citizens have been forced to sell their pride, their bodies, their children and even their own hair in order to get a loaf of bread.



Finally, in order for you to have an image of your friend, who is speaking with you through the book, I post a photo for you.

The World, Middle East & Iran's situation at the time of Reza Shah's rise

First, let's review very concisely the history of Iran, as our history is like our *Shenasnameh*—Identity Certificate. A person without an I.D. Certificate would be ignorant about his/her ancestry, his/her roots. Also, knowledge of our past could be used as a guiding light for our future.

Nobody knows with certainty when the history of humankind starts. Fossilized skulls recently discovered lead to a new theory that believes the start of human beings is about 3.8 million years ago. I am not aware of the existence of such skulls in Iran, but I think it would be worth mentioning that I have seen rock paintings in Lorestan that have been estimated by Professor Mc Burney of Cambridge University to be from 42,000 years ago. That is 40,000 years prior to Jesus and Mohammad!



Cyrus the Great, the Achaemenid king unites Persians and Medes (Kurds) and establishes the world's first documented empire. The most important characteristic of Cyrus, which exalts him above all world leaders to a super-human hero, is his respect for equal rights of human beings of all races, ethnicities, cultures and religious beliefs. The Cyrus Cylinder, found in Babylon and being kept at the British Museum, reflect his thoughts. That is why it is widely considered as the first declaration of Human Rights and a source of pride for Iranians.




His other distinguished trait is his fair and just administration of twenty-eight countries within his vast empire. His reputation causes a Greek philosopher and historian called Xenophon to write his famous *Cyropaedia*, also spelled *Cyropedia*, which became a training manual for kings and statemen for centuries as well as an inspiration for the founding fathers of the United States in their structure of government and the U.S. Constitution.

I would be remiss if I didn't mention that the people of Egypt, a country that was part of the Persian Empire for over seventy years, bestowed the title of *Pharaoh* on Emperor Darius the Great to show their gratitude. This was because he brought Persian artisans to bring water to the arid country by constructing Kariz (Qanat), an ancient underground aqueduct system recognized by UNESCO as a World Heritage entity.

The same emperor navigated through the Pars Sea (Persian Gulf), went around Saudi Arabia, and in order to get to the Mediterranean Sea, had a canal dug in the vicinity of today's Suez Canal. He had this marvel inscribed in three large tablets, one of which is kept at the Cairo Museum.

These are three magnificent deeds of many that show our ancestors' genius contributions to the world, things that cannot be ignored by anybody.



Unfortunately, after about two hundred years, the Persian statesmen fell to corruption to the point that Alexander of Macedonia, a military genius, defeated the Persian Empire and proudly donned Darius the Third's robe. This he did, because he took pride in the Persian culture and civilization. Alexander, who had developed a tremendous amount of respect for Cyrus after reading Xenophon's *Cyropedia*, severely punished some of his soldiers when he heard that they had desecrated his tomb. I should add that it is believed that upon Alexander's setting on fire the palace of Persepolis, the eastern wall of Apadana palace collapsed. During excavations in 1933-34, close to 14,000 small tablets were discovered under that wall, some which have been translated at the University of Chicago. They reveal an amazing array of regulations concerning work, wages, and methods of payment for skilled and unskilled men, women and children. They had a severance pay and unemployment benefit, where a worker would receive about three months of wages and benefits upon his/her termination. These documents can be considered as the world's first labor laws. Also revealed were laws regarding kindness to animals such as dogs that were trained and utilized in people's daily life. It was only after the advent of Islam that dogs lost their popularity.



I have had the personal honor to have had several meetings with Professor Abdolmajid Arfaei, both at the Iran National Museum as well as in the U.S., and I learned a lot from him. He is the only person who has dedicated over 50 years of his life to identifying and translating the tablets. I have also had the pleasure of touching a few of these tablets, thereby trying to connect with my good-thinking ancestors.


Upon his return from India, Alexander fell ill in Babylon, southern Iraq, and died after 12 days of excruciating pain. Much has been written about his illness, but recently, a medical professor from New Zealand, has offered a new theory. She argues that Alexander had GBS, a rare but serious immune disorder that caused him paralysis to the point that he couldn't even speak. She argues that his body had shut down, but his brain was alive. The doctors at

that time used to rely on breath, not pulse, to determine if a patient was alive or dead, and since they could not notice his breathing, they pronounced him dead six days before his brain died.

A bloody power-grabbing war broke out among his lieutenants and lasted about forty years. Ultimately, Alexander's empire was split into three pieces. Persian territories all the way to the Chinese borders came under the Seleucids rule for close to 160 years; however, based on the admission of those in the know, the Macedonian/Greek culture was unable to overcome the Persian culture.

With the rise of Parthians/Ashkanians, Iran was revived. Ashkanian kings brought back to the motherland lost territories from near Chinese borders to Armenia (part of today's Turkey) to parts of Iraq, Syria, all the way to the territories in south of Persian Gulf (today's Kuwait, Emirates, Oman...). The Persian hegemony extended to about 464 years. A proud and fascinating point about this era is that it enjoyed a true constitutional monarchy. Ratification of laws, important appointments, and even selection of kings went through two houses of parliament, the *Mehestan*. It was during this period, about 36 B.C. when Persian warriors dealt such a huge defeat to the renowned Roman commander, Marcus Antonius (Mark Antony) and his 200,000 men, which caused him to flee and cling to the skirt of Cleopatra in Egypt. The historian, Plutarch, estimated the number of Persian forces to only 80,000.

The most important event in this era was adoption of Mithraism as the official religion of the government. Per writings of two renowned Iranian scholars and linguists, professors Zabih Behrooz and Mohammad Moghaddam, Mehr or Mithra was born on December 25 in 272 B.C. This religion was adopted by many people who spread it from China in the east, to Ireland in west Europe, to the point that in the fourth century after Christ, close to 90% of the members of the Roman army were followers of Mithra. That is when the Cesar, Constantin ordered that everybody must convert to Christianity. It was after this order that Mithraic worship temples, Mehrabe' مهراپه, which were built underground (resembling a cave) throughout the Roman Empire, were either destroyed or filled with dirt and churches were constructed on top of them. Today, the most accessible one can be visited in the basement of Basilica Di San Clemente, just a couple of hundred yards from the Colosseum/Coloseo in Rome, Italy. Here is a map I have borrowed from Google that shows the location of this ancient temple (red indicator).



After 464 years of Parthian/Ashkani hegemony, it was the Sassanid/Sassanian era's turn to expand on the fame, fortune and fine Persian culture to shine on the world for more than 420 years! Shapour, the Sassanid emperor, after a 15-year war, ultimately defeated the Roman forces in Edessa (middle of today Turkey) and captured the Roman Emperor, Valerian, and 70,000 Romans. The capture of the first Roman emperor as a prisoner of war, which caused shock and instability throughout the Roman Empire, was eternalized in the rock carvings at Naghshe Rostam, near Persepolis.



The world's first university, Gondishapour, was one of the three Sassanian centers of education where medicine, science, philosophy and arts were taught. It became the most important medical center in the world!

Khosrow Anushirvan was so progressive in the ancient world that about 1,500 years ago, he ordered a census to be conducted throughout the empire, not only for human beings, but also for domesticated animals and palm and olive trees! In this era, women attended discussions and formal parties and went hunting with men. Girls had the freedom of choosing their husbands; women had the right to divorce. It was in this period of enlightenment that two Persian women, Purandokht and Azarmidokht, ruled the empire as queens. By the way, when chess was brought from India to the court of Anushirvan, he ordered a game to be devised in response, and Iranians invented Backgammon.

During the 420 years of Sassanian dynasty, Persian civilization, culture and arts—especially music—reached its zenith so much so that some scholars have named that era the Persian Renaissance. The Sassanian culture had a deep impact of the cultures of the Roman Empire, Western Europe, India, Turkestan, China, and Africa. The Romans adopted the Persian army's structure and warring methods, the court protocol and government administration. It is believed that today's western diplomatic protocol is based on the Perso-Roman diplomatic relations.

Another interesting point is that the Babylonian Talmud (the central text of Jewish civil and ceremonial law) was compiled in 37 volumes by Persian Jews in the capital of the Persian Empire. This, in itself, is a testament to the existence of equality among all Persians in the Sassanid era. It is also noteworthy that this Talmud, also known as the Persian Talmud, is still utilized today and is favored by many people over the Jerusalem Talmud!

The disaster for Iran started when Khosrow Parviz deviated from humanity, neglected his forefathers' virtues and replaced them with warmongering and bloodshed, especially with the Byzantine Empire, and thus caused the destruction of the four-hundred-year dynasty of the Sassanids. Unlike Cyrus the Great, who upon conquer of Babylon, had liberated the Jews and had ordered their dilapidated temples to be rebuilt (that is why he is admired in the Old Testament as God's Shepard and the anointed one). He, who had captured today's Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel...brought the revered "True Cross," a cross believed to be the original cross upon which Jesus had been crucified, to the capital of Ctesiphon. The Byzantine emperor, Heraclius, who like Khosrow Parviz, had made war a habit of his, six years later reached the Persian capital; however, after so many years of war, neither army had any more vigor; he just reclaimed the cross and left.

At this juncture of history, Omar, the Caliph of Moslems, who saw Moslem had forgotten the Islamic brotherhood in only three years after the death of their prophet, and were engaged in wars amongst themselves, employed his genius by promising the nomadic Arabs of the desert two options: if they, instead of killing each other, followed him in wars to expand Islam, and were victorious, they would divide the war loots, including girls and women. If, on the other hand, they got killed, they would be considered a martyr in the path of Allah, thus entering Paradise and enjoying all the heavenly blessings, including lots of women! It is said that when Bedouin Arabs captured the Sassanid palace and saw all that wealth, food, wine, they thought they had been killed and were already in Paradise! After realizing that they had captured the earthly paradise, they cut the gem-studded Baharestan Persian rug (as big as a football field) into pieces with their daggers and took them as their loot.

If you wish to find out a little bit about the killings, savagery, tyranny and oppression committed by Arabs on Persians, try to read an uncensored version (published before the Islamic revolution of 1979) of *Do Qarn Sokut* (*Two Centuries of Silence*) دو قرن سکوت, written by Abdolhossein Zarrinkoub. I hope after reading it, you would refrain from cursing me!

By the way, I remember about 65 years ago when I was in elementary school, it was written in our books that prophet Mohammad ended the era of ignorance, جاهلیت. This was written in a way that I, as a schoolboy, thought that the entire world had been in the dark ages of ignorance. Later on, when I was made aware of the humanistic culture of Cyrus the Great and my good-thinking ancestors, the Greek, Roman, Indian, Chinese, Japanese... cultures all of which had flourished thousands of years before Islam, I realized how childish and unwise my understanding had been!

The unfortunate thing is that some Persians became slavish servants of the invading Arabs, and helped the desert people who hadn't even dreamt of running an empire. The result was creation of an Islamic empire that expended through Europe all the way to the gates of Vienna in the north, and North Africa through Morocco, and Spain and Portugal in southwest Europe. It has been claimed that this period of time developed into an Islamic golden age. Nothing could be farther from the truth! I had the honor of having taken a course at Pahlavi University with Richard

N. Frye, Professor Emeritus of Iranian Studies at Harvard University. He, who had willed to be buried in Iran, the country he loved, had written and kept saying that if one takes the contributions of greater Iran (Iranian plateau including Armenia, Azarbaijan, present Iran, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, parts of India and China) out of the Islamic civilization, what remains would be less than 5 percent!

The Taherids/Taherian, who were Persian Dehghans/Dehqans in Khorasan area, established the first Persian independent dynasty after the Arab conquest in most of present Iranian, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan territories. They were in power for about 52 years. Iran was revived by the Taherids.

Yaqub Laith Saffar یعقوب لیث صفار meaning coppersmith, took control of Sistan, present Afghanistan, Kerman and Shiraz, and later on, defeated the Taherids in Khorasan. He declared Persian as the official language of Iran. Yaqub, who by scholars' consensus was very smart and very brave, twice attempted to overthrow the Bani Abbas Islamic dynasty, but on his second attempt, having taken Khuzestan province, suddenly fell ill and passed away in Gondishapour. Saffarids were in power for about 135 years and caused the Persian culture and language to flourish again.

The Samanids سامانیان established another Persian dynasty and ruled for 130 years in today's large parts of Iran, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and parts of Kazakhstan and Pakistan. They, too, supported Persian language. The Samanid court was a supporter of notables such as Avicenna ابن سینا یا پورسینا (a genius in medicine and astronomy whose works were taught for centuries in European universities) and Mohammad Zakaria Razi (Rhazes/Al-Razi) محمد زکریای رازی (Razi means from the city of Rey, south of Tehran) a physician, chemist and philosopher who discovered alcohol.

Daylamites دیلمیان (from Daylam on the southwest coast of the Caspian Sea) who were divided into Buyid (آل بویه) and Ziyarid (آل زیار یا زیاری) ruled in central, western, southern Iran and Iraq for about 121 years. The situation of the Caliphate in Baghdad had deteriorated so much that it changed hands five times in 14 years! Caliph Mostakfi/Mustakfi, who could no longer tolerate his Turkish guards, asked Ali Buyeh for help. Ali sent his own brother Ahmad, who had recently invaded Ahvaz, to help. The Caliph of Islam was so excited that Ahmad was named the commander in chief. A month later, Ahmad ordered the Caliph to be dragged to his presence. He ordered the humiliated Caliph of all Moslems to be thrown into jail. The Caliph's replacement was someone named al-Muti lillah مطیع لله, meaning obedient to Allah, who was truly obedient to Ahmad! To emphasize on their Persian roots, the Buyid kings used to call themselves *Shahanshah*, king of kings.

The next Persian dynasty was the Ghaznavids, who were of Turkic origin. They ruled for 224 years on today's eastern parts of Tehran, Esfahan, Bandar Abbas, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan. The most famous ruler was Soltan Mahmoud, who, despite the fact that he had limited knowledge of Persian language, collected scholars, writers and poets in his court sometimes forcibly and even by kidnapping! Our own Ferdowsi, who had spent 30 years composing the epic *Shahnameh*, had to escape the Soltan's court!

The Turco-Persian Saljuq Empire was founded when Tughril/Toghrol defeated Mahmoud Ghaznavi. At the height of their power, they had today's Iran, a large part of Turkey, Syria, Armenia, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan under their rule. They, too, opted Persian as their official language. Their rule extended for about 157 years.

The great grandfather of the founder of Khwarazmian or Kharazmshahian dynasty was a slave who was purchased by the Saljuqs in the Khorasan area, but through demonstrating immense talent and quality, was able to ultimately bring the Khwarazm area under his rule. Kharazmshahian had almost all of present day's Iran, half of Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan for about 160 years. Perhaps it could be opined that the biggest mistake or miscalculation in the history of Iran, aside from Khosrow Parviz' stupidity, vis a vis Arabs, was committed by

Mohammad Kharazmshah, which led to the defeat and destruction of Iran by the Mongols. As far as we know, the ruler of Otrar or Farab *فأراب*, a city in today's Kazakhstan, ordered a caravan of Mongolian tradesmen and Genghis/Changiz *چنگیز* envoy executed as spies. Changiz Khan sent representatives to Mohammad Kharazmshah's court, demanding the mayor be punished. Mohammad, who looked down on Changiz Khan, undiplomatically and out of sheer foolishness, killed his envoy. It was then that the floodgate of Mongol wrath was opened on Iran and killed and destroyed everyone and everything in its path. The only consolation for Persian ever since this destruction is that Mohammad's son, Jalaaladdin, defended his country against the Mongols, sacrificing his life for Iran.

Mongols continued their land grab to the point that the Mongol Empire, at its height, became the vastest empire in the history of mankind (25% of the entire world), extending from China, Korea and Vietnam in the east to Russia (including Moscow) Hungary and Poland in Eastern Europe, as well as the entire Middle East. The reign of Mongols in various territories was about 162 years.

It is interesting to note that Hulago Khan *هلاکو خان*, the grandson of Changiz, on the advice of Nasir al-Din Tusi *خواجه نصیرالدین توسی*, a Persian polymath and scientist, captured Baghdad, the seat of the Islamic Caliphate. However, since people had been indoctrinated to believe that the Caliph is Allah's representative, and shedding his blood would cause heavenly calamity, per Tusi's suggestion, Calif Mutasim bi'llah *معتصم بالله*, whose name means the one who hangs on to Allah, was wrapped into a Felt rug *نمد* and beaten repeatedly to see if a calamity would befall. They kept beating him, but there was no earthquake, no flooding, no thunder, and no fire. The poor creature, the Caliph, who was discovered not clung to Allah, passed away.

Also noteworthy is the fact that the Mongols who had no religion, never put artisans, writers, philosophers, intellectuals and people under any religious pressure or censorship. That is why it is said that despite the bloodshed and destruction, the Mongol era was the period of freethinking and creativity—in a sense, a renaissance. Alas, some Iranians introduced Ghazan Khan to Islam, and the dark clouds of dogma, restriction and repression gradually covered the skies.

Allow me to mention another point that shows how political, military and economic events in the world affect all developing countries, including Iran. It would be prudent to always take into consideration the impact of these events in the world on Iran. In mid fourteenth century, and at the end of the Mongol Ilkhanin/Ilkhanate dynasty, the city of Tabriz in Iran had replaced the economic hub, populous port of Constantinople, present day's Istanbul. Why? Because the Ottoman Empire was growing larger by the day, and their constant wars for conquest in various lands had resulted in the blockade of the port by enemies, having a negative impact on trade. Tradesmen alternatively selected Tabriz as a new economic hub. So, you see events shaping outside of Iran impacting the country, albeit positively in this case.

The Mongol era, as any other era, ended due to corruption and discord among the leaders, and Timur/TaimurTamaerlan/ Gurkani *تیمور لنگ گورخانی*, a Turco-Mongol Persianate, founded the Timurid dynasty that lasted more than 131 years.

Then was the turn for Esmail Safavi *اسماعیل صفوی*, believed to be of Kurdish ancestry, whose mother, Martha, was Greek. With the help of seven clans of Kurdish, Lur, Turk, Talsehi, Turkman and Persian origin, who were called Qezelbash *قزلباش* (Red-Head, red headgear), all followers of the Sufi order, declared himself king, and in 15 years extended Persian borders from Syria in the west to Sind River in the east, and from Caucuses to the Persian Gulf.

The Ottoman Empire (at its height had territories from near Austria in the north and from Egypt to Sudan, Ethiopia, and Algeria in Africa, and present day's Saudi Arabia and Yemen under its control), kept attacking Persian lands. The Safavids, in order to have people defend the homeland against the Ottoman Sunnis with religious zeal, ordered Persians to convert to Shi'ism. It is said that the Qezelbash would kill anybody who, as a declaration of being Shi'i,

failed to curse Abu Bakr, Omar and Osman. Despite explicit order in the Koran that says: “All believers are brothers” (Sūra al-Ḥujurāt/10 سورة الحجرات) (my apologies to women, as they are not taken into consideration in here!), destructive and bloody wars and killings between Sunnis of the Ottoman Empire and the Shi’ites of the Persian Empire lasted for some 300 years!

Here, we notice another case of the impact of international affairs impacting Iran. A trade shipping route is established by a Portuguese mariner, Vasco da Gama, by rounding a cape in south of Africa. The king of Portugal, hoping for lucrative trade with India and countries in the east, calls it Cape of Good Hope. The Portuguese established a series of fortified posts from Africa to India and China. The British, who see the route is exclusively under the Portuguese control, strike a deal with Ivan the Terrible, czar of Russia, forming Muskovi Company, to establish a northern route. It is for this reason that for the first time in history, a British representative of this company called Anthony Jenkins, went to visit Shah Tahmasb I. It is said that fanatic Tahmasb, who did not want to have anything to do with any “infidel”, ordered the courtiers to cleanse the infidel’s walking trace to the court with ash! The British, who were already aware of the spread of superstition and dominance of the clergy over the affairs of the country, through their insidious cunning devised a plot in their colonialism by promoting superstition and fostering covert friendship with the clergy. And it was from this point in history that the real misfortune of Iran started. It is said and believed that later on, British spies who had learned Persian and Arabic languages, gradually robed as clergy, and in order to deceive illiterate and ignorant people, would have a premeditated plan for someone from the audience to shout that the clergy is a fake. Then, the same person would insist that the accused clergy should throw his turban into the fire in the presence of the audience to prove that he is a true mullah! The British spy, having made his turban of fireproof fabric, after some initial reluctance, would throw it into the fire, thus making people his true believers and followers!

In Safavid era, two factors led to increased contacts between Iran and the western world. Keep in mind that these contacts were between the rulers, not the people. Due to complete control of the mullahs on the population and spread of superstition and ignorance caused by religious dogma, ordinary people would never even fathom to be in contact with the progressive world in order to find out about new inventions and development in scientific, medical, economic or cultural arenas. The first reason for contact of the Safavid rulers with the west was their antagonism against the Ottoman Empire. Europeans shared the same enmity against the Ottomans. The first person to try to establish contacts with the west was Shah Abbas. He sent several delegations to the European courts. Several large Persian rugs that he had gifted to the European leaders can be seen today at the San Marco Museum, *Museo di San Marco*, in Venice. Shah Abbas suggestion for a simultaneous attack by Persians and Europeans on Ottomans fell on deaf ears. The second factor was that the sixteenth century was the beginning of the era of exploration by Europeans looking for trade routes outside of the Mediterranean. The Portuguese, who exported spices from India, occupied places on Qeshm and Hormoz islands as well as Gambroon/ Gabroon/Gabran گبران (later Bandar Abbas), Masqat and Bahrain. Shah Ismail, who didn’t want to fight the Portuguese, the most powerful empire controlling even parts of Indo-China, signed a trade and military agreement with them (against the Ottomans), and thus the gate was opened to Portuguese as well as the Spanish in later years.

108 years later, Shah Abbas signed an agreement with The British East India Company. At its height, this company had half of the entire world’s trade, from cotton and silk to opium and slave trade. It is also considered the cornerstone of the British Empire. It had total control over the government, lives and fate of the people in the subcontinent of India, which included today’s Pakistan. Pakistan was carved out of India several centuries later, in 1947, and was replaced as Iran’s neighbor. Six years after the agreement with the British East India Company, Persian forces demonstrating heroism and bravery, with the help of the British Navy, defeated the Portuguese and kicked them out the Persian Gulf. Shah Abbas had a new port built next to Gabran, named Bandar Abbas, *Port Abbas*.

Thus, the British found a way to Iran through this port, and trade was established through branches of British companies in the cities of Shiraz and Esfahan.

By the way, my dear friend, let us strive to make non-Iranians understand that they need to write and pronounce some famous Iranian names properly. The straight to the Persian Gulf should be written as Hormoz, not Hormuz. Not a single Iranian pronounces it as Hormuz! As nobody spells or pronounces New York as New Yerk, we can justifiably ask non-Iranians to spell and pronounce Esfahan (as in establish, Escondido), Kerman (as in Kermit, Kerry), not Kirman, which has a derogatory connotation Persian language! Let's ask international entities, such as the United Nations, as well as governments and media such as CNN, Fox, BBC, etc. to spell and pronounce these names properly.

My apologies for digressing a little bit!

In Safavid era the clergy influence—such as spread of self-flagellation with chains and daggers and chest-beating rituals (believed to have roots in the Christian Dark Ages), and divination استخاره instead of logically thinking and planning—spread like cancer throughout the royal court and the country to the point that when the superstitious Shah Soltan Hossein found out that Mahmoud the Afghan (Hootaki محمود هوتکی) had reached the gates of the capital city, he called the clergy to let him know through divination whether he should defend the country! And since the answer was negative, the coward king declared that it was Allah's will for the Afghan to overthrow and replace the Safavid emperor!

Allow me to site a few good and bad, but informative points. Safavid appointed rulers in Afghanistan treated local people so horribly that Mohammad Hashem Asef, author of Rostamoltavarikh رستم التواریخ, writes that no resident of Kabul and Kandahar, neither woman, nor man was spared of being raped by the Qezelbash!

نگاده زن و دختر نامدار	قزلباش نهاد در قندهار
زن و دختر و امرد کابلی	زهرسو قزلباش گاد از یلی
برآمد زهرسو ز افغان فغان	ز جور قزلباش خواهان امان

The second point, a positive one, is about a Persian lioness who was born to a family that had escaped the Safavid oppression to India, taking residence close to Kandahar. She was called Merolnesa مهرالنسا, and was later renamed Nur Jahan نورجهان after marrying Jahangir Shah, India's emperor. Per Shah Jahan, Nur Jahan evolved into an astute advisor, skillful hunter, great diplomat, and great advocate of arts and culture, who alongside her husband, ruled the country.

One of the folktales still recounted by Indians has it that when the emperor was captured in a war, it was Nur Jahan who gallantly commanded an army of warriors that defeated the enemy and liberated her husband!



Source: Wikipedia

It is important to note that after the passing of Shah Abbas, the Safavid kings' power and control over Persia started eroding. This encouraged the Russians and Ottomans to resume their attacks on Iran. At the same time, the trade through the Persian Gulf, which had flourished for quite some time, stagnated due to incapability of the weak Safavid kings in keeping the trade routes safe. Even the Dutch abandoned their lucrative trade business in the area and moved to the Far East. Lack of trade led to a huge loss of revenues for Iran.

Sometime after the shameful defeat of Shah Soltan Hossein, his son, Tahmasb II, with the help of Nader Gholi, attempted to bring the country back together. Nader, whose intrepidity, heroism and military genius earned him

the title of Iran's Napoleon, was at war against the Afghans and Uzbeks on the eastern front when the Ottomans started a pre-planned attack on the west. Tahmasb II was defeated, lost all the territory that Nader had conquered in the previous year, and signed a humiliating peace treaty with them giving up sovereignty of five cities in the Caucasus to the Ottomans. Nader revolted against Tahmasb for signing the treaty and chose his infant son Abbas III as king, with himself as regent. During the next three years, Nader defeated the Ottomans in the west, forced Russians to withdraw from the northern territories and liberated eastern Iran from the invading Afghans. In 1736 the infant shah died, and Nader assumed the throne as Nader Shah Afshar and was crowned in the plain of Moghan in Azarbaijan, northwest of Iran. During the next 11 years, his main task was to retake the territories lost by later Safavids and further to expand the empire. Additionally, he strived to end fratricide among Sunnis and Shi'as and rid Iran of the clergy, fanaticism and superstition.

The assassination of Nader Shah led to 12 years of warfare among the many claimants to the vacant throne. The victor was Karim Khan, the head of the Kurdish Zand tribe, who ruled Iran with kindness for 21 years. Instead of calling himself shah or emperor, he preferred the title of "Advocate of the Peasants." Karim Khan, rather than killing the son of his bitterest enemy, kept the castrated Agha Mohammad Qajar, as an honored guest in his house for many years. Upon Karim Khan's untimely death, this same conniving, brutal, stingy and anti-social person fled Shiraz, and after seventeen years of warfare, crowned himself in Tehran as the founder of Qajar dynasty in 1795.

Perhaps it can be stated that Agha Mohammad Khan may be considered as the last Persian emperor, as upon his assassination, other Qajar kings, who instead of tending the affairs of the country, getting abreast of the world's scientific, cultural, economic progress as well as the colonial plots of Britain, Russia, and France, spent most of their time on their numerous concubines and dogmatism and fanaticism inherited from the Safavid era. This decay and corruption led to the loss of expansive territories such as Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, today's Pakistan, Caucuses, Georgia, Armenia and Azarbaijan, in various wars. In other words, the shame, ignominy and mortification of the fall of the Persian Empire was registered during the 129 years of the Qajar dynasty.

I wish to suggest that if the Safavids had encouraged freedom of thought rather than suffocation of the Persian spirit with religious dogma, and if the brightness of the reign of Shah Abbas had been the beginning of an era of excellence rather than the end of intellectual ferment which had ushered in the Persian renaissance, then the nearly two centuries of relationship with the European countries would have produced leaders who were at least aware of the tremendous movements that had rejuvenated the western world and were able to empower Iran relatively so that she could protect herself in the world political chess. But unfortunately, the main seed sown by the Safavids was religious fanaticism, and the main crop harvested was superstition and ignorance. The following demonstrates what I mean:

Mehdiqoli Hedayat (Mokhberolsaltaneh مخرالسلطنه) in his book *Khaateraata va Khataaraata* خاطرات و خطرات, *Memories & Dangers*, writes that he was visiting Abutaleb Sadrolzakerin, one of Tehran's most famous mullahs. He saw a young woman there pleading to the clergy to get her rid of the jinn جن that had possessed her! He let his hand in her blouse, moving from one breast to another, up and down, pretending he was trying to catch the jinn. He kept telling the gullible young woman that her jinn was a son of a bitch who kept evading him. After a long time, he finally pretended that he had captured the jinn, threw it into a bottle and capped it. The woman thanked and left him a gold coin. Hedayat asks him, "What kind of charlatanism and trickery is this?" The clergy responds, "These people are all possessed by jinns. Some of them go to you, statemen, and some come to me. I will not let you enjoy them all!"

It is said that the debauchery got so bad that Fath-Ali Shah, the successor of Agha Mohammad Khan, instead of running the country, got so many wives and temporary wives and concubines that 2000 people claimed to be his

children! In Article 3 of the treaty that this devout Moslem king wanted the leader of France to sign between the two countries, he requested Napoleon (the infidel) to religiously testify that Georgia was the Halal and inherited territory of Fath-Ali Shah! Two months later, Napoleon, defeated by the Russians, signed a treaty per which the Russians gobbled up Georgia, the certified Halal loaf of a territory, and drank a glass of vodka on top of it!

The only person of the entire Qajar dynasty that is left with a good reputation is Abbas Mirza, Fath-Ali Shah's son and his crown prince, who demonstrated immense courage and heroism in wars against Russia and The Ottoman Empire. Unfortunately, his father supported him neither financially, nor militarily. As a result, Iran was dealt a huge defeat in the second war against Russia as a result of the horrible and shameful treaty of Turkmenchai, signed in 1828. Fath-Ali Shah, whose name means *the victor*, not only did not have any victory anywhere, but also lost a total of 250,000 square kilometers of Iranian territories, 120,000 square kilometers of the Caspian Sea area and 120,000 square kilometers of land on the Black Sea. The most ominous part is Article 4 that gives a right to Russia to support the Qajar crown princes, whenever necessary, so that no foreigner could interfere in Iranian affairs. The old British fox that didn't want to be left behind, declared his support in this regard. Thus, from then on, a total of five crown princes were escorted from Tabriz to Tehran by the Russian and British forces, and Iran came practically under these two country's controls. It is abundantly clear that anybody who wanted to be counted in any way would become either Russophile, or Anglophile. This also applied to the court of Qajar, as well.

In Volume 4 of a book entitled *Rejaal-e Iran* رجال ایران , *Iran's Statemen*, there is a quote attributed to Etemadolsaltaneh, a high-ranking person and confidant to Naseroddin Shah Qajar that reads: "...went to visit Zelolsoltan ظل السلطان (one of Nasseroddin Shah's sons). The prince made a strange statement that shocked me. I wasn't supposed to hear such a statement from the son of a Persian king. He said, 'very soon, the country of Iran will be divided into three parts, and with the support of the British, with whom I have a close friendship, I will be given one major part.' Territories under the rule and control of Zelolsoltan were per British insinuation, discretion and support; and territories under the rule and control of Kamran Mirza, Nasseroddin's other son and crown prince, was per Russia's wish."

Napoleon's ambassador to Iran, Jaubert, has quoted a statement from Abbas Mirza that confirms what I have previously offered. Jaubert writes: Abbas Mirza asked me: 'I don't know what power it is that has made you dominant over us, what causes our weakness and your progress? You are skillful in fighting and conquering as well as utilization of brainpower, whereas we are drowned in ignorance, corruption and sedition, and rarely ponder the future.'


Perhaps we should utilize our brainpower instead of emotion, corruption and sedition.

Fath-Ali Shah, shortly after his son, Abbas Mirza succumbed to illness in Mashhad, passed away, and Abbas Mirza's son was crowned as Mohammad Shah. He was under the thumb of Russia. He, who proved to be as narrow-minded, superstitious and incompetent as his grandfather, in a deal with the Ottomans, gave up the city of Soleimani in today's Iraq in return for them to stop claiming ownership on the Arvandrood river, Mohammareh (Khorramshahr) and the Abadan island!

Nasseroddin Shah, who would take loans against the country to cover his expensive trips to Europe, instead of paying attention to the technological economic and cultural advances, would show interest to the short skirts of ballet dancers and order his numerous wives and concubines to wear the same type of skirt, shaliteh شلیته, in his court! His son, Mozaffareddin Shah, also made three costly trips to Europe with a huge entourage under the disguise of getting medical attention. His Prime Minister, Aminolsoltan, امین السلطان within a period of two years, took two loans from Russia with horrible terms—a detriment effect on the country's stagnant economy.

Yet another calamity befalling Iran was that, per Professor Peter Avery in the Cambridge History of Iran, "...the British, alarmed at the growth of Russian influence, gave some money to the leading members of the 'ulama' in Tehran and in the shrine cities of Iraq to help arouse activity against the Russian-favoured trade agreement." I don't know why I am suddenly reminded from my childhood a prevalent expression among many people: if you lift the clergy's beard, you will notice it is written, "Made in England."

Since admission by the British government of making payments to Iranian and Iraqi clerics for the purpose of instigating opposition of the Iranian people against the Russians is of importance, especially in light of the fact that it is made by a British professor in a series of publications by Cambridge University Press, I reproduce page 200 of this book for your review. I am also including the inside cover of the book with all the pertinent information, along with Professor Avery's own handwritten dedication to me: "With warm regards, Peter Avery, 16 Jan. 98."



Payments to clerics by Britain

IRAN UNDER THE LATER QĀJĀRS, 1848–1922

One of Amīn al-Daula's projects was to invite in some Belgian customs administrators to reorganize the customs, which had been farmed out region by region, resulting in customs farmers underbidding each other, below the already low 5% limit, in order to attract trade, and also in farmers collecting far more than they paid in. The Belgian experiment was extended under Amīn al-Sulṭān, and the leader of the Belgians, Naus, was made Minister of Customs. This resulted in an increase in efficiency and collection, but also widespread complaints by Iranian merchants that they were discriminated against in favour of foreigners, particularly the Russians, with whom the Belgians had close relations. The exact validity of these charges is unclear, but it is clear that many Iranian merchants had now to pay more than formerly, and that they blamed this on the Shah, the prime minister, and the presence of foreigners. Naus's influence soon extended far beyond customs, and he became *de facto* Minister of Finance.

In order to pay for the foreign trips recommended by the Shah's doctors, Amīn al-Sulṭān floated two large loans from Russia, in 1900 and 1902. The first loan required Iran to pay off its British debts and not to incur any other debts without Russian consent, while the second one included major economic concessions. The Russians also insisted on a new customs treaty, which was signed in 1902, and gave key Russian goods lower rates than the already low 5% *ad valorem*. The income gained from the loans and from customs reform was not used productively, and went largely for the three extravagantly expensive trips to Europe which the Shah and his entourage took between 1900 and 1905.

Meanwhile, discontent with the government was becoming organized once again. Secret oppositional societies became active in Tehran and elsewhere, and distributed inflammatory leaflets, called *shabnāmas* (night letters) because of their night-time distribution, against the government in 1900 and 1901. Some members of the societies were afterwards discovered and arrested. A new coalition among some of the leading ʿulamā, courtiers, and secular progressives began to focus on the dismissal of Amīn al-Sulṭān, who was seen as responsible for the alarming growth of loans and concessions to the Russians that were leading to Russian control of Iran. Even the British, alarmed at the growth of Russian influence, gave some money and encouragement to leading members of the ʿulamā in Tehran and in the shrine cities of Iraq to help arouse activity against the Russian-favoured trade agreement. This opposition movement also called for the removal of Belgian customs officials and closure of newly established modern schools. These agitations were accompanied by an outburst of anti-foreign and anti-minority feelings in a few cities, instigated by some of the ʿulamā. Chief among these were the anti-Bahāʿī riots of the summer of 1905

To provide proof of the meddling of the British in every aspect of affairs in Iran, allow me to quote from a book authored by my great grandfather, Shokrollah Sanandaji (Fakhrolkottab) (فخرالکتاب) شکرالله سنندجی, written in 1900 and published by Dr. Heshmatollah Tabibi in 1987. He writes of a Kurdish Shaikh, clergy, by the name Abidollah, who rebelled by claiming that his father's spirit had told him to "get out and gather all the tribes' people together, take over the crown in Iran and completely uproot the Rafezis (Shi'i people)." The shaikh spreads leaflets everywhere encouraging the tribesmen to rise in Jihad, holy war, stating that the previous shaikh (his father) "has orally made the killing of the Shi'i people permissible, and has promised governance as well as Paradise." He gathers a lot of followers and takes several villages and towns including Savojbolagh ساوجبلاغ (Mahabad) and Miandoab میاندوآب and intended to mount an attack on Orumieh. The British consul, who happened to be the shaikh's advisor, suddenly enters the meeting of the elders of Orumieh and advises them: "Defending the city and fighting against the shaikh is not prudent. You'd better surrender and thus protect yourselves from the consequences of fighting against him!" Then, he goes to meet with Monsieur Emanuel Golzar, the Bishop of Orumieh Catholics, advising him to "take the Catholics out of the city, or raise British flags on top of their houses to become immune from the impending attack." He opined that pretty soon Orumieh will fall to the shaikh's control as Miandoab did. The Bishop tells him: "You'd better, instead of encouraging people to surrender, and worrying about the Armenians, discourage the shaikh from following up this corrupt dream...and not murder innocent people."

We are now getting to the point of reviewing the declassified British documents that I have obtained from the UK National Archives. It should be noted that in 19th and early 20th centuries, they used to refer to ambassadors *Minister Plenipotentiary*. They also used the term Legation for embassy. However, for the sake of simplicity, we will call them ambassador and embassy. The first document is parts of a letter from the newly arrived secretary at the British embassy where he shares his observations with a colleague/friend named Francis. He writes about the sad situation in Iran at the time, the barelegged guard, and the plague that is being ignored by the central government... This becomes more depressing when we see evidence of not only paved streets in San Diego, California, but concrete sidewalks in 1886 and 1896!

copy.

*Amid
Aug 8/99
J.R.*

153


T E H R A N.
June 27th, 1899.

My dear Francis:-

I hope you are enjoying yourself. I suppose you are too hard worked to enjoy yourself or the reverse. This place is quite the queerest I have come across yet in my experience. Since I have come here the Legation in Tehran has been twice attacked by burglars. Our guard (a set of bare legged ragamuffins who in default of pay live on the fruit of Lady Durand's kitchen garden) let off their rifles under our windows: I suppose to show they are awake: the Russian bank has been

robbed

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Sidewalk concrete in San Diego, California

Another revealing, depressing and frustrating issue is the corruption of Iranian statesmen in the Qajar era observed by the French ambassador, Count Joseph Arthur de Gobineau. In his book, *Three years in Persia*, he writes: "Prior to going to Iran, I had obtained a book entitled *Haji Baba of Esfahan*. I read that during the reign of Fath-Ali Shah, the British ambassador had brought some potatoes as a gift for the Persian government, stating that, "Should you cultivate this plant in Persia, you will never have famine, as it is easy to farm, produces a lot and can be used as a replacement for bread." The Prime Minister, Mirza Shafi Mazandarani, before accepting the potatoes, asked the ambassador: "How much are you willing to pay me to order it cultivated throughout the country?"

Gobineau writes: At the time I had not been to Persia yet, and I was shocked as to how is it that the prime minister of a great country such as Persia asks for a bribe in order to order cultivation of a crop that would benefit the entire population of his nation. But now, since I have been living for some time here, I think that story was true. It is impossible for you to be dealing with a government employee and get anything done without paying a bribe.

Mehdi Bamdad in his book, *The Persian Statesmen*, quotes from Etemadsaltaneh, who was Naseroddin Shah's interpreter and accompanied him on his trips to Europe: "The shah's conversations with the ministers is about nothing but cash and materials, and Persian government's politics is exclusively related to money, amassing assets and compiling materials, and nothing else."

Superintendency of the Armory was bestowed upon the shah's special adjutant in return for 15,000 tomans a year!

The shah gave headship of artillery to Eghbalolsaltaneh in return for 5,000 tomans.

The title of 'Eghbalolmolk' was given to Mirza Mohammad Mostofi Nezam, who has recently been appointed as the governor of Kordestan after gifting 500 tomans.

Upon gifting 500 tomans, Mohammad Ebrahim Memarbashi, received the title of 'Vazir Nezam' from the shah.

Mohammad Mostofi Qavamoldoleh, son of Mohammad Taqi Qavamoldoleh, in 1858 gave a huge gift to the shah, and was appointed, for the second time, as the governor of Khorasan to replace Hesamolsaltaneh.

Masoud Mirza a.k.a. Zellolsoltan (shah's shadow), Naseroddin Shah's eldest son (from a temporary wife) offered to gift the shah 1,000,000 tomans to replace him with his other son, Mozaffareddin, who was from a permanent wife, as the crown prince. The shah informs his crown prince in Tabriz of the offer in a letter, perhaps with the hope of getting a bigger offer from his crown prince!

The following document, classified as 'Secret,' is from the minutes of the 10th meeting of the War Cabinet's Easter Committee, held on May 28, 1918 at 3:15 P.M. It has a list of attendees under the chairmanship of Lord Curzon, the Foreign Minister.

I have chosen the upper portion of the first page that includes all the attendees' names, and a portion of page 7 that talks about the decision made by the Committee to pay Ahmad Shah a bribe to appoint Vossughed-Dowleh Prime Minister! They haggle about the amount by offering 15,000 tomans instead of 20,000, and of course, Sir Charles Marling said that "he had given the shah to understand that we would not submit to blackmail."

Minutes of the War Cabinet, payments made to Ahmad Shah

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

Printed for the War Cabinet. June 1918.

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SECRET.

E.C. 10th Minutes.

WAR CABINET.

EASTERN COMMITTEE.

*Minutes of a Meeting held in Lord Curzon's Room at the Privy Council Office on
Tuesday, May 28, 1918, at 3.15 P.M.*

Present:

The Right Hon. the EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.
(in the Chair).

Lieutenant-General the Right Hon. J.C. SMUTS, K.C.

The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, O.M., M.P.,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. the LORD HARDINGE OF
PENSHURST, K.G., P.C., G.C.B., G.C.S.I.,
G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O., I.S.O.,
Permanent Under-Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs.

SIR MARK SYKES, Bt., M.P., Foreign
Office.

The Right Hon. E. S. MONTAGU, M.P.,
Secretary of State for India (for
Minutes 1 and 2).

Mr. J. E. STURCKBUSH, India Office.

General SIR H. EL WILSON, K.C.B.,
K.C.M.G., D.S.O., Chief of the Imperial
General Staff (for Minutes 1 and 2).

Major-General SIR G. M. W. MACDONALD,
K.C.M.G., C.B., Director of Military
Intelligence.

Also attended:

The Right Hon. LORD ROBERT CECIL, K.C., M.P., Minister of Blockade
(for Minutes 1 and 2).


Mr. H. W. KENNARD, Foreign Office.

Mr. J. M. KEYNES, Treasury.

Lieutenant-Colonel L. STONE, Secretary.

Circulation of
Papers.

1. The Chairman said that telegrams and papers for consideration by the Committee emanated from three Departments: the Foreign Office, the India Office, and the War Office. These papers had hitherto been circulated to members in one file, and had not been arranged by subjects, but merely in chronological order. He proposed that in future all papers, before circulation, should as far as possible be grouped together in accordance with their subject headings for convenience of reference. Some difficulty arose from the fact that frequently a flood of important telegrams was received during the twenty-four hours immediately preceding a meeting. He trusted that the new procedure would succeed in coping with these drawbacks, and hoped that the Departments concerned would send to



Ahmad Shah

Ahmad Shah was an excessive money-grubber. The British ambassador in Persia, Sir Percy Cox, in a telegram sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on June 8, 1920, writes: Vossughed-Dowleh said that no matter on what point his conversation with Ahmad Shah starts, it always ends on one specific point, meaning provision of funds the shah wants. The shah, in the most recent audience inquired as to why required funds were not sent to him when he was in Europe. The amounts that his majesty demands from the government include:

- 1,000,000 Francs that he had spent from his personal account,
- 8,000 Liras that he had borrowed from Nosratoldoleh prior to his trip,
- 50,000 tomans in cash that he had with Tomanians,

- but the money exchanger is unable to repay due to bankruptcy!

The king expects his destitute subjects to pay for his partying, womanizing and wining and dining in Europe. Additionally, he deposits funds with a money exchanger, perhaps for gaining interest, and when the man goes bankrupt, he wants the people, who had nothing to do with his transaction, to pay for it!

The ambassador continues in his telegram: ... Shah's behavior shows that even trips to Europe and seeing the behavior and manner of European kings hasn't had the smallest effect on changing his worst trait, which is his excessive money worshipping!

Below are two photos of Ahmad Shah's favorite place in France. One is Hotel Royal Barrier in the city of Deauville in northwest France, and the other depicts the beach city of Biarritz, located in southwest France. The third photo shows Sir Percy Cox standing with Farmanfarma and Qavam.



Royal Barrier Hotel in Deauville, northwest France



Beach city of Biarritz in southwest France



Iranian Historical Photographs Gallery : www.touman.com

Percy Cox, Qavam, Farmanfarma

British payments to Bakhtiari

What is unfortunate is that, based on the UK National Archives' documents, many of other statemen, including Sardar Zaffar Bakhtiari, Farmanfarma and Qavam, demanded and received monthly payment from Britain not only for themselves while in Iran, or in exile, but also for their surviving family members in case of their death!

Bakhtiari
Subsidies to Ilkhani and Ilbegi.

9. With reference to Minute 3 of the Second Meeting, Lord Hardinge drew attention to Sir C. Marling's telegrams No. 335 (E.C.-186) and No. 434 (E.C.-368) regarding the arrangements to be made for the Ilkhani and Ilbegi. In the latter telegram, Sir C. Marling had pressed for an early decision on the question raised in his former despatch regarding the subsidy to be paid to the heads of the aforesaid clans. He notified the provisional arrangement to be

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that Sirdar Zaffar should receive 1,500 tomans a month from the 30th April until the end of the war, provided that he remained Ilkhani and conformed to our wishes in every way. The said arrangement also comprised the payment of a lump sum of 6,000 tomans to the Ilkhani and Ilbegi jointly next autumn in return for an undertaking on their part to check enemy intrigue and to expel hostile agents.

Mr. Keynes having intimated the acquiescence of the Treasury in this provisional agreement,

It was decided—

To authorise the above payments.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.,
May 29, 1918.

The next document is related to Farmanfarma and Qavam's (Kawam/Ghavam). It is the minutes of yet another War Cabinet, Eastern Committee meeting that took place on June 21, 1918 at 3 P.M. I found some of discussions among the Committee members interesting, therefore, the entire document is in front of your eyes.

British payments to Farmanfarma and Qavam

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.] Mr. Barnes.

Printed for the War Cabinet. June 1918.

SECRET.
E.C. 15th Minutes.

6

WAR CABINET.

EASTERN COMMITTEE.

Minutes of a Meeting held in Lord Curzon's Room at the Privy Council Office on Friday, June 21, 1918, at 3 P.M.

Present :

The Right Hon. the EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.
(in the Chair).

- | | |
|--|--|
| Lieutenant-General the Right Hon. J. C. SMUTS, K.C. | Mr. L. OLIPHANT, C.M.G., Foreign Office. |
| The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, O.M., M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. | The Right Hon. E. S. MONTAGU, M.P., Secretary of State for India. |
| The Right Hon. the LORD HARDINGE OF PENSHURST, K.G., P.C., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O., I.S.O., Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. | Mr. J. E. SHUCKBURGH, India Office.
Major-General SIR G. M. W. MACDONOGH, K.C.M.G., C.B., Director of Military Intelligence (representing the Chief of the Imperial General Staff). |

Also attended :

Mr. J. M. KEYNES, Treasury.

Lieutenant-Colonel L. STORR, Secretary.

Our Liabilities in Persia.

Payments to Firman Firma and the Kawam.

1. The Chairman said Sir C. Marling had telegraphed on the 16th June (E.C.-564) that our consul at Shiraz had received a letter from Firman Firma, making the following requests :—

- (a.) That the British Government should pay him compensation at the rate of 40,000L. a year for losses sustained owing to non-collection of revenue for the last three years from estates belonging to him and his five elder sons ;
- (b.) Will guarantee them that revenue as long as troubles continue ;
- (c.) Will guarantee the lives, honour, and their free enjoyment of property to himself and his family ;
- (d.) That in the event of his having to flee the country, and loss of his estates, the British Government will grant him property in British territory and private income equal to that lost ;
- (e.) That such increment be paid him and to his sons afterwards.

Sir C. Marling had suggested the following alternatives :—

- (1.) 15,000L. down in respect of (a) ;
- (2.) 3,000 tomans a month so long as he remains Governor of Fars ;

- (3.) 3,000 tomans a month to his family in Teheran, of which 1,000 tomans to Firuz;
 (4.) 40,000L. a year in case of exile, of which 10,000L. to Firuz.

The Chairman said that he thought Firman Firma's demands were quite preposterous. The alternatives had apparently been shown by Gough to Firman Firma, who objected to them as being inadequate. Gough had then strongly urged that the original proposal should be accepted without discussion.

Mr. Balfour said that as we had not enough troops in South Persia, he thought we must adopt the alternative of payments.

The Chairman said that Firman Firma had been a good friend to the British interests for some years; he was committed to our side, but his position was very difficult, and now in order to keep him straight we were asked to consent to a ridiculous bribe.

Lord Hardinge said that, so far as his department was concerned, the purely office point of view was that we might accept the first three alternative suggestions of Marling's, and also give Firman Firma a lump sum in lieu of the annual payment of 40,000L. a year, provided that we were given satisfactory guarantees in return.

The Chairman said that the losses of revenue from his property sustained by Firman Firma were really due to disorders in the country, and had nothing to do with us, so far as he could see.

Mr. Oliphant pointed out that most of Firman Firma's property lay in the north, and especially around Teheran, and he may have been unable to collect the revenue for some time. His great fear was that if he definitely came over to us and an unfriendly Persian Government came into power, he would be deprived of all his revenue.

Mr. Montagu said that he agreed with Mr. Balfour. If we wished to bribe him to remain on our side, we must be prepared to offer a sufficiently large bribe to secure his adherence. He thought, however, that if we offered a lump sum, he might actually seek exile. He suggested that Marling should be informed that he was at liberty, within certain limits, to negotiate with him.

The Chairman pointed out that he was already on our side, and said he did not see the necessity to pay him an excessive bribe now. We certainly might have to pay him if he actually lost either his estates or his Governorship, or were compelled to leave the country.

Mr. Oliphant said that unless we paid him we might lose our only asset in the province of Fars, which was the friendship of the Governor-General.

Mr. Keynes said it was impossible to give 40,000L. a year. It could not be done out of the Vote of Credit, and, as a recurring charge, it would have to come before Parliament; besides which, as Mr. Montagu pointed out, if we gave him this money, it would appear to be more lucrative for him to abdicate than to remain. He suggested offering him some monthly sum so long as he acted on our side. He strongly advised against giving a lump sum, and stated that his department would sooner pay in sterling than in tomans.

General Smuts said, to guarantee the lives, honour, and free enjoyment of property to Firman Firma and his family was an entirely undefined claim, and, moreover, a preposterous demand. So far, Firman Firma had not been actively assisting us with forces; he had merely given his blessing to the South Persia Rifles.

The Chairman suggested that Marling should be informed that we cannot decide about compensation without further information, but that he might be offered, say, 2,000L. a month so long as he remained—(a) Governor-General of Fars, and (b) friendly to us.

Mr. Keynes thought that we should only offer this monthly payment for the period of the war.

The Chairman said as regards the remaining items, we might say that, if his estates were confiscated or he had to go into exile,

we would take these questions into consideration if, and when, these events occurred.

Mr. Montagu then read a draft of a telegram to Sir C. Marling, which he had just written down.

Mr. Balfour said that all lump sums were open to the disadvantage that the man who received them might not "deliver the goods."

Mr. Montagu suggested that discretion should be given to Marling and Gough to negotiate, within certain financial limits, whether it was decided to give a lump sum or to make monthly payments.

Mr. Keynes said that his department could not view with equanimity the proposal to give Marling and Gough a free hand.

Mr. Balfour said that he agreed with the Chairman that Firman Firma might be bribed with an annual sum, but that we wanted more information about his estates.

Mr. Oliphant reminded the Committee that the question of the payment of Firman Firma had been raised by the latter last February, when he was apprehensive of an advance on the capital.

The Committee decided—

To ask the Foreign Office to telegraph to Sir C. Marling in the following sense :—

- (a.) *That until they were in possession of fuller information as to the extent and value of Firman Firma's estates and his alleged loss of revenue therefrom, His Majesty's Government are unable to determine what compensation, if any, should be offered or promised to him. They would, however, be prepared, in the event of his losing his estates on account of his friendship with us, to give that matter their consideration.*
- (b.) *That Firman Firma and his family may be granted a monthly allowance, not exceeding 6,000 tomans for the period of the war only, so long as he remains (i) Governor-General of Persia, (ii) friendly to us.*

The Chairman said that on the 18th June Marling had telegraphed (E.C.-572) to say that the consul at Shiraz had informed him that the Kawam-ul-Mulk had asked for an understanding on the following points :—

- (a.) That the British Government would guarantee to reimburse him for the money losses sustained as a result of his openly declaring for us ;
- (b.) That the same assurance should hold good for his heirs if he were killed or died ;
- (c.) That the British Government would, in case of his enforced exile, compensate him for his losses.

These demands the consul considered as not more than reasonable, and thought that his active assistance would be well worth the price ; he also stated that the Kawam-ul-Mulk was awaiting our reply before ordering his Arabs to declare war against Soulet.

Mr. Oliphant explained that the Kawam was the Ilkhani of the Khamseh Arab tribe as opposed to Soulet, the Ilkhani of the Kashgais. He himself was disposed to support this claim, and suggested that the Treasury should be asked to fix a sum, and that the consul should be told not to exceed it.

Mr. Keynes said that as regards this claim we had absolutely no data to go upon. He urged that we must limit the financial assistance we gave, to very important people only. He thought, in

the first instance, the consul should be told that his telegram, as it stood, was not understood.

Mr. Montagu thought the Committee should certainly promise the Kawam or his heirs an allowance on the same lines as had been proposed in the case of Firman Firma.

The Chairman agreed, and suggested that a telegram should be sent in the following sense:—

"We cannot agree to grant compensation for unknown losses, but if we can be satisfied that certain losses have been definitely sustained, we would consider the question, and that in the event of his enforced exile we would grant compensation to him, and, in case of his death in our cause, to his family."

The Committee decided—

To request the Foreign Office to telegraph to Sir C. Marling to the effect that—

- (a.) *His Majesty's Government cannot commit themselves to giving compensation for losses to an unlimited amount, but they were prepared to consider the question if and when such losses are incurred, provided that the Kawam remains friendly to us and that the losses sustained are on account of his friendship with us;*
- (b.) *In the event of the Kawam's enforced exile, such reasonable compensation as may be decided upon will be paid to him; and*
- (c.) *In the event of his death in our cause, to his family.*

The Committee further decided—

That the expenses of any subsidies it might be decided to give to Firman Firma and the Kawam should be borne in equal shares by the Indian Government and His Majesty's Treasury.


(At this point Mr. Keynes withdrew.)

In order to alleviate the risk of blood pressures dangerously rising, perhaps we should take a breather and review imperialism, colonialism and the world situation in early 20th and prior centuries.

The World situation and Colonialism

Imperialism, colonialism, or as it is said in Persian, world devourment *جهانخواری*, is as old as human history. What we are familiar with started in 15th Century, first by the Portuguese, followed by the Spanish through and discovery of America by Christopher Columbus, the Italian explorer, and spread to coastal lands in Africa, the Middle East, India and east Asia. In 16th and 17th centuries, Britain, France, Republic of Holland (a small but powerful country founded in 1581 and extinguished in 1795, transforming into the first Independent Holland) got into the fray. Later on, Belgium, too, entered the arena of colonizing and exploiting other countries and lands. The Ottoman and Japanese empires should also be added to the list.

The map below shows world empires and colonies in 1898. The Peach color shows the extent of the British Empire all the way from Canada to South America, the Caribbean, Africa, parts of Saudi Arabia and Oman, India, Nepal, Myanmar all the way down to Australia and New Zealand. France (dark blue) has gobbled up huge areas in Africa as well as Vietnam in Asia. Russian, in magenta color, has devoured many countries and 17 cities, along with vast areas of land from Iran.



Source: Wikipedia

A very brief story about China could be a lesson for all of us. During 19th Century, Britain, France, and even Russia sought various excuses to attack China and invade vast territories, including Hong Kong Port as well as the entire Indochina countries. An example would be why China attempts to stop illicit sale of opium to its citizens! It is said that a few of our own prominent Shirazi people were involved in, and cooperated with, the British in the transportation of opium in large ships from India to China. It is funny and shameful that in 1860, during an attack on northern China by the Brits and the French, they set palaces in Peking on fire after having looted all the precious gold and jewelry they could find. Yet, the ignorant forces could not and did not believe that the looted statues and other items were made of real gold, so they either bartered them for wine or discarded them! On the contrary, the Japanese, who had invaded Eastern China and Korea from 1895 to 1945, systematically and methodically searched and transferred all the gold and jewelry they could find to Japan and a portion of it to the Phillipines that was under their occupation, burying them in 175 huge underground caves. It is claimed that after World War II, the Americans discovered them. The amount of the treasure was so enormous that the Americans divided and deposited them in

banks throughout the world, including Iran. Those who are curious to know the economic impact of this event on the world are recommended to read a book authored by Sterling & Peggy Seagrave entitled *Gold Warriors*.

I brought the above part to your attention to show that Persia or Iran was not the only victim of the world's big powers. The important lesson is that China, despite the fact of being concurrently trampled by the British, the French, the Russians, the Germans and the Japanese, has now become one of the economic superpowers of the world. This tells us that we, too, can become an economic powerhouse in the world, only if we utilize our brains and our knowledge to find the right way to achieve that goal.

The misfortune faced by Iran was that at the same time that the Portuguese and the Spanish set out to find and gobble up the world, our statesmen (sorry, because of our religion, our women never got a chance to become a stateswoman), instead of founding friendship with the world's technologically and culturally advanced countries, and thus creating an awareness for themselves and the citizens, embraced more religious zeal and superstition by following the clergy, who were called "scholars" just by studying four or five unscientific and outdated books and saw it in their own interest to dumb down people, lead them to not think and to be happy in the face of misery by blindly believing it was their preordained destiny. This kind of attitude has encouraged other countries to commit political and economic rape of Iran.

Mehdi Bamdad, in his book entitled *The Biography of Statesmen of Iran*, quotes Etemadolsaltané, Naseroddin Shah's interpreter who accompanied him in his European trips, as writing: "Naserodin Shah didn't pay much attention to the political articles of [European] newspapers and world's important issues, and my reading newspapers for him was like a type of storytelling." He adds: "When I was translating a letter written by the British Minister of Foreign Affairs to his French counterpart in relation to the issue of Tunisia for the shah, and thought it was of utmost importance, the Shah asked Malijak [the court clown]: "Hey boy, where are you planning to spend your summer holiday?!"

As a child, I think I read in Robinson Crusoe's story that once he was captured by cannibals who intended to eat him. Robinson had a pocket calendar that showed, according to science, the specific night that a lunar eclipse would occur, told the cannibals that he was friends with gods and he could ask them to eclipse the moon. Once the ignorant cannibals see the eclipse, instead of eating him, worship him and he exploits them as long as he wishes! It wouldn't be too far off if one considered Iran's situation during the Qajar period analogous to this story. The ignorance was so profound that a clergy chastized the European-educated scholar, Mohammad Ali Foroughi, for wearing prescription glasses—perhaps a symbol of corrupt and infidel West in his hollow brain—on a religious mourning day!

During the last years of the Qajar dynasty, Iran was practically bankrupt. In 1914, the currency, Karan/Qaran, had been devalued to one fifth of its value a century earlier. Of course, one could argue that the collapse of the currency during the rule of the Islamic Republic has been much worse! During the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, one could buy a U.S. dollar for 70 rials, whereas now the exchange rate has collapsed to 150,000 rials to a dollar! That means in 40 years, the Iranian currency's value drop has been around two thousand-fold! One reason for the lethargic economy of the late Qajar era was Russian and British economic policies and exploitation of Iran's resources. Perhaps a more important reason was the widespread corruption starting from the royal court to the government, to the huge landowners and the tribal leaders who kept trampling on the rights of farmers and peasants by usurping their lands, their only means of subsistence. This forced a lot of poor people to emigrate to southern Russia. Statistics show that in 1905, 16 years before Reza Shah's reign, 300,000 people had gone to Russia legally and illegally. The population of Iran at that time, after the great famine, was estimated somewhere between 7.5 to 10 million. Statistics show that during the same Qajar era, the total number of people engaged in any type of industry throughout Iran was less than 850! That means a staggering 0.00011% of the population was involved in

production of glass, ceramics, brick, soap, leather, string and calico! According to Fereydu Adamiyat and others, concurrent with industrial advancement in Europe, Amir Kabir (Mirza Taghi Khan Farahani), the Prime Minister of Naseroddin Shah in the first three years of his reign, started establishing factories in Iran. He sent a few people to Europe to learn about weaving broadcloth, manufacturing porcelain and paper. Additionally, he brought a few experts from Austria; however, upon his ordered assassination, all that was forgotten and was replaced with giving concessions to the Russians and the British. As a result, Iran was lagging behind even the Middle Eastern backward countries.

In order to have a better understanding of the situation in Iran in the late years of the Qajar dynasty and issues that led to the rise of Reza Shah, it would be helpful to know about developments in Europe which had an impact on Iran.

First, the most important event that had a profound impact on Europe and the world was the 12 years of the French Revolution. The French society was divided into three levels of the clergy, the nobility—including the royal court and feudal—and the rest of the people. The collusion between the clergy and the nobility, church and state, had placed a heavy yoke on the people. People had to pay 10% of their income to the church. This religious tax was called Tithe. Moslem clergy still demand 20% *Khoms* from their followers!

France had a rotten administrative and economic system; frivolous wars had led the country to bankruptcy; the population had doubled in a short time and people were hungry; people wanted the church and state to be separated, and they desired to get rid of the clergy, the nobility and the feudal altogether.

Intellectuals and philosophers who were inspired by thinkers such as Montesquieu, Voltaire and Rousseau were demanding social reforms, elimination of social classes and involvement of people in their own destiny. Montesquieu warned that “there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.”

An election was held for the Estates-General, which had not had any meetings for about 175 years! This assembly election occurred to include 300 for the nobility, 300 for the clergy and 600 deputies for the third estate, meaning ordinary people. However, from the beginning, the king and the nobility and the clergy started colluding against the ordinary people by trying to impose a policy that each class would have one vote! This meant the court and clergy would have two votes and people would have one vote! Elected representatives of the ordinary people, who were fed up with the nobility and the clergy, declared themselves the National Assembly and occupied the king’s indoor tennis court and swore not to disperse until France had a new constitution. The king reluctantly agreed with their demands and asked the clergy and the nobles to join the assembly. The assembly was then called National Constituent Assembly. At the same time, the king started gathering troops to put an end to the Assembly. The Assembly decreed the abolition of the feudal system and of the Tithe, introduced the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, proclaimed liberty, equality, the inviolability of property and the right to resist oppression. Another achievement of the French Revolution was the nationalization of the lands of the church and the clergy to pay off the public debt. It also proclaimed the right of self-determination based on the territory of Avignon, which was under control of the Pope, was reunited with France. Then, France declared war against Austria, perhaps because the king hoped that he would thus gain more authority, or the foreign army would rescue him. The queen, Marie-Antoinette, who was born in Austria, privately encouraged her brother, who was the emperor of Austria, to attack and invade France! Initially, France suffered a defeat, but when people heard about it, volunteers joined the army and defeated the aggressors. People imprisoned the king and his family in the royal temple. Then, they broke into the prisons and massacred the nobles and the clergy there. On September 20, 1792, the same day that the French defeated the enemy, a new assembly was formed and was named the National Convention. One day later,

the National Convention put an end to monarchy and established a republic government. Louis XVI was condemned to death for treason and Marie-Antoinette was guillotined about nine months later.

Second, a small number of freedom-loving Iranians, about a century after the French Revolution, who had found out about Europe's economic and political advancements (governments that were tasked to run the country, were elected either by people, or people's representatives in a place called the Assembly, or Parliament), aspired to have the same type of system in Iran. This was named *Mashrooteh* مشروطه (provisional/conditional), meaning the shah can be the king provided the running of the country be in the hands of the people's representatives. It is worth mentioning that "Mashrooteh movement" is correct, not "Mashrooteh Revolution." Unfortunately, many of Iranian historians have erroneously using the term *revolution* in relation to Mashrooteh. The Webster Dictionary defines revolution as "the overthrow or renunciation of one government or ruler and the substitution of another by the governed." We know that the people and the leaders of Mashrooteh never intended to overthrow the monarchy. What took place in Iran was not a revolution, but a movement. And Mozaffareddin Shah signed a declaration called Mashrooteh while he stayed in power. For a good read on the history of the Mashrooteh movement, which is generally translated as "Constitutional" movement, one may read the late Ahmad Kasravi's *Tarikhé Mashrooteh*, the original one that is not censored by the Islamic regime.

Despite the fact that the good Iranians, after the Japanese, were the first people in the entire continent of Asia who aspired such a noble system, it was clear from the beginning that due to the influence of Russia and Britain, as well as the lack of knowledge by the majority of Iranians about the world democratic political developments, compounded by the blind followership of the illiterate masses of the clergy, the constitutional movement was doomed to fail. Remember the story of the clergy who was constantly touching a young woman's breasts to rid her of the jinn? Also, one should remember the conversation between the Persian Prince and the French ambassador: "Abbas Mirza asked me: 'I don't know what power it is that has made you dominant over us, what causes our weakness and your progress? You are skillful in fighting and conquering as well as utilization of brain power, whereas we are drowned in ignorance, corruption and sedition, and rarely ponder the future.'"

Well, in the campaign for constitution, the Russians supported the despotic Qajar kings against the intellectuals, and the British, in order to oppose the Russians, decided to support the constitutionalists. The clergy, who didn't want to fall behind and lose their influence over the masses, entered the arena and pushed for replacing Mashrooteh with Mashrooeh, meaning everything should be based on Islamic (Shi'ii) Sharia!

Nazem ol-Eslam Kermani, in his book, *Tarikh-e Bidari-ye Iranian, the History of Persian Awakening*, reveals a few points that he, himself, might not have noticed:

Today, the bazaars were closed. Businessmen, seminary students, fabric sellers and money exchangers entered the embassy in perfect manner. Embassy staff show absolute good will and hospitality. It can be said that the embassy is turned into a school. A number of people have gathered under tents and in corners, and a politically learned person, such as students and others, is teaching the people [under each tent]; that is, people are hearing new things for the first time that not a single person dared to utter hitherto...

Isn't it interesting that the people have gathered at the British Embassy? Why should people congregate at a foreign embassy? And the embassy is providing people food and drinks! Additionally, a 'politically learned person' is educating people. Does anybody doubt that those learned people have already been coached by the British? Would these 'learned' people dare to say anything against the British and their policies? The saddest part is that it shows people had no clue about constitutional monarchy, liberty, democracy, etc., and everything was taught to them. The poor souls had absolutely no political knowledge!

Mozaffareddin Shah signs a decree named Constitution Proclamation. A little study shows how ridiculous and misleading this proclamation is:

Your Excellency, the Prime Minister, whereas God almighty has placed the head thread of progress and prosperity of the guarded land of Iran in our (imperial way of saying my) competent hand, and has made our august person (how narcissistic!) the guardian of the rights of all citizens and our sincere vassals, now therefor at this time when our august will is set on gradual implementation of reform laws in governmental and state entities for the welfare and security of all citizens of Iran as well as strengthening of the foundation of the government, we have decided that [a] **National Consultative Assembly** of elected Qajar princes, the clergy, grandees/the rich, nobility, landlords, and businessmen and guilds elected by their respective class (note that it is not the people, but the classes that elect from their own, meaning the clergy select a clergy, the rich select a rich person. In other words, he was not thinking about election by the people. Additionally, he totally ignores the people and does not bother to even mention them in his proclamation!) to be convened at the seat of the government in Tehran to exercise necessary consultation and scrutiny (not legislate) on important issues pertaining to the governance and public welfare of the country, and provide needed help and assistance to our cabinet ministers in reforms that would lead to Iran's prosperity and happiness, and through the head of the government, in complete security and confidence, its ideas in relation to the good of the government and the nation and public welfare and the needs of all the citizens to be received and signed by our majesty and get implemented. It is self-evident that you shall prepare, based on this blessed rescript, the by-laws and regulations and necessary tools of the assembly, and upon approval and signatures of the elected persons, to be signed by our majesty and by Allah's help, the said **National Consultative Assembly**, which shall be the guardian of justice, will be opened and begin the needed reforms of the affairs of the country and execution of the sacred religious laws, and we also order that the blessed rescript be made public so that all the citizens, as before, be informed of our good intentions that are entirely related to the progress of the government and the nation of Iran, and keep praying for the permanence of this government and this eternal court. At Sahebqaraniyeh Palace, on August 5, 1906 the eleventh year of our reign.

Since the king had neglected to mention people in his proclamation, the people started a *bast*, sit-down. Where? In the garden of the British Embassy! This means the situation was so bad and precarious that people were afraid that the "just" king's men might attack and kill them!

The king issued a supplemental proclamation containing two new tricks:

... In supplementing our previous rescript dated August 5, 1906, in which we had ordered and made a clear proclamation for the establishment of an assembly of the representatives of the people (he did not and still does not say so!), again, in order for the entire citizenry and members of the nation be aware of our complete attention, we order and establish that the said assembly to be formed quickly per previous rescript (meaning selection of the classes of princes, clergy, etc.), and after the election of the members... create the by-laws and terms of the **Islamic Consultative Assembly** (here is his second deception as he replaces the word '**National**,' which had been written twice in his first decree, with the '**Islamic**') ...

It would be useful to remember that Shah Tahmasb I, who because of his religious zealotry and superstition would not touch any infidel, had ordered the footsteps of the British infidel to be cleansed with ash. And that the British, who were already aware of spread of Islamic superstition and the control of the clergy over the people, being ever

shrewd and conniving, found the best way to achieve their goals in promoting superstition, zealotry and covert colluding with the clergy, in this case used the same strategy: the gullible protesters take refuge in the British Embassy; negotiations start with the royal court; and the king in an apparent heeding to the demands of the people, issues a second rescript in which he gives lip service to the people, orders his first decree to be followed, and most importantly, replaces the 'National Consultative Assembly' with 'Islamic Consultative Assembly.' And the uneducated, simple-minded Moslems, who have already forgotten that the main issue was about people, either do not pay attention that *National* was replaced by *Islamic*, or think that the word Islamic guarantees them a place in Paradise!

By the way, the praying the shah had written in his proclamation apparently is not heeded by Allah, as he dies five months after signing the proclamation. His son, Mohammad Ali Shah, takes the reign and opposes the constitution, and asks the Russians, who were his supporters, to bombard the parliament. Russian troops also lay siege on the city of Tabriz and massacre a number of freedom-loving people. The horrifying picture below, which is from Edward Brown's book entitled *Letters From Tabriz*, translated by Dr. Hasan Javadi, is a sad testament to their atrocities.

At the same time, an American Christian missionary, Howard Baskerville, age 25, who was teaching English in Tabriz, witnessing the savagery committed by the Russians, goes to Sattar Khan, leader of freedom-lovers, and asks for permission to join his forces. Sattar Khan thanks him and encourages him to keep teaching the youth. His insistence on fighting alongside good people against evil forces, finally gains him permission from Sattar Khan. And the young teacher gives his life for freedom in Iran.



On 31 August 1907, Russia and Britain, the two enemies of Iran that were working against each other in Iran, suddenly come into an agreement to divide Iran into three zones: Russian sphere of influence covering the entire Iranian land all the way to the south of Esfahan; British sphere of influence, initially including the southeast part of Iran, but in later years encompassed the entire

southwest, as well, including Bushehr and the Khuzestan province. The zone in between the north and south zones was left to the Iranian government, a zone with not much natural resources.

A brief look at the international political chess game being played by the big powers would be beneficial, as the end result impacts the fate of many countries. Britain, apprehensive of Russia's encroachment towards India, occupies Tibet, a vast area in northeastern India, in 1904. In the same year, Britain makes an agreement with France according to which the two powers would not interfere with their respective international affairs. In other words, Britain would turn a blind eye on the French occupation of Morocco, and France would reciprocate by not paying attention to the British occupation of Egypt! Russia is defeated by Japan in 1904-1905 war. In the middle of this war, Britain extends and reaffirms the agreement she had signed with Japan two years earlier. Now the Russians are apprehensive! At the same time, Britain is fearful on two other issues: Russia has extended its railroad all the way to Afghanistan border, which causes concern for Britain's prize, India. Britain is also concerned about the impact of the Iranian Constitutional movement on Indian citizens. It should be remembered that earlier, the British, who were concerned for the security of India vis-à-vis Russia, and were unhappy with the incompetence of Fath Ali Shah's government, facilitated the secession of Afghanistan from Iran so that they could install a powerful government there for the purposes of erecting a strong barrier between Russia and India. Russians, defeated by the Japanese, have no appetite for entering a war against the British. The British have figured out that diplomacy and negotiations are less expensive than going to war. At the same time, Germany is growing more powerful by the day and becoming a nuisance for the Brits. Britain decides that it would be advantageous to start a friendship with Russia rather than Germany, because Russia is stronger than Germany, but is not as politically astute and wise as Germany! Consequently, Britain reaches an agreement on several issues with Russia: they divide Iran among themselves; Russia agrees for Afghanistan to remain under the British influence; in return, Britain accepts to withdraw from Tibet and leave it under the Chinese government; and Russia agrees to turn a blind eye in British affairs in Shanghai!

Following this political chess, one would find that later on, the British, Russians and the French form an alliance against Germany, and a few years later, WWI starts. The Iranian statemen, who didn't have much knowledge and understanding of these chess games, declare neutrality, which sounds honorable, but in the end, works against Iran's interests.

The Russophile Mohammad Ali Shah, having had the parliament bombarded, doesn't last more than two and a half years, and is removed by the fledgling parliament (with the British support?) and installs his 11-year-old son as the new king, and the history shows how intertwined he becomes with the British!

Pejman Bakhtiyari, the famous poet, describes the situation during the Qajar period: "...ever increasing problems where Iran had no money, no power, and no social unity..."

Here are some photos of Iranians during the Qajar reign. I have borrowed the kabob sellers, the shoeing of a donkey and the water seller carrying water in a goatskin container from princess Ashraf Pahlavi's book, *Faces in the Mirror: Memoires from Exile*; and I am indebted for the rest to the famous photographer Antoin Sevrugui.



In order for you to grasp the depth and the severity of the situation in Iran under the reign of Ahmad Shah, the last king of the Qajar dynasty, I wish to bring a piece of history that is aggravating, depressive and inspiring at the same time and makes one to thank God that throughout the history some human beings have shown what humanity is all about. Saadi's poem, translated by Dr. Aryanpoor, says it all:

Human beings are members of a whole
 In creation of one essence and soul,
 If one member is afflicted with pain
 Other members uneasy will remain,
 If you have no sympathy for human pain
 The name of human you cannot retain.

James L. Barton, in a book entitled *Story of Near East Relief 1915-1930 An Interpretation*, writes that during WWI, a committee of ordinary American volunteers who had become aware of the destruction, misery and misfortune of the people in the Near East (east of the Mediterranean Sea, such as Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, the defeated Ottoman Empire, now named Turkey, Greece, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan) was formed to help displaced, hungry, naked and ill men, women and orphaned children regardless of their race, religion, or ethnicity. The initial goal was to raise \$100,000.00. These ordinary Americans started contacting people, companies, universities, businesses and their congressmen throughout the United States to raise that amount. In the end, instead of \$100,000.00, they were able to raise close to \$116,000,000.00, which in today's dollars is close to \$3,000,000,000.00—three billion dollars—not Tomans, and brought supplies, medicine, food... to millions of people. Soon, Iran was added to the list of the receiving aid countries. Dr. Harry Pratt Judson, President of Chicago University, age 70, volunteered to head the commission and go to Iran. It should be noted that thirty of the volunteers who went to help, lost their lives due to illness. This is exactly when Ahmad Shah was having fun in Europe!

A very important issue that I think one should always take into consideration is that due to the religious zealotry and superstition that had been continued from the Safavids to the Qajar era, Iranian Zoroastrians, who have lived in Iran for over 3,000 years, Iranian Jews, who had lived in Iran for over 2,700 years, Iranian Assyrians and Armenians, who had lived in Iran for about 2,000 years, as well as Iranian Bahais, who had brought their new religion, were more than others under assault, oppression, and plunder. Therefore, the humanitarian aid provided by American Christians who treated everybody the same, must have been appreciated even more profoundly. The volunteers knew well that all human being were created by one God. In Tehran alone, they were able to give aid and comfort to 30,000 hungry dispossessed people.

I have borrowed two photos from the book to share with you. One depicts the desperate situation of a family in a dilapidated building, and another is an interesting picture of an American aid "ambulance" in Orumieh, where one person is holding an American flag on one side, and another holds a white flag for the warring sides to know that they are not at war against anybody.



The second assembly, or congress, was formed four months after the ouster of Mohammad Ali Shah. There were two main factions: Etedalioon (moderates) and democrats. Ayatollah Behbahani, Ayatollah Tabatabaee and Farmanfarma were among the leaders of the so-called moderate faction (Mashrooeh) that supported Sharia law. It should be noted that Farmanfarma is the same person, who based on British declassified documents presented in previous pages, was receiving 6,000 tomans per month from the British and had requested that the stipend to be paid to his heirs in case of his death. The second faction had dreams of European-like progress and wanted to educate people and cut off the clergy from government and people's daily life control. There were ongoing severe clashes between the two factions, but the bankruptcy of the country had presented a dire situation that was above politics. So, they voted to appeal to the U.S. government for help, and President Taft recommended Morgan Shuster as head of a group of American financial experts to re-organize Iran's financial system. But since Shuster's good work and devotion to duty was against the interests of Russia and Britain, the Russians gave an ultimatum to the so-called independent and democratically run government and congress of Iran to fire Shuster. The British, not only supported the idea, but also committed a military occupation of the port of Bushehr on the Persian Gulf! Congressmen sent telegrams to the entire world pleading for help, but no country and no congress came to their assistance! As a result, the regent, along with Samsam-ol-saltaneh Bakhtiyari, the prime minister, succumbed to the Russians' demand, dissolved the parliament and fired Shuster and his team of experts!

There are a few lessons in this shameful and sad event. First, if a country is moneyless and powerless, she can't accomplish anything.

Second, when there is no understanding of principles of democratic governance and citizenry participation; people have been disenfranchised by a few foreign-connected wealthy groups; schools, universities, justice, equal rights for men and women are non-existent, and beautiful sounding words such as parliament, liberty and independence ring hollow for the hungry masses.

Third, the bitter and cold reality is that a country must be self-reliant. In this case, not a single democratic country or supporter of liberty and freedom, or even a Moslem country, took a single step to even pay lip service to the so-called "elected representatives of the people of Iran" and symbols of democracy and theocracy! Nobody was willing to antagonize Russia and Britain for the sake of supporting or defending Iran. A country goes to the defense of another country only if doing so is in its own economic and or political interest. And even in such a case, people in the country that is being helped should not gullibly assume that the two countries will be good friends to the eternity! The international political chess game goes on forever, and alliances could shift very easily and swiftly. The divergence and convergence of Russian and British policies in relation to Iran in various periods should always be kept in mind.

Now, let's look at the situation in Iran during the last years of the Qajar dynasty, as well as the relations among Britain, Europe and Russia from another angle. You might get the impression that we are getting off the subject, or we are repeating some aspects. If you note, you will see that we are attempting to observe, from different angles, the situation in Iran before Reza Khan enters the political arena in Iran. This is analogous to looking at Mount Damavand through the camera of a drone that flies from top to the bottom, north, east, west, south, and even inside the crater.

Here, I wish to borrow from Dr. Houshang Sabahi's book, *British Policy in Persia 1918-1925*, as it is written masterfully:

From the perspective of Whitehall, Persia was a crossroads where Britain's European and Indian interests met. Control of Persia by any European power was bound to jeopardize the security of British India. A threat to India could in turn be used as a lever to upset the balance of power in

Europe. To forestall this danger, Britain tried various policies. At first London and India hesitantly experimented with the policy of bringing Persia into the British sphere of influence either by contracting an alliance with her or by turning her into a protectorate. Persia's crushing defeat in the war with Russia put an end to these experiments. The Turkomanchai Treaty of 1828 firmly established Russian influence at Tehran.

For the rest of nineteenth century, the basic thrust of British policy was to prevent Russia from taking control of Persia and, at the same time, to avoid a serious dispute with her over Persia. So, Persia had to be preserved as a buffer zone. But, as Russian influence continued to grow in the north and threatened to expand southwards, Britain's position began to shift. Persia's independence was becoming a threat, rather than an asset, to the security of India. By the end of the century the north seemed to be irreversibly in Russian hands; the south must be secured for Britain. An increasing number of politicians and officials began to advocate the partition of Persia. The exponents of an agreement with Russia eventually prevailed. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 divided Persia into sphere of influence.

...Persia remained a bone of contention between the two powers until the beginning of the First World War...At the end of the First World War, with her rivals eliminated, it suddenly appeared that Britain could solve the Persian question once and for all by extending her control over the country. At the same time, the occupation of Mesopotamia and the Navy's growing dependence on Persian oil had increased Britain's stakes in Persia. It was against this background that [Lord George Nathaniel] Curzon set out his Persian policy.

Curzon, a statesman, a former member of House of Lords who had served as Viceroy of India for years, in the middle of WWI became the leader of the House of Lords after which he became a member of the government and finally became Foreign Secretary, Minister of Foreign Affairs. This genius, very well disciplined and selfish man writes in his book, *Persia and the Persian Question*, that he saw Iran as a "pawn". "Turkestan, Afghanistan Transcaspia, Persia...to me, I confess, they are the pieces on a chessboard upon which is being played out a game for the dominion of the world."

I am not digressing here. Curzon's behavior and his relation with the British government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the British ambassador in Iran and even the British army (when he was the Viceroy of India and had to resign and return to England because of his differences with the British Ministry of War) can allude to points at the beginning and the rise of Reza Khan.

Per Curzon's suggestion, an interdepartmental committee was formed in 1917 and was named The Persia Committee. Although the Foreign Secretary, James Balfour, was the head of the committee, Curzon dominated the proceedings. Establishment of the Eastern Committee of the War Cabinet in March 1918 at the request of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff strengthened Curzon's position. The purpose was coordination between the British policy and military strategy on the Eastern Front that encompassed Persia and the Caucasus after the collapse of Tsarist regime in Russia. The hope was the Committee would facilitate military operations by smoothing over time-consuming bureaucratic bickering and disagreements among various government entities. The Prime Minister appointed Curzon as the Chairman of the Committee. The Foreign Secretary and his deputy, who had been included in the committee considered this as a direct blow to the Foreign Office's claim to control foreign affairs. The India Office and the War Office also resented the fact that Curzon would step on their tails. The turf war continued for some time. A few people, including the deputy Foreign Secretary, tried to undermine Curzon, to no avail. It got to the point that Curzon threatened to resign. Having overcome his rivals, Curzon and his followers proposed that if

Britain wants to stay in Iran, she should take control of Iran's finances and armed forces! This was the stepping-stone of the ominous 1919 Agreement.

The above is indicative of bureaucratic inefficiency, bickering, disagreement, rivalry, and even backstabbing within the United Kingdom. All of this can be characterized as byproduct of human nature that can be found in any government. However, a review of the past, and even occasionally in present, Iranian publications show a false assumption that everything in the UK government and parliament works in smooth coordination and as precisely as a good Swiss watch! This delusive, fallacious and misleading high regard for everything British had such a vast negative impact that even when some act of mere stupidity, incapacity, ignorance, or imprudence was committed by the British, most people would think it was intentional and preplanned! My Uncle Napoleon, a great fiction, which became one of Iran's most popular TV series, masterfully depicts this point. The canniness of the British was that they had learned to show themselves as always calm and cool and hide their own disputes.

Since the 1919 Agreement would practically give British control over Iran, Curzon and his people tried to get it done in secret. Three people helped arrange this: Vosoughdoleh, Ahmad Shah's Prime Minister, Prince Firouz, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prince Saremodoleh, the Minister of Finance. These people signed the agreement on behalf of Iran after receiving a total of 400,000 tomans, or 131,000 sterling pounds, which in today's exchange rate, equates to something like 727,225,994 tomans! Half of the amount went to the Prime Minister and the other half went to the two Qajar princes. The people of Iran and Ahmad Shah were shafted! When Ahmad Shah was asked during his trip to England to sign the agreement, he responded: whoever got the money should sign it! Mohammad Javad Sheikh-ol-Islami in his book, *Simay-e Ahmad Shah-e Ghajar (Ahmad Shah Ghajar, A Political Portrait)*, writes that Ahmad Shah demanded two things to sign the agreement: First, he wanted his monthly payment of 15,000 tomans by the British government that he was receiving for the appointment of Vosoughdoleh to become permanent. Secondly, he wanted the British government to guarantee his kingship and that of his heirs!

In order to conceal the bribe to the three politicians, the British deposited the amount into the Iranian government's bank account as the first part of the British loan of £2,000,000! Later on, due to the opposition by Iranians, which was practically encouraged and supported by the Russians, pressing that it must be ratified by the Iranian parliament, the agreement was never implemented. The British were outfoxed by Iranians and never got their bribe money back. However, no tears are needed for that, because they gained a lot more through other means, including the theft of the proceeds of the sale of Iranian oil. My fury and frustration were alleviated a bit only by reading in *Tarikh-e Rejaal-e Iran (Biography of Statesmen of Iran)* that not long after becoming the king of Iran, Reza Shah confiscated the bribe money from the three politicians in 1927.

Perhaps it would be beneficial to find out about the background of the three persons who signed the ominous and infelicitous 1919 Agreement:

Vosoughdoleh is the same person who received his appointment as the Prime Minister in return for 15,000 toman per month bribe from Britain to Ahmad Shah. He happens to be the brother of Ghavam-ol-saltaneh /Kawam, whom per revealed UK National Archives document, had asked for and was receiving a monthly stipend from the British government conditioned on his cooperation. The two brothers became Prime Minister many times. Later, we will see how Vosoughdoleh grabbed about 35,000,000 square meters (8,648.6 acres) in eastern Tehran without paying a penny when his brother, Ghavam, became Prime Minister after Reza Shah's exile.

The second signatory of the Agreement was Prince Nosratodoleh Firouz, the eldest son of Abdolhossain Farmanfarma, the same Farmanfarma who, based on the same document, was receiving a stipend from the British government. The stipend was going to go to his children, should the he get killed. Firouz was the Minister of Justice in Vosoughdoleh's cabinet. Two days before the signing of the Agreement, he was appointed as the Foreign

Minister! Per *Simay-e Ahmad Shah-e Ghajar*, there were reasons for his change of position: first, he had participated in the entire negotiations of the Agreement, and now, per previous arrangement, was ready to sign it. Second, as Foreign Minister, he was going to be a member of Ahmad Shah's entourage in the upcoming trip of the king to Europe, and whenever necessary, replace the Iranian ambassadors who opposed the Agreement. Additionally, he was supposed to prevent patriotic Iranian expatriates and Iran-loving foreigners from approaching the king and warning him about the faults and flaws of the Agreement.

The third person was Mirza Masoud Saremodoleh, Naseroddin Shah's grandson, a British educated prince with close ties to them, who became the Minister of Finance per British government recommendation.

The Agreement stirred a scandal and political embarrassment in Europe, especially when, per Bahar's *A Short History of Political Parties in Iran*, prior to a royal dinner gala in his honor, Ahmad Shah was shown a copy of the British King's speech mentioning the Agreement which Ahmad Shah was expected to confirm in his own speech. He declined and declared: "Those who have received money should confirm it, I shall never confirm it!"

To sum up, Iran's situation was so dire that per Hossain Makki's *Tarikh-e Bist saaleh-e Iran* (twenty-year history of Iran), when Ahmad Shah appointed Sepahdar-e Azam as the new Prime Minister, Sepahdar made a declaration stating:

At a time when warp and woof of the affairs of the country are totally entangled and broken due to economic crises and political developments, business affairs and public subsistence have been afflicted by severe fluctuation and pulsation, administrative system is totally out of order, law and order is shaken and a body of lawlessness and mental chaos with the ugliest consequences is being exhibited ...and the bad fortune at a time that can be considered the darkest political and societal era with the most critical and irrecoverable moment of this wretched and destitute country...

At that time, prime ministers and their cabinets would survive about 90 days! This poor man's cabinet couldn't survive more than 78 days, and the next time he was appointed, he lasted only 26 days! This is indicative of how unstable and dire the situation was in Iran before Reza Khan came into the picture.

The Coup d'état

Encyclopedia Britannica defines this French term as: "Coup d'état, also called Coup, the sudden, violent overthrow of an existing government by a small group." It seems the Iranians of that era were so desperate that would call any change or development for rescuing the country coup d'état! Hossain Makki writes that the Prime Minister encouraged Ahmad Shah to make a coup d'état together! How could the heads of a regime and government arrange a coup d'état against themselves? And if they take any action together, it cannot be called a coup d'état. It is absolutely disappointing to see that all Iranian historians, scholars, statemen as well as the public even today call the event that took place in 1920 a Coup d'état. This is when Reza Khan and his Cossack forces went from Ghazvin to Tehran and Reza Khan, along with Seyyed Ziaoddin Tabatabaie, had an audience with Ahmad Shah, during which they declared their loyalty to him and their service to the country! This act cannot be characterized as a Coup d'état! Perhaps a "movement" would be a more accurate term for it.

Makki writes:

The idea of a coup d'état was on all reformists' minds. They were all looking into the horizon hoping for a hand come out of the unseen and eradicate the rotten roots of weak and straw governments with one strike; and if it does not perform miracles, at least bring security and put an end to the banditry and pillage and rape of the people... Modarres (the clergy) was plotting a coup d'état, Sardar Asad Bakhtiyari and other chieftains...gathered at Chehel Sotoon building in Esfahan, and the warlord was gathering armed men; Nosratodoleh intended to pass the snow-covered western mountaintops as fast as a strong wind and reach Tehran; Seyyed Zia was making compromises with the centers of power, and even Starosselsky, the Russian commander of the Persian Cossack brigade, had something in mind! Everybody was entering the race towards the coup d'état, and everyone tried to get there first!

One of the candidates for the 1920 coup d'état was [Prince] Nosratodoleh [Firouz, the eldest son of Farmanfarma, and one of the three signatories of the 1919 Agreement] who had been considered by London for playing such a role. He was hurriedly returning to Iran to perform coup d'état in Tehran... a few hours after his return to Tehran, the British Ambassador, Mr. Norman, meets him and talks with him about two and a half hours. The person who reports this, who had been present at Nosratodoleh's house and is one his close friends and confidants, says: "The British ambassador, while discussing the coup d'état and its terms that need to be carried out by the leader of the revolution, mentions the names of a number of the respectable people that must be arrested and detained." Nosratodoleh objects and says: "In London, Lord Curzon and I agreed on the generalities of the coup d'état plan, but I have to be completely free in determining the details and these kinds of operations!"

It is interesting to note that Bahar, whose political view was different from that of Makki's, writes in his aforementioned book: "...everybody believed that one could reach the goal through coup d'état and bringing together the divided forces!" Also: "incidentally, at the same time period, Mr. Smart, one of the members of the [British] embassy, came to the author's residence and had a discussion with me about establishing a strong government that would be able to quell various dissenting voices, a stable and semi-dictator government. And I was generally in agreement with him on the necessity of the formation of such a government... two days before the arrival of Reza Khan and Seyyed Ziaoddin Tabatabaee in Tehran, I told Zia in a very clear and emphatic way that if you have a plan related to the situation, I will be in agreement with you."

In order to have a better perspective of the factors pertaining to the movement, change, or the so-called through coup d'état, one could take into consideration the following:

Per UK National Archives declassified documents, British newspapers and the Diaries of General Ironside, the general who was tasked to execute safe withdrawal of the British forces from Iran, the British economy was in shambles. Money was so scarce that officers of the British armed forces who were not in war fronts, or on war missions, received only half of their salaries! And the British Parliament was exerting pressure on the government to bring back the forces from the countries that it deemed useless.

Per BBC News website, in February 1919, Habibullah Khan, the Afghan king for 18 years, is assassinated. The same Afghanistan that by the British plotting and encouragement had started seceding from Iran during Fath Ali Shah's reign, and eventually, in 1857, after British military occupation of southern Iran, its independence was recognized by Naseroddin Shah per Paris treaty. Interestingly, Habibullah Khan's own son, Amanullah Khan, as well as his brother, Nasrullah Khan, both of whom were suspected of the assassination, claimed to be the new king. Amanullah out staged his uncle, and in an apparent attempt to deflect the assassination rumors, and in order to show "a great gesture against the British," attacked India.

The altercation continued for about a month, and when the British air force bombarded Afghanistan, he asked for a ceasefire. A peace treaty was signed per which the Afghan king committed not to intervene in the tribal areas' affairs. Britain, on the other hand, recognized Afghanistan's independence and stopped paying a monthly stipend to the king!

This event coincides with the gradual rise of Reza Khan in Iran. Six years later, Reza Khan puts an end to the Qajar dynasty by being declared as king by the parliament.

A few things can be observed here: Britain has come out of the WWI victorious, but tired. Her overseas military expenditure and financial burden is overwhelming and her economy has weakened. At the same time, the formation of an alliance with Russia against Germany, and Russia's regime change has alleviated, albeit temporarily, Britain's concerns regarding Russia's encroachment towards India via Iran and Afghanistan. As a result, as Amanullah Khan and Reza Khan appear as two strong characters in the two neighboring countries, Britain adopts a new policy that is concurrent with ideals—a strong unified country, economic development and eradication of corruption—of these two strong men for their respective countries. It is interesting to note that my Afghan friends all regard Amanullah Khan on the scale as Reza Shah and as the person who tried to bring Afghanistan to the modern world.

Another revealing angle relates to the deployment of General Edmund Ironside in October 1921 to Iran for the specific purpose of safely withdrawing British forces. A few interesting points can be found in a book that was published based on his diaries about fifty years later by his son. The first point that stands out is the condition of the British troops in north Iran after their disastrous defeat dealt to them by the Russians in northern Iran. Ironside says: "British prestige had suffered a heavy blow."

Ironside describes the conditions the British military was in Iran at that time:


I found the troops in a pitiable condition. They had been dumped down at any point where an old shed or a derelict caravanserai offered itself, often in malarious hollows. The men were still in their summer kit, for the most part ragged shorts and torn shirts. Many had no coats of any sort, though the nights were already growing cold. Quite a number were suffering from malaria and the general state of the sanitation of the posts was lamentable... when I looked at them I thought they were like a batch of newly released prisoners of war from a German camp. I had to send

home the CO, as soon as I saw him on my return to Kazvin, as being quite useless for further military service.

One can only imagine how dire the situation must have been in Iran, where many people, including Ahmad Shah himself, still wanted the British stay in Iran as a security measure against the Russians! Before leaving Iran in February 1922, Ironside, along with the British ambassador, gets an audience with Ahmad Shah.

... a very ordinary chair. The young shah, wearing a plain black frock coat with no decorations of any sort. He sat hunched up in the chair with his head sunk deep into his shoulders... The Minister (ambassador) then told the Shah that the British Government was growing tired of the delays in the ratification of the treaty which he had signed. He said plainly that it was impossible for them to go on advancing money unless the treaty was ratified. The Shah was very halting in his replies...He wanted it ratified, knowing that it was the best thing which could be done for his country!!!

...He then proceeded to paint for us a lurid picture of what would happen if we withdrew our forces from Persia. His country would at once be overrun by the troops of the Soviet Russia... He prayed the Minister (ambassador) not to withdraw the British troops, if not for the sake of Persia then for the sake of the British Empire and India... He presented a pathetic picture of defeat.



Here, I ask for your indulgence as I focus on an issue that I think has been misused for decades by those who wish to put a negative light on Reza Shah. Lord Ironside, the General's son, writes in the introduction to his father's diary he published in 1972: "In his diary he says, 'I fancy that everybody thinks that I engineered the coup d'état. I suppose, I did strictly speaking.'"

Uncle Napoleons have taken this as proof positive that Reza Shah was a pawn who was brought to power by the British. Now that for the first time in history, photos of the declassified British documents are placed in front of you in this book, I hope you go through them and reach your own conclusion. Additionally, I reviewed the General's diary several times, and I could not find that quotation. Neither have I found it in the declassified documents, in any newspaper or publication in the UK, Europe, U.S. And not a single person has ever claimed in the last one hundred

years to have heard it uttered by General Ironside! It is also interesting to note that a few lines prior to making that claim about his father “fancying,” Lord Ironside writes:

The story of his choosing Reza Khan to command them (Persian Cossacks) is known to many and although he could not know at the time that this man would one day become Shah of Persia...

Thus, it is clear that the British General could not and did not know at the time that Reza Khan would one day become the Shah of Iran, and per his diaries, he even obtained a promise from Reza Khan not to be disloyal to the Qajar Shah, a promise to which he was faithful for some time. We will also see documents sent to London by the British ambassador, the military attaché and others which said Reza Khan had colluded with Russian Bolsheviks, and that he was a patriot who only thought about his country. So, perhaps it would be appropriate, for the sake of being recorded in history, to take a new look at him in an unbiased manner and admit that Reza Shah, with all his good and bad characteristics, was a self-made, independent-minded, and obstinate Iranian who with perseverance, within the boundaries and limitations of his time and his contemporaries, attempted and sacrificed himself for the salvation and revival of Iran.


Here, I wish to draw your attention to two salient points. First, my research, studying books and going through documents, all indicate that at the time of Reza Khan, who later became Reza Shah, people did not talk about or asked for democracy. On the contrary, they were longing for a competent central power, for which they used the word “dictatorship,” that would be able to first provide safety and security throughout the country, and then fix the miserable economic conditions. It is noteworthy that during the last years of the Qajar dynasty, Iranian governments under various Prime Ministers were dependent on receiving a monthly stipend/assistance from Britain to cover employees’ salaries and other expenses! Approaching the end of his life, Dariyoush Homayoun writes:

Intellectuals of that era, being closer to the Constitutional [Movement] and the facts of that era, considered cultural renaissance, economic revival, creating infrastructure such as university, hospitals, railroad, women’s education and modern justice system as the most important parts of the constitutional ideals. They simply and clearly believed if a huge section of the citizenry is hungry, ill, illiterate, deprived of clean potable water, it would not only not seek political and media freedom, but also would not benefit from them.

Secondly, it would obviously be unfair for those who are today residing in southern France, southern California and Stanford University, to totally disregard the fact that people at that time were only longing for sustenance and security and pompously declare that Reza Shah’s behavior was not democratic! It is utterly unfortunate that even today, after about a century later, we do not see a sliver of democracy and democratic behavior in the entire Middle East and its rulers.

The following 6-page declassified document is a telegram sent to London in 1922 by Sir Percy Loraine, the British ambassador in Iran, in which he provides a perspective of Reza Khan and his characteristics.

Telegram by Sir Percy Loraine providing a perspective of Reza Khan



one of
daughter of the "Muhajerin", or the refugee inhabitants of
the Caucasian districts wrested by Russia from Persia by the
Treaty of Turkomanchai, who preferred to emigrate to Persia
rather than remain in their native land under Russian rule.
He told me that he has been serving in the Persian military
forces since he was fifteen years of age, and his heart is
evidently centred on his Military career. He is a powerfully
built, well set up, big boned man, well above the average height,
with a quiet voice and a direct manner of speech which is most
unusual in a Persian. He gets straight to what he has to say
and does not waste time in exchanging the delicately phrased
but perfectly futile compliments so dear to the Persian heart.
In what conversation he has had with me so far, he has never
spoken for himself, nor for the Government of which he is a
member, but only ^{on} behalf of his country, and his references
to foreign powers have been merely concerned with the influence,
beneficial or otherwise, which they can exert on Persia's prosperity
and development.

It is only natural that having regard to his origin and
~~his~~ humble upbringing, Reza Khan should be an ignorant and uneducated
man: nevertheless he betrays no awkwardness of manner, nor self
consciousness, he has considerable natural dignity, and neither
his speech nor his features reveal any absence of self control.
In speaking with him I had rather the impression of an unemployed
brain than of an empty one, but of one which was seeking to grasp
and assimilate the new field of vision which fresh and unexpected
responsibilities had thrust upon it and was striving, not without
success, to distinguish and fasten on the main issues, and to
form independently its own conclusions. I felt, in fact, that
His Excellency was a very promising pupil in the school of
responsibilities, that his patriotism was of a much more practical
and serious order than is common among his compatriots and that
he



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that he was really setting his shoulder to the wheel to lift his country out of the ever deepening rut into which it has sunk owing to the incapacity and folly of its rulers.

Your Lordship is well aware of the circumstances of Reza Khan's rise to power. I need not recapitulate them, and it will suffice to say that, having been selected as an instrument, he has proved himself a master, to the discomfiture of many of his aristocratic compatriots who had no idea that a man whom they regard as an ignorant parvenu could spring so swiftly and so inconveniently into the front rank; and indeed, the "ignorant parvenu" must be possessed of exceptional will power and singleness of purpose to have achieved this result. So far as I can ascertain, Reza Khan has not enriched himself unduly and has not allowed monetary considerations to influence his judgement. He has secured funds sufficient to build himself a commodious house suitable to his present station, and has no doubt accepted what pass in this country as courtesy presents from persons anxious to enjoy his favour, but judged by Persian standards, with the elastic nature of which Your Lordship is well acquainted, his attitude in this respect is not open to censure and the public do not accuse him either of venality or corruption. It is within my knowledge that not long ago he had a sum, of Tomans 150,000 tucked away in the Bank: he himself made no secret of it, and called it his reserve fund. Whether or not however, he intended this money for his own personal use later on, I have it as a positive fact that during the last few months of financial stringency, he has spent every Kran of it on his troops.

The submissive respect with which he is treated is almost comical: he apparently has a very rough

rough edge to his tongue, which his fellow countrymen are not spared, however highly placed they may be; Persians are quite unaccustomed to this sort of treatment, and they seem to be just as puzzled how to deal with him as Jack Hearne was the first time he bowled to Mr. Jessop and was hit over the ropes about three or four times in each over. Reza Khan seems even to have struck with ^{his} ~~his~~ the august heart of His Imperial Majesty. I am informed, and it may well be true, that the Shah had for sometime been in an extremity of doubt whether, in his personal interest, it was wiser to back Reza Khan or Qavam es Saltaneh, and that his determination to evade the issue by bolting was the main reason for his precipitate departure at an inclement season most unfavourable for travelling. This means at least that the Shah hesitated to throw in his lot with the Persian magnates and bureaucracy, notwithstanding their unrivalled powers of intrigue and passive ejection, against the solitary but highly inconvenient intruder.

The military Attaché has kept me regularly informed of the progress made in respect of training, discipline and demeanour of the army which Reza Khan is creating; his reports have shown a great and rapid improvement which is unquestionably due to Reza Khan's strong personality and driving power. The day before the Shah's departure a review was held in His Majesty's honour on the big parade ground in the middle of the town, of the forces now stationed in the Capital, some 6,000 strong, at which the foreign representatives and their staffs were invited to attend. I thus had an opportunity of forming my own opinion and, recollecting the old fashioned Persian "Sarbaz" who constituted the rag-tag and bob-tail infantry of my earlier stay in Persia, I could hardly believe my own eyes at seeing the new troops, of all arms, marching, performing evolutions, doing manual and physical drill with a smartness.




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a steadiness and a precision which would compare not unfavourably with some second class European armies. The only person who seemed completely bored with the whole proceedings, was His Imperial Majesty who, during his inspection of the troops, did not deign to address a single word to a single officer or man on parade.

Of Reza Khan's future it is difficult to speak with any certainty. By all accounts he is an ambitious man and aims at concentrating all authority in his own hands: some believe that his aspirations reach even as high as the throne itself. I can only say that, except that he has hitherto subordinated all other interests to those of the army under his command, he has wielded the authority which he actually possesses with comparative restraint and moderation. When Qawam es Saltaneh fell he could undoubtedly have become Prime Minister had he wished to do so: but he felt that he would be getting too far out of his depth. His attitude towards the Mejlis is one of contemptuous toleration: he regards them as a set of tiresome, but on the whole fairly innocuous cacklers. He is, I think, genuinely anxious to have his country reformed and to see it stand on its own legs, but I fear that he relies too much on the Army as the instrument of its regeneration and, through lack of general education and experience, rather discounts other essential factors in that process. It would, in my opinion, be most unwise to offer Reza Khan our support, even if we had justification for doing so: if the conviction with which I have sought to imbue him, that England is the only real and disinterested friend of Persia, sinks into his mind, he will insensibly turn to us when difficulties arise for him, as they are bound to do, and we must then avoid any appearance of placing him under our protection. Meanwhile,



Meanwhile, I shall endeavour to keep touch with him, without
 in the present sensitive state of public opinion compromising
 him in any way, and keep him enlightened, as regards the true
 state of affairs in matters of mutual interest to our two
 countries.

I have the honour to be with the highest respect,
 My Lord,
 Your Lordship's most obedient,
 humble Servant,
Percy Loraine

The next document is a page that is placed over Loraine’s telegram. The top block contains the gist of the telegram.

The bottom block, which seems to be Curzon’s hand-written comment, might be interesting to many:

“Very interesting. I wonder whether Reza is of the stuff of which Diaz, Mohammad Ali & Nadir Shah were made? That he is half Caucasian is in his favour.”

By Diaz he could mean a Mexican strong general and president who brought great progress and modernization to his country. Mohammad Ali could be Mohammad Ali Pasha, viceroy of Egypt, who put an end to Egypt’s traditional society and crashed all rebels.

Legation must avoid any appearance of placing him
 under our protection.
 Copy India Office
 Colonial Office.
 War Office.

L. Oliphant March 23. 1922.

Very interesting. I wonder whether
 Reza is of the stuff of which Diaz,
 Mohammed Ali, & Nadir Shah were
 made? That he is half Caucasian
 is in his favour.

R.C.L.
 Mar. 20
26

(Action completed.) *31/3*
 (Index) *of*
 Next Paper.
 E 3114.


OTC
 Mar 25

285973—W1 4880/258—97 M.—3-21. W. & S. Ltd. 1903

<p>109</p> <p>1922</p>	<p>E.</p> <p>128</p>	<p>E 3074</p>
<p>Registry Number E 3074/8/34</p> <p>FROM Sir P. Loraine (Tehran)</p> <p>No. 62.</p> <p>Dated Jan. 31st 1922.</p> <p>Received March 20th 1922</p> <p>E: Persia</p>	<p>Position and ambitions of Reza Khan, Persian Minister for War. 16</p> <p>Refers to Tehran telegram No. 21 of 11th January (E 538/8/34). Contains account of Reza Khan's antecedents and of the impressions which Sir P. Loraine has formed of him. Transmits copy of memorandum prepared by Mr. Smart on conversation between Sir P. Loraine and Reza Khan which took place on 22nd January, in which latter explained his attitude towards His Majesty's Government and gave his views on the policy of His Majesty's Government in Persia.</p>	
<p>Last Paper.</p> <p>E 3069</p>	<p>(Minutes) <i>The King's Cabinet.</i></p> <p>Sir P. Loraine's estimate of Reza Khan is decidedly encouraging. While he is ^{not} free from the vices of most of his compatriots his heart ^{seems} appears to be in the right place, and appears to justify some hope of his proving satisfactory. This appreciation does not, I fear, coincide with Mr. Armitage Smith's view of the man whom he regards as bad even among Persians!</p>	
<p>(Copy) A</p> <p><i>Persia</i></p> <p>PRINTED</p>	<p>Sir P. Loraine is wise in deciding that the Legation must avoid any appearance of placing him under our protection.</p> <p>Copy India Office Colonial Office. War Office.</p>	
<p>(How disposed of.)</p> <p>✓ (L. 14) S.O. ✓ (41) S.O. ✓ (41) S.O.</p> <p>Mar 31.</p>	<p>L. Plunkett. March 23. 1922.</p>	
<p>(Action completed.)</p> <p>31/3</p>	<p>(Index)</p> <p>of</p>	<p>Very interesting. I wonder whether Reza is of the stuff of which Diaz, Mohammed Ali, & Nadir Shah were made? That he is half Caucasian is in his favour.</p> <p><i>R.C.L.</i> Mar. 20</p> <p><i>G.C.</i> Mar 25</p>
<p>Next Paper.</p> <p>E 3114.</p>	<p>385073-W1-4880/558-47 M.-3-21. W. & S. Ltd. 1903</p>	

Memorandum of Conversation between Sir Percy Loraine and Minister of War (Reza Khan)

The British Ambassador had a conversation with Minister of War, Reza Khan, the summary of which was prepared by W. A. Smart and enclosed with the previous telegram sent to London.



the Northern Oil. If England tried to get the Northern Oil Russia would make great difficulties for Persia. He thought it best to let the Americans get in there, before Russia became strong enough to turn out both the English and the Americans. He was not without knowledge of the oil question in its world aspects, but he thought it rather bad luck that Persia should have to turn in the rivalry of Anglo-American oil competition. In reply to an enquiry by His Majesty's Minister he said that he did not at all object to Anglo-American participation in the Northern Oil, provided that the thing was done in the name of the Americans, and British participation was kept in the background. This was the only way of disarming Russian hostility to Persia.

His Majesty's Minister suggested that it would be better to leave the oil question alone for six months to settle itself. If England, America and Persia were in agreement, Russia could do nothing.


Sirdar Sipah concluded by assuring His Majesty's Minister that he was a friend of England and not a pro-Bolshevik. His Majesty's Minister accepted his assurances with satisfaction, and said that he felt that this conversation would greatly advance the cause of an Anglo-Persian rapprochement.

W. A. SMART.

The following handwritten notes on Reza Khan's business card and the Ministry of War's letterhead debunks his opponents' claim that he was illiterate.


سردار سپه
Sardar-e-Sepah
 سردار سپه
 سردار سپه
 سردار سپه


نمونه‌ای از دستخط سردار سپه بر روی کارت ویزیت او



The document below, a telegram from the British Ambassador to London on 4/17/1922, has two salient points:

1. The fact that Reza Khan states to the Ambassador that “if the British views prevail in Turkish negotiations and Genoa conference our [British] position in Persia will be enormously strengthened...” shows that Sardar Sepah was fully aware of and understood international events and their impacts on Iran.
2. The fact that the Ambassador tells Reza Khan “that Persia’s attempt to stand by herself was a failure...” shows that Reza Khan has been trying to make Iran stand on her own feet and independent of foreign countries.





Also of interest is the Ambassador's draft of the private and confidential letter written to the British Consul in Kermanshah in page 2, of which he writes:

"One day he may, and very likely will, want our direct assistance, but he is an independent character, and we had better await the occasion."

149 # L18.

Tehran,
April 15, 1922

British Legation,
Tehran.

Draft.

N.P. Curran Esquire
Kermanshah
Private & Confidential

279/3
Mr. Sec^y
to Sec.

My dear Curran,
Many thanks for your interesting letter of March 28th.
As regards my relations with Sardar Sepah. They are fundamentally very good: I see very little of him however, & for a cause, because he is now so manifestly anti-BE that he is generally supposed, & the Russians of course sadly mislead the belief, to be absolutely in our pocket, to do nothing without consulting this Legation, & to be financed by us secretly. Of course this is all humbug & quite untrue. But as I have anticipated for some time, Bolshevism being utterly antagonistic to all he thinks & cares about, the inexorable pressure of circumstances is driving

him, without my lifting a finger, into our camp. One day he may, & very likely will, want our direct assistance, but he is an independent character, & we had better await the occasion. On the rare occasions of our meeting, he is very friendly & ready to listen, & his relations with M.A. are also excellent. Briefly, it would be a serious mistake to compromise him by any ^{close or} overt association with him, though of course, when I do see him, I never make any secret of ^{doing so} ~~it~~. I don't mind a bit what I say to him, & he takes it remarkably well. His army is his passion, & he has done very good work with it in deed.



I am asking Monson, who has succeeded Bridgeman as Counsellor, to talk to Molitor about your Customs Belgians & will let you know the

Here is a secret Intelligence Report by the British Military Attaché, which was sent by the Ambassador to London.

...Reza Khan... is opposed to executive power being given to British officer instructors...

The Shah has been intriguing with Reza Khan for the removal of Sayed Zia...

The Russian legation...secretly encourages Reza Khan and his adherents.




Intelligence Summaries sent to London ...

Another report by the Military Attaché indicates:

...Reza Khan sent a secret cypher message to the Persian staff officers...to keep him minutely informed of all troops movements and threatened sever punishment...

...he is afraid of British officers gaining more control of the men than he has...and it remains to be seen what further pressure Reza Khan can bring to bear in order to ensure their removal.



Yet another report reads: The Persian Government... regarding the retention of British officers...it no longer requires these officers...and requests their withdrawal...The real reason for their removal is undoubtedly the pressure brought to bear by the Russian Government, added to the marked opposition ...by the War Minister, who is openly anti-British, and working in close touch with Rotstein.

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 8.—ARCHIVES.

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PERSIA.

[August 24.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[E 9650/2004/34]

No. 1.

Mr. Norman to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 24.)

(No. 120.)

Tehran, July 13, 1921.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 113 of the 3rd July, 1921, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of Intelligence Summaries Nos. 9 and 10 for the weeks ending 2nd and 9th July, compiled by Lieutenant-Colonel Saunders, military attaché to this Legation.

I have, &c.
H. NORMAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

Intelligence Summary No. 9, for week ending July 2, 1921.

Gilan.

THE delegates of the Persian Government are still in conference with Kuchik Khan at Kasma, and have requested the Persian Government to take no military action until the conference is over.

The rebel forces in Gilan and Mazanderan, however, have not been inactive.

Masulia was reported to have been occupied by Kuchik Khan's forces on the 28th June, who are said to be preparing the way for an advance by that route on Zinjan. West of Masulia on the Zinjan-Ardebil road a detachment of 300-400 Shahsevans under Haji Baba Ardebili is co-operating in the rebel movement. These detachments are opposed by gendarmes from Zinjan.

Qualu Qurban's detachment, partly at Resht and partly astride the main road on the Siah Rud position, has shown no activity and appears to be purely on the defensive. It is opposed by the main body of the Persian Cossack division, who have remained in the same positions at Jubin and Menjil for over two months.

East of the Safid Rud rebels are reported to be holding Aubu (24 miles north-north-east of Kazvin (D.S.8L.), and the Salamber Pass at the eastern end of Aluhamut (D.S.8L.). These are opposed by the detachment of Persian Cossacks sent from Kazvin as described in last week's summary.

Farther east, Kudjur is held by Persian Cossacks on a line running roughly north-east and south-west. This detachment had orders to advance and drive the rebels westward, but since taking up this line it has remained stationary.

Saed-ed-Dowleh, the rebel commander in the Tunekabun area, is reported to have handed over his command to Ihsanullah Khan, and to have proceeded by boat to Gumish Tappeh to induce the Turkomans to co-operate in the rebel movement. There has been for some weeks past considerable unrest amongst the Turkomans in this area, and the Governor of Astrabad reports that the situation is serious.

This rebel movement in North Persia is obviously co-ordinated, and everything points to the movement being controlled and directed by Russian Bolsheviks in touch with Rotstein. That the Kemalists are watching the movement is shown by the arrival a few days ago at Kuchik Khan's headquarters of six Turkish Kemalists agents.

Reza Khan, the War Minister, visited his troops at Kazvin, Menjil, and Jubin on the 30th June, and is still showing a masterly inactivity in dealing with the situation.

The Persian Government, in replying to His Britannic Majesty's Minister regarding the retention of British officers with the Persian Cossack division, states that it no longer requires these officers for financial reasons, and requests their withdrawal. It thanks them for their services and proposes to bestow decorations on individuals. Instructions have been given to these officers to concentrate at Kazvin, whence, after receiving the pay due to them, they will evacuate to Bagdad. Difficulty in obtaining their pay from the Persian Government is anticipated. The real reason for their removal is undoubtedly the pressure brought to bear by the Russian Government,

[6712 aa-1]

B

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added to the marked opposition to their employment by the War Minister, who is now openly anti-British, and working in close touch with Rotstein.

Reports as to the actual number of Russians left in Gilan are rather confusing. The most reliable of these state that there are at Resht and Enzeli about 150, mostly civilians, a few of whom have taken service with the rebels. A reliable report states that Russian staff officers are employed at rebel headquarters in Mazanderan (under Saad-ed-Dowleh). . . . of Russian gold 10-rouble pieces are now in circulation.

The Military Attaché writes in another report that: "Reza Khan had a secret interview with Rothstein, which lasted two hours. These interviews take place at frequent intervals.

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- 6 -

Banned

An anti-British propaganda leaflet, printed in Persian, was distributed in the city a few days ago. Translation attached (see appendix "A").

ROSENBAUM, the Russian Assistant Military Attaché, left Teheran on June 27th for Moscow with despatches.

NADIRKO, formerly Secretary to the Russian Consul at RESHT, has been temporarily appointed Russian Consul at Teheran until LEVIN returns.

Rotstein has requisitioned all property belonging to the official representative of the Azerbaijan Republic in Teheran. This has been done through the Persian Government, instructions having been sent to this effect by the present Soviet Government at BAKU.

On June 23rd, the War Minister, REZA KHAN had a secret interview with ROTSTEIN which lasted two hours. These interviews take place at frequent intervals.

1st

~~FRABAD.~~ A reliable report dated June 21st states that a detachment of Russian troops is concentrating at HASAN QULI (S.E. corner of Caspian Sea). The trading boats which arrive there from MAZANDERAN are not allowed to return.

The Governor of ASTRABAD is concerned at the indiscipline of the local Persian troops, who refuse to take the field owing to not having received pay for some months.

copies to Director of Military Intelligence, War Office, Chief of General Staff Simla, General Headquarters Baghdad, and Military Attaché Meshed.

M. Saunders
Lieut-Colonel,
British Military Attaché.
Teheran.

To:-- E.E.M. Minister, Teheran. (2 copies).
Copy to:-- Dir. of Mil. Intelligence, War Office, London.
Chief of the General Staff, Simla, India.
General Headquarters, Baghdad.
Military Attaché, Meshed.

7-6712 aa



Reza Khan

The following document, containing an admission of the British ambassador that Reza Khan works against British interests certainly appears to debunk Reza Khan's enemies' theory that he was brought to power by the British, especially when one remembers that Seyed Zia publicly took pride for being an Anglophile.

Minister of War...and Shah have, after long struggle, succeeded in forcing Prime Minister out of office...***All my efforts to dissuade conspirators from this disastrous intrigue failed, owing to the fact that, since withdrawal of our troops, Minister of War no longer fears us.***

The next document is part of Churchill's handwritten document and Oliphant's note on the same document.

The Following paragraph was contained in Mr. Norman's dispatch No. 29 of March 3, reporting the composition of Seyed Zia's Cabinet:

*Besides Major Masud Khan, the movement which produced the recent change of Government had two military leaders. Of these one, Reza Khan Mirpanj (General), retains the chief command of the Persian forces. **He is an honest and capable officer without political aspirations.***

Reza Khan received the title of Serdar Sipah and became Minister of War in March. He has evidently fallen a victim to Mr. Rothstein's intrigues. I do not believe that the Shah trusts Reza Khan any more than he did Seyed Zia and we will not have long to wait before Reza Khan is banished.

The position is certainly very unsatisfactory but there appears to be nothing better to do than to remain entirely aloof as proposed by Mr. Norman. Mr. Norman was quit right to stop future supplies of munitions and officers.

Reza Khan has fallen to Rothestein's (Russian Amb.) intrigues

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[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 8.—ARCHIVES.

PERSIA. [May 26.]

CONFIDENTIAL. **SECTION 1.**

[E 6940/2/34] No. 1.

Mr. Norman to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 310.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, May 25, 1921.*

MINISTER of War, who is also commander of Cossack division, and Shah have, after long struggle, succeeded in forcing Prime Minister out of office. His ~~Excellency~~ ^{Highness} leaves for Bagdad 25th May.

All my efforts to dissuade conspirators from this disastrous intrigue failed, owing to fact that, since withdrawal of our troops, Minister of War no longer fears us, and Shah, afraid of Prime Minister, who has been represented to His Majesty as a dangerous Bolshevik, who means to arrest and perhaps kill him, put his whole trust in Minister of War, who is in supreme command of all military forces.

Courtiers, priests, officials and other corrupt elements, whose interests had been affected by comprehensive reforms initiated by Prime Minister, naturally supported intrigue, while some popular discontent has been caused by a recent increase in municipal taxation, which has not been accompanied by a fall in cost of living.

Minister of War, an ignorant but astute peasant, who has risen from the ranks, may himself assume Presidency of the Council or appoint a nonentity. He has given oral assurances of his readiness to co-operate with us, to accept British control of Ministry of Finance and of accounts of Ministry of War and to retain British officers in the north as instructors, but without executive powers. He is, however, not to be trusted, and is anyhow so politically inexperienced that his régime offers little prospect of stability.

Russian Minister is generally credited with an active part in movement, and is said to have offered Minister of War munitions and money for army unconditionally, with or without Russian officers.

Ostensible reason for Minister of War's action was Prime Minister's proposal to give British officers executive powers, but, though he is undoubtedly jealous of foreign interference in army, I believe this to be largely a pretext, his chief motive being ambition.

I think our only course is to abstain from offering advice and maintain an attitude of reserve till the policy of new Government, formation of which will probably be delayed, is clear.

Russian Minister is said to have suggested to Shah that new Prime Minister should be a neutral, *i.e.*, neither pro-British nor pro-Russian.

Shah is now entirely in the hands of Minister of War, who is, for the moment, a dictator. Military attaché, at my request, has telegraphed to Director of Military Intelligence, India, and Bagdad to stop despatch of any further munitions or officers for the present, and Financial Adviser is supplying no more money.

Energy, honesty and constructive effort of Prime Minister's three months' administration has been beyond all praise.

Minister of War is, I believe, honestly anti-Bolshevik, but future, nevertheless, inspires me with gravest misgivings.

(Sent to India, Bagdad and consular officers.)

[6248 cc-1]

(H)

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The following passage was contained in Mr. Norman's despatch N^o. 29 of March 3rd reporting the composition of Seyed Zia's Cabinet:-

Besides Major Masud Khan, the movement which produced the recent change of Government had two other military leaders. Of these one, Reza Khan Mir Panj (General), retains the chief command of the Persian forces. He is an honest and capable officer without political aspirations.

Reza Khan received the title of Serdar Sipah and became Minister of War in March. He has evidently fallen a victim to M. Rostein's intrigues.

I do not believe that the Shah trusts Reza Khan any more than he did Seyed Zia and we will not have long to wait before Reza Khan is banished.

The position is certainly very unsatisfactory but there appears to be nothing better to do than to remain entirely aloof as proposed by Mr. Norman.

Mr. Norman was quite right to stop

stop further supplies of munitions
and officers.

gr. Reply approving his action
and concur in his proposal to stand
aloof.

G. Clarendon

26 MAY 1921

The future outlook is
certainly grave but Mr. Norman's
proposal is the only practical
one in present circumstances.

gr. act as proposed.

L. Diphkant
26 May.


A Draft Tel. is submitted.

R.L.L.
May 26

At the bottom of another telegram, in which is reported that Reza Khan has asked Rothstein for money to pay his troops, Churchill writes: The reported action of Reza Khan, the Cossack officer who is new Minister of War, shows that he is thoroughly pro-Russian.

<p>221 1921</p>	<p>EASTERN.</p> <p>PERSIA. 84</p>	<p>162 E 7118</p>
<p>Registry } E 7118/2/34 Number }</p> <p>TELEGRAM FROM <u>Military Attaché.</u> <u>(Tehran) to D.M.I.</u> No. C 37/24.</p> <p>Dated 15th June 1921. Received 21st " 1921.</p> <p>E: Persia.</p>	<p><u>Persian request to Bolsheviks for money.</u></p> <p>Reza Khan asked Rothstein for money to pay troops. Latter replied that he had Ts 3,000,000 at his disposal but must refer question to Moscow, and should Moscow agree no British Officer must remain in the force.</p>	
<p>Last Paper.</p> <p>E 4024</p>	<p>(Minutes.) File 99. p. V</p>	
<p>(Print.)</p>	<p>See minutes within. 23/6/21.</p>	
<p>(How disposed of.)</p>	<p>AR Maslen</p> <p>4 N 98</p> <p>FO 371/6404 11136056</p> <p>Return by (23/04/2018 08:45:02) doris spl8774307 (Hywel Maslen)</p> <p>Closure status: Open</p>	


Reza Khan... is thoroughly pro-Russian



In another document, the British Ambassador sends a Financial Adviser's opinion for Curzon's consideration:

Greatest difficulty is that Minister of War, who commands Cossacks, dominates the Cabinet, obtains most of the funds in the Treasury, and if the Medjlis does not succeed in controlling his demands, the only remedy is to cut all supplies until he is disposed of.

The only remedy is to cut off all supplies until he is disposed of



It is interesting for any observer to note that per released documents, Reza Khan, a person who was considered by the British politicians and some Iranians as an inexperienced common peasant, played the British and the Russians against each other. It is for this reason that Dr. Cyrus Ghani, in his book, *Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah*, writes that Reza Khan: “adapted and learned so quickly that he could have given Machiavelli lessons in statecraft.”

His policy has been to have neither foreign advisors nor troops

Below is a secret telegram to London which proves the above. It is reported that Reza Khan "replied Rothstein that he and the Persian force would oppose to the best of their ability any return of Russian troops, appealing to the British for assistance and that he would put himself entirely in British hands. He told me that from the commencement his policy has been to have neither foreign advisers or foreign troops in the country..."

84

PARAPHRASE. SECRET.

Despatched 1730 5/9/21.
Received 1000 7/9/21.

From:- B.M.A.Teheran.

To:- D.N.I.
repeated Baghdad, India.

131 cipher 5/9. 1st of 3 parts.

Reference my telegram No: 129 September 2nd. I was informed by War minister yesterday that Rotstein had told him owing to conduct of Israelenko affair (see telegram Nb. 477 dated 29th from minister to Foreign Office) Rotstein has refused to take steps to secure peace settlement with K.K. He spoke very bitterly against Rotstein accusing him of having broken his word. He considers Soviet Government is supporting K.K., on advice of Rotstein, in order to maintain Revolutionary centre in Gilan and to continue uncontrolled export of foodstuffs. He stated Glykalo was at Enzeli and that he had received a report that a volunteer force was being organized in Baku for operations in Persia.

Part 2.

He told me that over the Israelenko affair Rotstein had been very abusive to him, threatening to remove Russian Legation from Persia and to take severer measures meaning of course another invasion of Soviet troops. He replied Rotstein that he and the Persian force would oppose to the best of their ability any return of Russian troops, appealing to the British for assistance and that he would put himself entirely in British hands. He told me that from the commencement his policy has been to have neither foreign advisers or foreign troops in the country and that on no account would he tolerate a Belshhevik invasion and if driven back, he, his troops and the Shah would retire south to Ispahan or Shiraz.

A complete collapse...of British prestige and influence

It is very interesting, and frankly heartwarming, that about a year later, the British Foreign Secretary in a letter to the Ambassador in Iran laments about **“A complete collapse for the moment of British prestige and influence in that country”!**

COPY.
Confidential.

Hackwood,
Basingstoke,
May 30th, 1922.

My dear Loraine,

I have never been able to write to you, since you went to Persia, tho' I am in your debt for one letter a recent telegram after my health.

It is the latter alone, or the want of it, that enables me to write now. For I am ill in bed, flat on my back, at Hackwood, and Mr. Balfour is acting for me for 4 - 6 weeks. Hence a certain measure of relaxation which I take advantage of (in circumstances of great physical difficulty) to send you a line.

I consider that you have played a very difficult part with much tact and ability since you arrived in Teheran. What a topsy turvy world it is. Here we have the only country (our own) which is disinterestedly interested in Persia. We have spent or rather wasted millions upon it in the last 10 years. I gave, I think a fair synopsis in the paper I wrote for the Americans about American advisers. Here also you have a British Foreign...

-2-

Foreign Minister who has devoted more years of labour in the last 35 years to the cause of Persian integrity and freedom than most other people have devoted days or hours. And what is the result of it all? **A complete collapse for the moment of British prestige and influence in that country;** and, as I judge, the universal execration of the aforesaid friend. Now from what does all this come?

(1) I have often wondered whether Sir Percy Cox, for whom I have the warmest esteem, Vossugh-ed-Dowleh and the Ferhan Farma family consciously deceived us when the Agreement was under discussion. Cox always avers that had he stayed none of these evil consequences would have ensued. But I surrendered him to Mesopotamia, an unselfish, and on the above theory, a suicidal act.

(2) Then came Norman's régime, about which I can scarcely speak with equanimity and which seems to me to have rattled the bricks out of a perhaps none too stable structure with a remorseless and tireless rapidity surely unequalled in diplomatic history.

(3) Next came the attitude of the Cabinet at home and particularly..



I wish to once again ask for your indulgence to review a couple of documents that could prove to be revealing as well as educational. The first one is a report by Sir Percy Loraine, the British Ambassador to the Foreign Secretary in London on official letterhead with embossed Royal Coat of Arms featuring a shield with a crown on top and lion and a unicorn on the sides.

It is about people taking refuge “bast” بست نشستن in the Russian Embassy in Tehran. It is impossible to determine whether the story about Mr. Farrokhi is true or not, but there is no doubt about people taking refuge in both British and Russian embassies. I have also read a lot about the abusive behavior of some newspapers making fabricated and unfounded allegations against some influential personalities; however, the worst and most shameful part reflected in this report is about agitators attacking innocent Iranian Jews and Bahais. I am embarrassed to state that I have personally witnessed such despicable acts committed by some people in Iran at the outset of the Islamic Revolution for which I am still, after 40 years, disturbed, and as a person believing in Human Rights, apologize profusely to the victims of such savage attacks and violations.

The "bast" in the Russian Legation

No. 234.

4c
British Legation,
Tehran,

274
5893
12 1922
April 21st 1922.

MY Lord,

With reference to my telegram No. 155⁽¹⁾ of the 20th March last, I have the honour to inform Your Lordship that the "bast" in the Russian Legation is practically finished, the original refugee, Farokhi, being alone left there completely abandoned by his erstwhile supporters.

It may not be without interest for Your Lordship if I review briefly the causes and results of this "bast" and the efforts which certain "agents provocateurs", almost certainly in the pay of the Russian Legation, made to create by that means a great demonstration against the existing Government in general and against the Minister of War in particular, and so enhance the prestige of the Russian Soviet Legation as the representative of freedom for the masses, and purposely cause the downfall of the only man, the present Minister of War, who to-day by his prestige and watchfulness is preventing the machinations and intrigues of the pro-Bolshevik elements from gaining ground.

Shortly after the opening of the fourth parliament, newspapers started to appear in considerable quantities, a former Minister of Education, Muntaz-ed-Dowleh, having accorded permission for some thirty five newspapers in Tehran. Before the opening of Parliament there had been a very strict control over newspapers by the military Government, and it was expected that the Military

Government

The Most Honourable

The Marquis Curzon of Kedleston K.G.,
etc., etc., etc.,

(1) File 7 (2)

Government would cease to function when the people's representatives should gather in the Mejlis. This however was not so and the activities of the press remained still curbed to a great extent. At the beginning of the autumn however, various editors of obscure papers began to resort to the familiar blackmail of former times, attacking all and sundry who refused to pay them to keep quiet. There was no sphere outside the range of their vituperations and one or two newspapers were suppressed and one or two editors banished or punished in other ways. There is no Press Law in Persia and no responsibility. Banishment and punishment of penniless agitating editors had no effect and only incensed their colleagues of similar standing.

About that time there was considerable coolness between the Russian Soviet Representative and the Minister of War and the former was undoubtedly subsidising some of the papers indulging in abuse of Ministers, Deputies, British institutions and even at times British officials.

Following on the banishment of a certain editor, Zia-ul-Vaezin, at the hands of the Minister of War, other Editors the leader of whom was a man called Farokhi, published their papers containing a torrent of abuse of the War Minister and almost before their papers were in the hands of the public, scuttled off to take refuge in the Russian Soviet Legation. There they were joined by a band of some forty malcontents and agitators who from their place of refuge sent out invitations to all and sundry to come and join them in their fight for freedom against the tyranny and repression of the War Minister and



Percy Loraine

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and the existing Military Governorships. They even offered a daily allowance in money to all who would come, but being people of no means themselves, it is to be inferred that their hosts were ready to supply the money. Many people visited the refugees during the day, more for reasons of curiosity than anything else, but very few joined them.

Their object was now clearly stated to be the abolition of the Military Governorships, so that they would be entirely free from any restraint and attack whomsoever they pleased in their papers and the abolition of the Military Governorships in the North would give a free hand to their hosts who could send over from Baku as many propagandists and agitators as they pleased to undermine at their pleasure the authority of the Central Government in that part of Persia.

These refugees were obviously beyond the power of the Persian Government and despite the fact that it was pointed out to the Russian Soviet Minister that his harbouring of such people was not in accordance with the Perso Russian Agreement, he refused to turn them out. In order to solve this difficulty resort was had to the cleaner section of the Press and a violent propaganda was set in motion against the refugees with such good effect that it rallied the mass of the people to the side of the Government and little by little the refugees melted away.

It was not without a considerable struggle however that the Russian and Persian agitators saw their plan failed. They started another popular cry, that of appealing for the Constitutional Law to be fully applied, but they made no impression on the populace. They even exploited a little local trouble between Jews and Mussulmans, urging the Mussulmans to raid the Jewish quarter and the Jews to come and take refuge with their co-religionists
of the

of the Soviet Legation. This agitation was also stopped by the War Minister putting his own armed guards in the Jewish quarter and thereby assuring the Jews safety. The agitators next tried to urge the Mussulman population against the Bahais and invited the Bahais to take fright and find refuge in the Soviet Legation. This agitation also bore no fruit and in the meantime the refugees had dwindled down to a round half dozen.

The "bast" finally came to an end when one evening somewhat late, Farokhi's last few friends went round to his tent to discuss certain matters and found him engaged in an unnameable act with a small boy. The sight of that seems to have been more than even they could tolerate and the next day, Farokhi, the Lord, the Champion of the peoples' rights was abandoned to an ignominious isolation.

I have the honour to be with the highest respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient,

humble Servant,

Percy Foran

The next document apparently is a telegram from the Russian Ambassador in Tehran to his Consul in Bushehr, which was somehow intercepted by the British forces in Iraq and sent as a "Most Secret" message to the War Office in London. It is self-explanatory.

Intercepted Russian telegram

MOST SECRET 57 304 (1)

NOT PARAPHRASED. PRIORITY.

From: H.C. British Forces in Iraq. Desp. 1635 24.9.23.

To: War Office. Recd. 1000 25.9.23.

X.5915 cipher 24th September, 1923. First of Two Parts.

Shumyatsky Teheran to Russian Consul Bushire August 30th.

The Britain revolutionary ^x (also ^x) is expected in a few days in Teheran. Shah is going abroad owing to persuasion of Riza. Crown Prince ^x (? intends) ^x to go to Tabriz, Relespaugh is abandoning Persia on pretext of leave to Beyrout. Riza has recalled Wusuq-Ud-Daulah from Europe. The complications are exceedingly great. Spread this information by means of a third person throughout all classes of the population. The Nationalists should work ⁱⁿ promotion of masses to protect against recall of Wusuq-Ud-Daulah as accused foe of national Persia. Agitate to show that arrival of Wusuq-Ud-Daulah may again break off trade relations of Persia and Russia. There must be strong ^x (mass meetings?) ^x against British action in this matter.

Last Part. They should demand that the Shah remains in Teheran. Without exciting a panic try to employ everything to secure nationalist ascendancy. In view of suspicious events, and to avoid provocative excesses, destroy at once all secret archives and bulletins in Consulate. Send a destruction certificate.

Paragraph 2. Teheran informed under my X.5909 September 20th. Minister asked that you be informed and requests that you will communicate above personally to Mr. Oliphant at Foreign Office.

.....

Note by C.4.(Telegrams). Portions marked x occur in original.

.....

C.4.(Telegrams) Copies to: Major Alston.

The next document, a summary of telegrams sent by Loraine, page two of which is quite revealing:

1. Loraine writes about a plot by Ghavam/Kawam to have Reza Khan assassinated. Four people hired for the job have been arrested and have confessed. Ghavam has left for Europe!
2. Mr. Mallet's handwriting at the bottom of the document in London reads: Kawam has got off lightly!

Those against Reza Khan have perpetuated this myth that the plot was a fake one that was arranged by Reza Khan himself. This document debunks all these claims. Also, considering the fact that per Eastern Committee's decision to pay Kawam "provided that the Kawam remains friendly to us" and in the event of his forced exile, he would be compensated, one can't help but to wonder if: A- The plotter had a wink of approval by London, and B- How much he received while in Europe?


*The Committee decided—
To request the Foreign Office to telegraph to Sir C. Marling
to the effect that—*

- (a.) *His Majesty's Government cannot commit themselves to giving compensation for losses to an unlimited amount, but they were prepared to consider the question if and when such losses are incurred, provided that the Kawam remains friendly to us and that the losses sustained are on account of his friendship with us ;*
- (b.) *In the event of the Kawam's enforced exile, such reasonable compensation as may be decided upon will be paid to him ; and*
- (c.) *In the event of his death in our cause, to his family.*

<p>43</p> <p>1923</p>	<p>E.</p> <p>PERSIA 312</p>	<p>66</p> <p>E 10479</p> <p>25 OCT 1923</p>
<p>Registry } Number } E 10479/77/34</p> <p>TELEGRAM FROM <u>Sir P. Loraine</u> <u>(Tehran)</u></p> <p>No. 343</p> <p>Dated 24th Oct. 1923. Received 25th Oct. 1923.</p> <p>E: Persia</p>	<p><u>Resignation of Persian Government.</u></p> <p>Refers to Tehran telegram No. 337 of October 23rd (E 10452/77/34). Reports resignation of government accepted, minister of war became prime minister and that Shah will leave Persia. Has explained risks to Reza Khan, who is determined to undertake government. He wants British friendship and understands that outstanding questions must be settled. (Sent to India).</p>	
<p>Last Paper.</p> <p>E 10452</p>	<p>(Minutes.)</p> <p>(Political)</p> <p>Political File 119(2)</p> <p>See within</p>	

Qavam's plot to kill Minister of War

<p>Papers submitted. <u>October 25.</u></p>	<p style="text-align: right;">67</p> <p style="text-align: center;">P E R S I A 313</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>Political Situation (119).</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <u>Sir P.Lorraine No.342 (tel) October 24.</u> <p>Qavam-es-Sultaneh's plot to kill Minister of War. There is little doubt as to his guilt and four terrorists who were to be employed have been arrested and have confessed. The dossier will be published in Tehran. Qavam-es-Sultaneh has left for Europe.</p> 2. <u>Sir P.Lorraine No.343 (tel) October 24.</u> <p>The resignation of the Persian Government has been accepted. The Minister of war will become Prime Minister and the Shah will leave Persia. Reza Khan desires British friendship and understands that outstanding questions must be settled.</p>
<p><u>Minutes.</u></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Kavam-es-Sultaneh has got off lightly; copy to India office 2. Serdar Sepah can hardly do worse than his predecessors, and may do a good deal better. The Valiakh will probably take the Shah's place, at any rate




Here is what Mallet's handwriting reads:

1. Kawam es Saltaneh has got off lightly. Copy to India Office.
2. Serdar Sepah can hardly do worse than his predecessors, and may do a good deal better. The Valiahd will probably take the Shah's place, at any rate for a time. He is a poor specimen, but less cowardly than his brother [Ahmad Shah].

Copy to India Office. Mallet 25 OCT 1923

Another eye-opening revelation is in the next telegram, in which Loraine, the British Ambassador, writes: [Ahmad] Shah will certainly leave despite vigorous protest of Minister of War! This means it was intended to keep the Shah in power. This contradicts Reza Shah's opponents who keep repeating that he came to power by the British. It is truly an interesting read.


Shah will certainly leave despite vigorous protest of Minister of War




The next document which has been redacted for unknown reason to me, is about "Political Situation" in Iran. The most interesting part seems to be the handwriting of Mr. Mallet on 20 Oct. 1923, which reads:

2. & 3. The Shah is determined on flight (escape, not boarding an aircraft), and for Sir Percy Loraine to do more than he has already done to dissuade him would be merely inviting a rebuff.

It does not look as if Serdar Sepah were aiming at an immediate overthrow of the Kajar dynasty.




It does not look as if Sardar Sepah were aiming at an immediate overthrow of the Kajar dynasty



Three months later, the Ambassador sends a "Very Confidential" telegram to London writing:

I hear that Russians are encouraging the idea of Persian republic which they consider likely to facilitate their more important aim in India and would acquiesce in presidency of present Prime Minister (Reza Khan) but would get rid of him as soon as they could afterwards. Prime Minister

has certainly been helping so-called socialist candidates in elections and calculating to extort an outwardly legal abrogation of the monarchy and the constitution from a submissive Majlis.



Five days later, Churchill responds: The present Shah, who is now in Paris, has proved a failure and his disappearance from the scene would be no loss.

The present Shah, who is now in Paris, has proved a failure and his disappearance from the scene would be no loss

<p>4</p> <p>1924</p>	<p>E.</p> <p>PERSIA</p>	<p>E. 1045 164</p> <p>FEB 24</p>
<p>Registry Number } E 1046/455/34</p> <p>TELEGRAM FROM <u>Sir P. Lorraine</u> <u>(Tehran)</u></p> <p>No. 35.</p> <p>Dated 31st Jan. 1924. Received 1st Feb. 1924.</p> <p>E: Persia</p>	<p><u>Political situation in Persia.</u></p> <p>Refers to Tehran telegram No. 24 of January 24th (E 804/455/34). Understands Russians encourage idea of Persian republic, and would acquiesce in presidency of present Prime Minister. Enquires what would be general attitude of His Majesty's Government towards change of régime.</p>	
<p>Last Paper.</p> <p>E 804</p>	<p>(Print.)</p>	
<p>References.</p>	<p>The present Shah, who is now in Paris, has proved a failure and his disappearance from the scene would be no loss.</p>	
<p>(How disposed of.)</p> <p>Ag. So. Feb. 6</p>	<p>As India might be affected by the change You consult India office and suggest a reply to the effect that Sir P. Lorraine should be instructed to abstain,</p>	
<p>(Action completed.)</p>	<p>(Index.)</p>	<p>As</p>

As in the past, from all
intervention in Persian
domestic affairs.

W. T. 2/2

1 - FEB 1924

I entirely agree

W.T. 2/2

AC

Feb 2

I agree with you

The next is a report from a British intelligence officer to his commander. I beg your indulgence for the poor quality of the document. As you note, it is typed on a very thin and set paper. The second page shows it is bound in a book by the UK Archives with other documents for preservation purposes. The officer, who had previously served in Iran, writes about his impressions of the change in Iran upon his return to the country:

For some time past Persia has had the novel experience of being governed by a man [Reza Khan] of patriotic ideals and some continuity of purpose...

7. There has, I regret to say, been a falling off in the quantity and quality of the flow of intelligence, particularly in the more important respects. I hope that this will be only temporary.

The last part perhaps means that Iranian informants are now afraid of spying on Iran due to the fear of facing Reza Khan's wrath.

CONFIDENTIAL.

British Legation,
Tehran.
1st June, 1924.

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
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Dear Colonel Muspratt,

I presume that you will wish me to continue the monthly D.O. letters which Colonel Saunders used to send and which have been discontinued since he left.

I will not attempt any review of the events of the past three months: for one thing I have been in Tehran little more than a fortnight; for another they have been generously treated in the Summaries sent in by Ranking and in the Minister's despatches.

2. My impressions on returning to Persia after 2½ years absence may perhaps not be without some small interest. I have known the country since 1911 - intimately during the years 1917 - 1921. I had hoped to see considerable changes but though there is outwardly a very marked improvement in some respects, I confess to being disappointed. Presumptuous though it is to give an opinion so shortly after my return, I have very little hesitation in saying that fundamentally little is changed; the plot of the comedy has altered little. For some time past Persia has had the novel experience of being governed by a man of patriotic ideals and some continuity of purpose; he has had the support of the Army, given solely in their own interest. Never in recent years has the Army held the position in Persia that it has today, or, perhaps it would be safer to say, had yesterday. Never have so many men of low birth and no education held posts of such authority and profit. But there are indications - perhaps still a trifle shadowy - that the people are beginning to show their resentment at the



In order to place yourself in Reza Khan's shoes, or any other Iranian who at that time aspired to save Iran by enabling her to stand on her feet, you would probably need to read the next report. The British Ambassador describes the situation by giving his own, albeit biased and probably in defense of his failures, perspective. It is a dark picture. Even if one assumes only a quarter of it to be true, it causes profound heartfelt pain.

British Ambassador's view of the political situation in Iran

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 8.—ARCHIVES.

PERSIA.

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[August 7.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[E 8049/77/34]

No. 1.

Sir P. Loraine to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 7.)
(No. 301.)

My Lord,

Tehran, June 19, 1923.

I HAD the honour to inform your Lordship in my telegram No. 147 of the 14th May that the Cabinet of his Highness Mustaufi-ul-Mamalek was very insecure; that his parliamentary majority, which was never very large, had been reduced to a narrow margin, and that Nosret-ed-Dowleh and Kawam-es-Sultaneh were intriguing to bring about his downfall. On the 12th June I reported in my telegram No. 185 that the Cabinet had fallen.

During the period between the two above-mentioned dates the parliamentary crisis continued in varying degrees of intensity; the energies of the Government were absorbed in endeavouring to avert defeat; the Opposition left no stone unturned to force a resignation; both sides showed remarkable tenacity of purpose and displayed a degree of energy and resourcefulness which, if directed into more profitable channels, might justify the hope that the salvation of the country may still come from within.

The crisis was undoubtedly precipitated by the approaching end of the 4th Majlis and the general election which had already begun. It is commonly believed in Persia, and probably with reason, that the Government in power has a disproportionate influence over the results of the election of Deputies to the Majlis, both in Tehran and the provinces; in the provinces its influence is exerted through the Governors whom it appoints. To this may be attributed the exceptional rivalry during the last month of the premiership of his Highness Mustaufi-ul-Mamalek.

In the absence of any political tenets, guiding principles or political co-operation of a serious and patriotic kind, the dominating factor in Persian parliamentary manoeuvres is for the most part the personal ambition or cupidity of individual politicians. Political parties, in the Western conception of the term, have not scarcely begun to take shape in the Majlis, which is split up into numerous groups of Deputies, owning, with perhaps one or two exceptions, no definite political programme, and acknowledging only temporary allegiance to various leaders in the hope of personal reward.

In this atmosphere of individual rivalry the advent of a general election supplied the motive for a more definite orientation than is customary of disconnected groups into two distinct camps; the supporters of the Cabinet and the Opposition. The result was a division of the Majlis into two parties of almost equal numbers; a few individual Deputies, rather more unscrupulous than the rest, added zest to the game by transferring their fickle allegiance from one party to another with disconcerting frequency, and with the result that the Government and the Opposition alternately claimed a majority. The mainstay of the Government support was composed of the Nationalist group under the leadership of Suleiman Mirza and Mirza Muhammad Sadik Tabatabai, numbering some twenty Deputies; the Opposition was led by Nosret-ed-Dowleh and his group, of whom the outstanding figure is Sayyid Hassan Modarres, a conceited and narrow-minded bigot. Other important factors in the Opposition were Kawam-es-Sultaneh and his followers, of whom the principal member is Mirza Hashim Ashtiani; Kawam-ed-Dowleh with five or six adherents, and a small group of Sayyids who comprise the religious element in the Majlis.

The Opposition began to muster their forces in April, when strong criticism of the national budget, then being discussed in the Majlis, led to the resignation of the Minister for Finance, his Excellency Beha-ul-Mulk. Thenceforth the difficulties of the Government gradually increased in consequence of the relentless tactics of obstruction employed by the Opposition. Both parties courted the unreliable support of a half-dozen "independent" Deputies. For some time the majority of one or two was claimed alternately by the Government and the Opposition; on two occasions the demonstrations were held outside the Parliament buildings by the mob on behalf of the Government, and the Deputies were able to leave the building only after the arrival of troops. Gradually, however, the Opposition succeeded in obtaining a definite majority, and finally presented a document signed by forty-four Deputies—out of a total of eighty-three—to Motamen-ul-Mulk, the President of the Majlis, demanding the

[880 g—1]

resignation of Mustaufi-ul-Mamalek. The latter refused to resign except on the direct command of the Shah, or unless an interpellation in the Majlis resulted in a vote of lack of confidence; he refused to be coerced by unconstitutional means, and he regarded the document presented by his opponents as unconstitutional. The Opposition were unwilling to interpellate the Government owing to the fact that according to article 67 of the Fundamental Law, a reply to an interpellation may be deferred for a month. In this case a month would outlive the present Majlis, and the interpellation would serve no useful purpose. A deadlock ensued. The ordinary business of Government was neglected. The supporters of the Government, in their turn, adopted obstructive tactics and refused for some days to attend Parliament, with the result that in the absence of a quorum no sitting could be held.

An attempt was now made by the moderate elements of both parties to seek a solution of the crisis; a commission of eight Deputies was appointed, including four from each party, to endeavour to reach a compromise and to effect a reform of the Cabinet. Kawam-es-Sultaneh was for a time persuaded to cease his opposition, and His Majesty lent his support to the movement. It was suggested that Mustaufi-ul-Mamalek, Mushir-ed-Dowleh and Kawam-es-Sultaneh should combine to form a coalition Cabinet under Mustaufi. The movement for a coalition was, however, speedily wrecked by Nosret-ed-Dowleh, who realised immediately the danger of isolation in this combination and the consequent destruction of his power to dominate the situation by playing one party off against another.

Nosret-ed-Dowleh now played his trump card. The policy of Mustaufi-ul-Mamalek had become identified, in the public mind, with one, if not of active sympathy, at least of benevolent neutrality towards the Russian Legation. The steady support given him by the Nationalist party strengthened this conviction; and it was now necessary to sound the alarm of growing Bolshevik influence to attract to his side the Deputies of higher social standing. This he proceeded to do vigorously, with the result that the struggle was dressed up in the character of a class fight of Conservatism against Socialism. At the psychological moment he sent his brother Muhammad Vali Mirza to see His Majesty, who was already disturbed at the protracted crisis, and whom he had already himself scared to good purpose with the Bolshevik bogey. As a consequence of the visit, His Majesty sent, on the 10th June, for Mustaufi-ul-Mamalek, who gathered from the interview that he no longer enjoyed the complete confidence of His Majesty. On the following day, the 11th June, the Opposition spokesman, Sayyid Hassan Modarres, interpellated the Government on the vague and flimsy pretext of its foreign policy, and Mustaufi-ul-Mamalek, while denying the charges brought against his Cabinet, announced his intention of presenting his resignation to His Majesty forthwith.

He did so, and His Majesty accepted his resignation on the same day.

In my opinion, the overbrow of this Government was entirely unnecessary and actually prejudicial. As usual, the whole business was engineered and stage-managed by Nosret-ed-Dowleh. He was actuated principally by a dire apprehension of losing his own election, and if he fails to become a Deputy in the 5th Majlis, that will certainly be the end of his political career and influence for some time to come—a most desirable consummation. Mustaufi-ul-Mamalek and his democrat supporters were trying to make the elections as free as possible from unfair influences. They dislike and mistrust Nosret-ed-Dowleh, and nothing would please them better than his rejection at the polls. As the slow counting of the votes cast for the twelve Tehran Deputies proceeded, and it is not yet completed, it became apparent that there was a fair chance of Nosret-ed-Dowleh not being returned for Tehran. This galvanised the Prince into an almost superhuman activity, and he hoped by overturning the Government perchance to obtain a reversal of the decision in Tehran, but certainly to make his election sure in a provincial constituency, e.g., Kerman, Kernanshah, Hamadan or Shiraz. This is indeed possible owing to the astonishing electoral arrangements in Persia, which make it possible for a candidate who has been rejected in one constituency to offer himself for election in another where the polling has not already taken place.

But Nosret-ed-Dowleh had another motive also. He had come to realise that the Government of Mustaufi-ul-Mamalek was at heart friendly to Great Britain and intended to come to terms with His Majesty's Government. The Bolshevik scare was therefore a mere pretext; the blow was aimed at the British. An interesting remark of Nosret-ed-Dowleh has been reported to me by a Persian acquaintance who overheard it: "En renversant le Gouvernement, j'ai tiré ma dernière cartouche contre les Anglais." Among the Persians themselves there is no family more cordially detested than that of Farman Farma, and no individual more than Nosret-ed-Dowleh, but they

are still feared, and the other Persians are still too timid to deal with them in the only sensible way, which is to turn them out of the country. Curiously enough, however, what the Persians are most frightened of is that Nosret-ed-Dowleh should reinstate himself in the graces of this Legation and return to power in a practically unassailable position with British backing. I am taking steps, which I think will shortly bear fruit, to disabuse them of this idea, and I have not hesitated to say that I would rather see Anglo-Persian relations continue in their present unsatisfactory state than have a rapprochement through the intermediary of Nosret-ed-Dowleh.

After having watched Persian internal politics closely for eighteen months, I have formed the opinion that in spite of their doctrinaire tendencies, their petulant insistence on rights of national sovereignty and their fractious suspiciousness, there is more worth and honesty to be found among the Nationalists and Democrats than in any other group of public men. If Persia is destined to find any degree of internal salvation, I think it will come from that quarter. There is some genuine patriotism among them, though its manifestations are rarely very happy, and there are men among them who are anxious to work for the good of their country without personal profit. This cannot be said of the reactionaries, who are thoroughly corrupt, thoroughly selfish, and completely unreliable. They have no god but mammon, and no incentive but greed for money and power.

The root of much of our recent difficulties in this country has, in my opinion, been due to the fact that owing to her policy during and immediately after the war, Great Britain became associated in the popular mind with the reactionaries, who are now profoundly mistrusted and cordially disliked. What success the Bolshevik Russians obtained, and they have only lost it through their own mismanagement and obvious reversion to type, was due to their identification with the popular and anti-reactionary movement; there has at no time been any sympathy for Communism among the popular parties, nor in my conviction will there ever be, but there was a not unnatural tendency to lean towards an outside influence which professed sympathy with the popular aspirations and proclaimed itself to be the champion of the down-trodden, and the exponent of the greatest degree of popular liberty which the world has yet seen. I think, however, that the scales have now fallen from the Persians' eyes, and that they are no longer the dupes of these high-sounding professions.

If the popular parties in Persia can now be brought to understand that England is unchanged, that she is still, in spite of the most grotesque misrepresentations, representative of the truest liberties, I think they will turn much more willingly to us than they ever did towards the Russians, and that a marked change will come about in the general atmosphere.

It was in order to start this idea that I recently established contact with two of the popular leaders, Suleiman Mirza and Tabutabai. I found with them strong evidence of an almost axiomatic belief that England had withdrawn her former sympathy with the movement for popular liberties and free institutions, and I think I have already gone far to shake that belief, and to show them the singleness and consistency of British policy and the mischief which is being done by those who seek to keep Persia and England apart.

I am forwarding copies of this despatch to the Government of India and to His Majesty's Acting High Commissioner at Bagdad.

I have, &c.
PERCY LORAINÉ.

Six months later, Loraine complains how Iran, under the premiership of Reza Khan, is going against the interests of Britain and giving development contracts to various countries such as the U.S., France, Sweden, Germany and Russia, and evicts "British doctors from the Persian Government Hospital."

Ambassador: ...shaking off the British and Russian economic domination of Iran

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No. 8.—ARCHIVES.

22

PERSIA.

[March 18.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 6.

[E 2423/455/34]

No. 1.

Sir P. Loraine to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 85.)

Sir,

Tehran, February 11, 1924.

I GREATLY regret that, just at the moment when you had taken office, it appeared necessary to bring to your notice the unsatisfactory attitude in many respects of the Persian Government and to suggest the desirability of reconsidering the attitude of patient forbearance, which His Majesty's Government have so long displayed, of examining, in view of the small return shown by the Persian Government for the consideration with which they have been treated, what levers might be at our disposal for bringing the Persian Government to a truer sense of their obligations and, failing to secure a satisfactory settlement of some of the main questions at issue between the two Governments, of employing those levers resolutely.

The particular occurrences which led me to submit these suggestions to you, and they unfortunately occurred almost simultaneously with the change of Government in London, were the offensive impugning by a Tehran newspaper of the veracity of my official statement that no hostilities had broken out between Great Britain and Afghanistan, and the flat rejection, on the flimsiest pretext, of the claims which I had been instructed to lodge with the Persian Government for arms, munitions, &c., supplied to them by His Majesty's Government, and for the pay and allowances of the British military and naval missions whose services had been placed at the disposal of the Persian Government in the early post-war period.

These incidents, however disagreeable they may have been, perhaps hardly warranted in themselves a suggestion on my part that the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the Persian Government should undergo any serious modification. They were, however, to my mind, indicative of a state of mind in the Persian Government which, I feared, might manifest itself in other ways of which His Majesty's Government could hardly approve, and illustrative of tendencies which I have noticed for some time and have thought would at one time or another require correction. I will endeavour to enumerate these tendencies and indications:—

1. While professing a sincere desire for the friendship of His Majesty's Government, the Persian Government have not shown in any tangible manner a like desire to regulate a number of outstanding questions the settlement of which would remove a great many sources of friction.

These questions are well known to you, and many of them are mentioned specifically later on in this despatch. I will, however, deal with one of them here, and that is the question of the unregulated debt of the Persian Government to His Majesty's Government. The claim was presented to the Persian Government in December 1921. In the spring of 1922 the Government of Mushir-ed-Dowleh did take some steps to deal with the matter, and appointed two Ministers to discuss it with me. The discussions, full records of which are in your Department, were not very satisfactory and were incomplete when Mushir-ed-Dowleh's Government fell. The succeeding Government of Kawam-es-Sultaneh sent the Minister of Finance to go over the ground with me again; unfortunately the result was equally barren. Since then and in spite of repeated representations, both written and oral, the Persian Government have shown no disposition to grapple with this question and still less to satisfy the claims of His Majesty's Government. It is possible that the Persian Government would be readier to negotiate a settlement if some hope were held out to them of an abatement of the claims which they maintain that their present resources are inadequate to meet. My instructions have hitherto precluded me from holding out any such hope, as I was informed that His Majesty's Government were not prepared to consider any abatement until and unless the general attitude of the Persian Government towards that of Great Britain showed a marked improvement.

2. A disposition to discourage British enterprise in this country, if possible to disregard British interests, and to have recourse to any other country rather than Great Britain for the purchase of Government materials and assistance in any form of economic development. This tendency has been exemplified in the case of the Northern Oil Concession; the negotiation with an American company for railway construction; the order for wireless telegraph apparatus from Russia; the purchase of motor lorries in Germany; the failure either to negotiate for railway construction with the Persian Railway Syndicate or to settle its account for the survey work undertaken several years ago; the eviction of the British doctors from the Persian Government Hospital; the vexatious delay in carrying out even their own proposals for settling the claim of a British subject in connection with the navigation of Lake Urumia; the violation, by the appointment of a Persian to be Director-General of Posts, of the conditions subject to which His Majesty's Government had agreed to negotiate for the transfer to the Persian Administration of the British post offices in the South; the failure to deal with a number of claims of the Imperial Bank of Persia, even in cases where suits had been brought in the Tribunal of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and judgment given in favour of the Bank; the discussion of a concession for the establishment of wireless stations in Persia with France and, it is to be believed, Sweden, while British offers to carry out this work were studiously ignored; the dilatory tactics employed in settling the outstanding telegraph questions; the disclaimer of responsibility for the victims of robberies on the Persian highways; the failure to apply a uniform tariff on all the frontiers of the kingdom; the unsatisfactory functioning of the Tribunal of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in suits to which British subjects are parties.
3. A disposition on the part of the Persian Government to settle, by a unilateral decision, matters affecting the position, rights and privileges of foreign representatives and foreign subjects enjoying extra-territorial jurisdiction; this has been exemplified in the negotiation of the protocol for the reception on first arrival of foreign diplomatic representatives; in the matter of the procedure to be followed as regards the exchange of visits between consular officers and Persian provincial governors; in the issue of regulations for the admittance and sojourn of foreign subjects in Persia; in the modification of courtesy titles hitherto accorded, by usage if not by right, to foreign representatives in the Persian language; in the disinclination of the Persian Government to take into account the special position of foreign subjects in connection with the levy of taxation.
4. A disposition on the part of the Persian Government, except in matters affecting their own interest, to disregard the British position in Irak.
5. Total failure of the Persian Government to discourage the periodical anti-British outbursts in the local press.

Altogether, and making due allowance for oriental obliquity and habits of procrastination, I have not any impression that the Persian Government are showing goodwill towards our questions or seeking to solve them in a spirit of friendly neighbourliness. It is difficult to conceive of an institution more difficult to do business with than the Persian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Many representations go unanswered altogether, and when they are answered, the reply is almost invariably evasive or frankly unsatisfactory. The slightest matter is subjected to the most vexatious delays, and the simplest question cannot be regulated without the expenditure of time and energy quite disproportionate to the issue involved. This accumulation of petty annoyances is in itself a serious hindrance to the transaction of serious business. The Persians often complain that they are not treated kindly by foreign Powers; the fact of the matter is that before settling the most elementary matter they exhaust every method of evasion and procrastination, and, if finally worried by a terrier-like foreign representative into taking a decision, make out that they have only given way under undue pressure, and that what he has claimed as a right they have granted as a favour to appease him. Given the Persian mentality these tactics will no doubt be employed in this country for many years to come, but their use, and the particularly annoying frequency with which I have encountered them, seem particularly inappropriate on the part of a Government which professes genuine feelings of friendship towards that of Great Britain.

It was not, however, only the inconsistency between Persian professions and Persian acts, nor even the sharp contrast between the Persian attitude towards ourselves and the helpful friendship in many difficult questions and circumstances extended by His Majesty's Government to Persia, that impelled me to lay the circumstances before you as fully as was possible by telegraph, and to seek an expression of your views. I had other considerations also in mind.

Firstly, the dangers which, in my opinion, are attendant on the entry of America into the Persian arena as a financial and economic competitor. This subject was treated in my telegram No. 41, Confidential, of the 2nd February, and I have nothing substantial to add thereto. My apprehensions may have fixed themselves on a mare's nest, and nothing would please me better than to find that such was the case; but the indications of American activity, coupled with the policy of the Persian Government, now publicly avowed by the Persian Minister in Washington, of "shaking off the British and Russian economic domination of Persia," constituted evidence of far too circumstantial a character to be ignored, and it, therefore, seemed necessary to take thorough stock of the situation if we were not to find ourselves confronted with a state of affairs by no means free from dangerous possibilities.


Secondly, I judged that the change in the general Persian situation, which in a series of reports, and notably in my despatch No. 551, Confidential, of the 4th September, 1922, and No. 31, Confidential, of the 10th January, 1923, I have led His Majesty's Government to anticipate, had to all intents and purposes been effected; for Reza Khan has not only got practically the whole country under control through the national army, but he has also gathered supreme political power into his own hands. Indeed, what I described in 1922 as his bold and adventurous plan has actually been carried out in all essential respects, and with comparatively little fighting. The task is not yet complete and the work of consolidation remains, but the main danger points have been surmounted, and entire success is, in all human probability, certain. Furthermore, it is hardly conceivable that anything short of sudden death could dislodge Reza Khan from his present position against his will, or prevent him from seizing even wider powers should he so desire.

It is not too much to say that without the forbearance of His Majesty's Government the difficulties of Reza Khan's self-imposed task would have been trebled, and his chances of success in carrying it out proportionately diminished. The forbearance has amounted to actual assistance, as which, indeed, it is regarded by a great number of the Persians themselves, and precious material assistance has also been given by His Majesty's Government in authorising the grant of advances by the Imperial Bank of Persia to the Persian Government at certain moments of extreme financial stringency, albeit their own claims on Persia remained unacknowledged and unsatisfied. Persia has thus been enabled to weather a most difficult period of her existence, and so long as there was a danger of collapse or a doubt in regard to her successful emergence, I have myself, on Persia's behalf, urged on His Majesty's Government the use of further indulgence, actuated as I was by the conviction that a collapse of the administrative machine would be far more prejudicial to British interests than the extension or consolidation of the central authority.

That transitional period is now drawing to its close, the central authority is, in my judgment, reasonably able to stand on its own legs, and it is time for us to look after our own interests rather more closely. I do not mean to suggest by this that our interests have suffered in any essential respect; on the other hand, I am of opinion that we have come through this difficult transitional period practically scatheless, and that our main interest has been best served by buttressing up the integrity of this country and encouraging its efforts towards regeneration and reconstruction. Apart, however, from the sound axioms of our general policy towards friendly States, and leaving out of discussion for the moment the vital strategical considerations from which the Persian problem can never be divorced, I take it that we must always look to Persia as a possible field for the employment of British enterprise, industry and capital, in which regard we claim no privileged position, but merely equality of opportunity.

I do not believe that the Persians, in their present state of mind, are either ready or willing to grant us this equality of opportunity, and that they will load the dice against us whenever they see a way of doing so; and I do consider that the prospects of fruitful British economic activity here in the future are being jeopardised so long as this state of mind continues.

That there are means at our disposal to bring about a change in this attitude can hardly be doubted, but the subject is a complicated one, intertwined with other



The significance of the next document is multifold. First, the Ambassador calls Nosratodoleh and Mossadegh "routine...hereditary politicians." Second, he reports that "the town of Khorramabad has been successfully relieved," thereby reporting to the British Government that Reza Khan's forces are closing in on Sheikh Khazal, who is supported by the Brits. Third, and perhaps most importantly, might give more credence to the idea that Reza Shah was not installed by the British. Lastly, the hand-written comment of Mr. Oliphant at the bottom of the telegram reveals how wrong the British policy-makers were in their assessment of Reza Khan. He writes:

If Reza Khan is forced to accept people like Nosret-ed-Dowleh in his cabinet, it will naturally be very significant and would probably be the beginning of the end. Nosret-ed-Dowleh is much too clever for Reza Khan.

History proved that in fact it was Reza Khan who was too clever for Nosratodoleh (the British-educated and Anglophile Qajar prince), as he not only remained in power as the Prime Minister, but also became the Shah of Iran within a year of Mr. Oliphant's comment.

A secret "Intelligence Summary" dated August 2, 1924 is also of importance, as under number 16 in page 2 "It is reported from several sources, and is commonly believed, that the relations between the Prime Minister and the Soviet Minister are very close at present..."

No. 26 in page 3 reads: "Contracts for two years are now being prepared between the Persian Government and the Junker Company for the services of two aviators, two mechanics and a rigger, all of whom are to be Germans.

Intelligence summary: ...reported from sources that the relations between the Prime Minister and the Soviet Minister are very close

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No. 8.—ARCHIVES.

PERSIA. [September 1, 1924.]

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1.

[E 7518/255/34] No. 1.

Mr. Ovey to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 1.)

(No. 391. Secret.) *Tehran, August 16, 1924.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of Intelligence Summary No. 31 for the week ending the 2nd instant, compiled by the military attaché to this Legation.

I have, &c.
ESMOND OVEY.

Enclosure in No. 1

(Secret.) *Intelligence Summary No. 31 for Week ending August 2, 1924.*

Caucasus.

IT is reported that a committee of journalists has been formed in Kars to investigate and report on the condition of Moslems under the Soviet rule.

2. It is reported that on the 6th July a band of fifty men attacked the station of Kisloyodsk and robbed a train. Some of the robbers were captured and found to be educated men, graduates of Russian universities, who said there was no other means of livelihood open to them but robbery.

Gilan.

3. The province has been placed under a Military Governor, the former Civil Governor, Mirza Sulaeman Khan, having been recalled to Tehran.

4. An objectionable anti-British article on the subject of Mr. Imbrie's death was published in a local Resht paper, which is subsidised by the Soviet consulate. The General Officer Commanding the Northern Brigade, when calling on His Majesty's consul to assure him that steps would be taken for the punishment of the editor, said that the article was the work of the munshi of the Soviet consulate, an individual by the name of Keshawarz.

5. A report is current in Enzeli that the Soviet Government has decided to demand from the Persian Government the return of all property previously belonging to the Russian Road Company and the Russian Banque d'Escompte.

6. A Russian gunboat arrived off Enzeli on the 29th. A report, which requires confirmation, says that a small armed party was landed to seize the products of the fisheries, but, finding the Persian guards prepared to resist, returned to their ship.

7. Between the 8th and the 19th July, 106,000 poods of petroleum were imported into Enzeli by the Naftkom.

Azerbaijan.

8. The General Officer Commanding the North-Western Division left Tabriz hurriedly on the night of the 23rd July for Salmas. A detachment of 150 cavalry and 200 infantry, with two mountain guns, set out on the same day and the next for the same destination. The local explanation was that Simko or Sayyid Taha was preparing to raid into Persia.

The divisional commander was reported to be at Ushnu on the 28th July.

9. It is reported from two sources in Azerbaijan that discussions have taken place between Simko and the Turkish authorities regarding the formation of a band of Kurds to raid into Mosul Vilayet. Simko's attitude to the reported proposal is not known.

10. Rumours are current along the Turco-Persian frontier of the despatch of reinforcements of Turkish troops towards the Mosul frontier. A reliable informant in Tabriz recently stated that the Turkish consul-general had said that, as the British were arming Sayyid Taha against the Turks, the latter had been obliged to send troops to protect their southern frontier.

[733 a—1]

Intelligence summary: There is much conclusive evidence to show that the Russians are strongly supporting the Prime Minister

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11. Goloub or Golubov took over the Soviet consulate at Urumia from Doupsou on the 22nd July. The latter proceeded to Tabriz where he succeeds Slavovski

Kazvin.

12. A Caucasian Bolshevik Committee is in process of being organised in Kazvin with the assistance of the Soviet consul, Hoffman. The president is said to be one Feridun Beg, and the vice-president Baki Khan.

Tehran.

13. The demands of the American Government regarding the murder of Mr. Imbrie have been notified to and accepted by the Persian Government without demur. The American note and the Persian reply have been published in the press.

The specific demands of the American Government for the escorting of Mr. Imbrie's body to a Persian port for embarkation on an American warship and for suitable compensation to Mrs. Imbrie will doubtless be complied with, but, as yet, the Persian Government has shown no evidence of a sincere desire to punish those responsible for the crime. Arrests continue to be made and many individuals are under investigation, but no one has as yet been put on public trial for the crime. Evidence of the presence of police and military officers, who took no steps to ensure Mr. Imbrie's protection, is understood to be conclusive, but, as far as is known, none of these have even been arrested.

14. The Minority party in the Majlis has interpellated the Government on several points connected with foreign and internal policy and the expenditure of public funds. Considerable political excitement has been aroused. Public opinion was at first inclined to believe that there was some risk of the Government's defeat in a secret ballot, but, perhaps as a result of the Prime Minister's energetic and rather minatory propaganda among the Deputies, it is now considered that the interpellation will be withdrawn by its mover, or that the ballot will result in a victory for the Government. It is not yet definitely decided when the Government will reply. The Constitutional Law allows them a month in which to do so.

15. It is reported from several sources that tentative efforts have been made, both in Tehran and the provinces, to start pro-Republican propaganda. Some Tehran newspapers, notably the "Azadi-i-Shark," which is subsidised by the Prime Minister, have published articles advocating a dictatorship as the cure for Persian ills. To close the Majlis and declare himself Dictator may be the policy under consideration by the Prime Minister for adoption if he should be defeated in the Majlis.

(Note.—The "Azadi-i-Shark" was previously published in Berlin, but since the arrival of the editor, Sheikh Abdur Rahman, in Tehran on the 14th July, it has commenced publication here.)

16. It is reported from several sources, and is commonly believed, that the relations between the Prime Minister and the Soviet Minister are very close at present, and that the latter is now supporting and encouraging the former. That M. Shumyatski is in favour is evident from the propaganda which he is allowed to make in a strictly censored press to the effect that he was chiefly responsible for the moderation of the note of the Diplomatic Corps regarding the murder of Mr. Imbrie and for the acceptance by the corps of the Persian Government's reply. An example is given in an appendix.

17. The press, being temporarily forced to refrain from open anti-British propaganda, has to content itself with statements of the following type:—

RELIABLE NEWS.

According to an unofficial report, . . . has received a credit of £20,000, which is to be distributed among certain of the Deputies in payment for their opposition to the Government.

18. The Council of Ministers has decided to give to the Ulan Company an option of three months, dating from the 23rd July, to allow them to complete their consideration and survey of the Caspian Sea-Persian Gulf Railway project. (See also paragraph 23 of Summary No. 21.)

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1808

19. Soper has left Tehran for Paris via Moscow. An unconfirmed report says that before his departure he warned the Prime Minister that there was little hope of raising the 10-million-dollar loan.

20. The Council of Ministers has decided to return to Khoshtaria all his immovable property in Persia, which consists of some workshops at Tularud, buildings, garages and storerooms at Enzeli, and houses in Resht and Kazian, with the exception of the Resht-Pir-i-Bazaar Railway and of some land at Enzeli which are to be retained by the Persian Government. Khoshtaria is to give a declaration that he has no further claims of any kind against the Persian Government.

21. The press announces the impending arrival in "Persian waters" of a "warship," the "Pehlevi," purchased in Germany. From other sources it is known that the Russians have been objecting to the passage of this ship through Russian territory to the Caspian, for which sea she was originally intended, and that the Persian Government have considered bringing her to the Persian Gulf.

22. A representative of the Khlopkom, the Soviet organisation for the encouragement of cotton growing in Persia, has recently completed a tour through Isfahan, Yezd, Kerman, Bam, Rafsinjan and Shiraz. This organisation undertakes to provide cotton seed to agriculturists on easy terms on the condition that the resulting crop is sold to the Soviet authorities.

He was accompanied on his tour by the Soviet military attaché, Bobristchev.

23. A report, which requires confirmation, states that M. Shumyatski has received instructions from Moscow that he is to remain one year more in Persia.

24. Reference paragraph 13 of Summary No. 30.

It is reported that a reconciliation has been effected between Dr. Millspaugh and Modir-ul-Mulk, the Minister of Finance.

25. The German Legation has announced that a German school will be opened in Tehran on the 15th September with the approval of the Persian Government. From a confidential source it has been ascertained that the Persian Government have agreed to subsidise the school to the extent of 24,000 tomans a year. Four teachers are to be engaged from Germany.

26. Contracts for two years are now being prepared between the Persian Government and the Junker Company for the services of two aviators, two mechanics and a rigger, all of whom are to be Germans. It is likely that the services of the pilots and mechanics who arrived with the Junker machines on temporary contracts will be retained. The terms are not definitely settled, but the following conditions, among others, will probably be agreed to:—

The pilots will not be required to take part in military operations or to fly outside the limits of Persia unless they volunteer to do so in particular instances.

They will not normally be expected to fly more than 2,000 kilom. in a month.

The pay of aviators will be 350 tomans per month.

27. Haase, the German whose arrival was reported in paragraph 15 of Summary No. 25, has taken over charge of the Tehran arsenal.

28. Herr Weiss, the German journalist who arrived in Tehran recently (see paragraph 23 of Summary No. 29), states that he intends to study conditions in South Persian and then to visit Kabul.

Isfahan.

29. Colonel Salar Munazzam, who has been appointed chief of the Amnieh Department of the South, left Tehran on the 26th to take up his appointment.

Kerman.

30. His Majesty's Consul at Kerman reports that the notorious Wali Muhammad Shirdil has commenced raiding in Narmashir.

31. The report in paragraph 28 of Summary No. 29 is incorrect. It is Lakhtionov, not Lokatsov, who has been appointed Russian consul at Kerman, vice Zaslowski, who is proceeding to Tehran. Lakhtionov was understood to have been appointed Russian consul at Bushire when he left Tehran in March.

Persian Baluchistan.

32. His Majesty's consul at Kerman reports that news from Bam received in Kerman in the latter half of June, which requires confirmation, states that Dost Muhammad of Bampur, Zargham-es-Sultaneh of Rudbar and Mir Barkat Khan of

Biyaban, have entered into an alliance and intend raiding in the neighbourhood of Kwash.

He also reports that it is stated that some circulars regarding revenue affairs which had been sent to Dost Muhammad were returned by him with the reply that the people of Baluchistan did not understand such things.

W. A. K. FRASER, Major, I.A.,
Military Attaché.

APPENDIX.

Persian Press.

AN article appeared in the Russian subsidised paper, "Hallaj," of the 30th July, congratulating the Soviet Minister, M. Shumyatski, on the assistance he has given the Persians on several occasions, especially on the occasion of the signing of the Commercial Treaty and on the occasion of the American consul's death. More than any other foreign representative he helped the Persian Government, and was the first to express his approval of the steps taken by them.

The paper highly praises the Minister, and says that, by his actions, the cruelties and atrocities of the officials of the Old Russian Government are going to be redressed. It expresses the hope that other outstanding questions between Persia and Russia, such as the handing over of the Port of Enzeli, may be settled through the good offices of the Minister.

The wish is expressed that others would adopt the same policy towards a nation who can appreciate the co-operation of foreigners.

The Soviet Minister, the Turkish Ambassador, and the Afghan Minister, are thanked for their sympathetic attitude towards the Persian Government in connection with the recent incident, and it is hoped that the relations between Persia and their Governments may be strengthened.

Extracts from the Russian Radio News-sheet, "Rosta," Moscow, August 1.

In connection with rumours in the foreign press about a secret treaty said to have been concluded between the Soviet and Italy, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs announces that no secret or military treaty whatsoever with Italy or any other Power has been concluded by the Soviet, nor will she think of such a thing, as it is in direct contravention of the principles of the foreign policy of the State.

Comrade Rakovski, president of the Soviet delegation in London, interviewed on a visit to Moscow, whence he returned to London on the 21st July, stated that great progress had been made in the negotiations and expressed his conviction that an arrangement could be come to with the London bankers as the mutual guarantees that have been brought forward were satisfactory to both parties.

In connection with meeting Herriot, Comrade Rakovski expressed his conviction that France, and, with her, Belgium, would announce the recognition of the Soviet within the next few days.

It is announced that an excellent harvest of Russian cotton makes it possible to increase output of the textile works, and, at the same time, to lower the general cost of production, although Russian cotton now costs about a third less than American. There will also be a lowering in price in the products of other textile industries.

In yet another secret "Intelligence Summary" dated October 29, 1924, under number 23 in page 2, it is reported:

There is much conclusive evidence to show that the Russians are strongly supporting the Prime Minister at present, and are propagandising energetically, if quietly, in his favour.

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[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 8.—ARCHIVES.

PERSIA.

[November 26, 1924.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[E 10388/255/34]

No. 1.

Mr. Ovey to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 501. Secret.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 29, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of Intelligence Summary No. 42 for the week ending the 18th instant, compiled by the military attaché to this Legation.

I have, &c.

ESMOND OVEY.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Intelligence Summary No. 42 for Week ending October 18, 1924.

(Secret.)

The Turkoman Situation.

1. Reference paragraph 17 of last week's summary. Serdar Muazziz has been reinstated as Governor of Bujnurd. This appears to be an indication that the Persian Government have abandoned, for the time being, their attempts to deal with the Turkoman situation in that area by military measures alone, and are reverting to the régime that existed when the Serdar of Bujnurd was able to exercise some check on the Turkomans by the mutual agreements that usually exist between Persian tribal chiefs living in proximity to each other.

Astarabad.

2. The Turkomans of the province, finding that no serious threat was being made against them by Government troops, have quietened down to some extent. The Government are now trying by intrigue to cause dissensions in the combination headed by Osman Shah (see paragraph 1 of last week's summary).

Mazanderan.

3. A certain Mirov has been trying to organise a workers' committee in Sari for the spreading of Bolshevik principles.

Gilan.

4. Information from a quite reliable source shows that the General Officer Commanding the Northern Brigade, who has up till now been remarkable for his firm stand against Soviet irregularities, has recently received orders to adopt a more conciliatory and helpful attitude towards Soviet officials.

Azerbaijan.

5. According to reports from Urumia of the 30th September, Christians of the district are being subjected to much ill-treatment from riff-raff Moslems, and are not being protected by the Persian authorities. The informant anticipated that unless a check was put on this oppression the Christians would take the law into their own hands.

6. A report from a reliable source in Urumia says that the Russian and Turkish consuls, who up till recently were on good terms, have quarrelled and are now working against each other.

Kazvin.

7. A Tehrani mullah—Sheikh Abdul Kazim—left Kazvin for Irak on the 13th October. He is known to have received money from the Russian consul before his departure.

Luristan.

8. An unconfirmed report has been received that a fight has taken place between small Government forces and the men of the Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh.

[789 cc—1]

B

Tehran.

9. The Majlis has voted a credit of 1,500,000 tomans for the conduct of the Arabistan operations. It was not decided whence the money was to be obtained.

10. Orders were issued by the Prime Minister withholding the payment of all civil salaries for the current month on the ground that all available cash was required for the Ministry of War. This order has since been rescinded.

11. The emissaries of the Prime Minister in the provinces have been active in securing the despatch by tribal chiefs and notables of telegrams expressing strong disapproval of Sheikh Khazal's actions, and usually asking that they may be allowed to join in his punishment. The majority of these telegrams, which have all been published in the press, are from Azerbaijan.

12. Rumours are being very assiduously spread in the town that His Majesty's Government are making the settlement of their money claims against the Persian Government a condition of their mediation with Sheikh Khazal.

13. It is reported that the troops who left Tehran for Isfahan (see paragraph 27 below) showed little enthusiasm for a fight against the sheikh. Officers were openly heard to say that it was a crime to plunge the country into war on account of the personal enmity between two men.

From a quite reliable source it is known that a warning was sent by army headquarters to the General Officer Commanding Isfahan Division to watch particularly the Naderi Regiment.

14. An anonymous leaflet has been widely distributed accusing the Prime Minister of having tried to buy British support by making the Majlis approve the payment of 320,000 tomans to Messrs. Stevens and Boudagiantz as compensation for the taking over by the Government of their Urumia Lake concession.

15. The budget for the year the 21st March, 1924, to the 20th March, 1925, is now before the Majlis. Details are given in an appendix.

16. A Bill has been submitted to the Majlis for the exemption from customs duties of agricultural and manufacturing machinery.

17. Orders have been issued temporarily prohibiting Persians from making the pilgrimage to the Mesopotamian shrines.

18. It is stated in the Government press that, according to information received from the Ministry of Public Works, it has been decided to import German locomotives via Russia for the Tabriz-Julfa Railway and that preliminary steps have already been taken.

19. Twelve Hansa-Lloyd 1½-ton lorries recently imported from Germany arrived in Tehran on the 14th October from Bushire.

20. Thirty-nine cadets recently passed out of the military school. Twenty-one were given commissions in the infantry and eighteen in the Veterinary Corps.

21. Information has been obtained from a confidential source that a certain Hadjean, a French subject, has submitted proposals purporting to be on behalf of the Henri Letellier financial group for a loan of 50 million dollars to the Persian Government. This loan is to be used for the construction of railways, and is to be guaranteed on—

- (1.) A concession for the exploitation of oil in North Persia.
- (2.) A priority right to exploit all other minerals.
- (3.) A priority right in the creation of different industries and in the development of intensive agriculture.
- (4.) The material of the projected railway.

22. The Government organ "Kushish" recommends that Persia should take advantage of the dispute between the British and Turkish Governments over the question of Mosul to substantiate her own claims to the province before the League of Nations. These claims, the paper says, are based on the fact that the majority of the population consists of Persian Kurds and Mahometans of Persian descent.

23. There is much conclusive evidence to show that the Russians are strongly supporting the Prime Minister at present, and are propagating energetically, if quietly, in his favour.

24. Recent numbers of the Russian wireless press have conspicuously avoided reference to Persian affairs in contrast to the prominence usually given to them, particularly since the beginning of the Arabistan crisis.

25. Zakki Bey, secretary of the Turkish Legation, left Tehran on the 14th October for a short visit to Angora.

Arabistan Situation.

26. According to the reports of His Majesty's consul at Ahwaz, the sheikh's confidence in his ability to defeat the Prime Minister is increasing. The Prime Minister, on the other hand, maintains that the sheikh is bluffing and that the majority of the supporters on whom the sheikh professes to rely will leave him as soon as hostilities commence. He talks with great confidence, and asserts his immediate readiness to attack the sheikh as soon as he is informed that the efforts of mediation of His Majesty's Government have failed. But, having regard to the unsatisfactory moral of his troops, the already empty Treasury, the difficult nature of the approaches to Arabistan and his military embarrassment in Luristan, on the Turco-Persian frontier and in the Turkoman country, it is probable that he would welcome a peaceful solution that would preserve his prestige and publicly demonstrate the sheikh's submission.

27. The following troop movements have taken place as preparatory measures in connection with possible operations in Arabistan:—

On the 13th and 14th 250 cavalry, the Naderi Regiment of 1,200 infantry, 1 battalion of 300 of the Rezapur Regiment, 12 machine guns, under the command of Colonel Hassan Ali, left Tehran for Kum and Isfahan.

On the 12th 180 infantry with 1 pack artillery gun and 2 machine guns left Isfahan for Chahar Mahal, Bakhtiari (see also paragraph 25 of last week's summary).

On the 12th October 300 infantry and 50 cavalry arrived in Shiraz from Isfahan.

On the 14th October 400 infantry left Shiraz for Behbahan.

28. Under instructions from the Prime Minister, the officer commanding troops at Behbahan has warned local chiefs that he is now in a state of readiness to commence operations against Sheikh Khazal's forces when ordered to do so.

29. His Majesty's consul at Shiraz reports that the General Officer Commanding the Southern Division has been ordered to prepare a landing-ground for aeroplanes at Behbahan.

30. The detachment of Persian troops at Shushtar and Dizful (about 280) have not yet been attacked by the sheikh. A sum of 4,000 tomans for their pay was despatched to them recently through a merchant in Ahwaz.

Bakhtiari.

31. Further Government reinforcements (see paragraph 27 above) have been despatched to the support of the Ilkani and Ilbeggi, who are still in Chahar Mahal.

Some of the tribes have reached Malamir on the downward migration. According to information received from His Majesty's consul at Ahwaz, Serdar Zafar and Shaab-es-Sultaneh, both of whom have expressed their sympathy with Sheikh Khazal, are proceeding to Malamir to proclaim themselves Ilkani and Ilbeggi. His Majesty's consul reports that they have the support of the Haft Lang tribes.

The Bakhtiari khans in Tehran remain optimistic that any serious trouble between the Government and the Bakhtiari can be avoided.

The Prime Minister is confident that loyal khans, with backing of Government troops, can assert their authority in Bakhtiari.

Fars.

32. Naser Khan, the son of Soulet-ed-Dowleh, has sent a telegram from Shiraz, under instructions from his father in Tehran, offering 100 sowars for operations against the sheikh.

33. The Kawam-ul-Mulk has received a second request from the Prime Minister to supply 100 men against the sheikh. To the first request (see paragraph 23 of Summary No. 40) he had given a non-committal reply. His Majesty's consul reports that, though unwilling to supply the men, he did not like to give a definite refusal.

34. Walden, the secretary of the Soviet Legation in Tehran, arrived at Shiraz en route for Bushire on the 9th October. It is reported that he has with him a quantity of propaganda literature which may be intended for India. It is also reported, but requires confirmation, that he is to officiate as consul, Bushire. This may possibly be true, as there is reason to believe that Lidin has been ordered to Tehran.

Sardar Sepah's Military Campaign in Khuzestan and Arrest of Sheikh Khazal

This event was of critical importance for Iran as it related to the future of the province of Khuzestan, oil as the biggest source of revenue for Iran as well as the income from the Khorramshahr Customs for the country. Here, I have to apologize for using two names in the documents. The British and Arabs used to call the port city of Khorramshahr as Mohammareh and the province of Khuzestan as Arabistan. Every time I see these names, I cringe!

One can find a plethora of contradicting stories, but we are not concerned about his life story in this book. The most important issue is to find the truth, by going through the declassified documents, about Khorramshahr and Khuzestan and their return to the motherland. It is written that Sheikh Khazal's ancestors had migrated from what today is called Saudi Arabia to Basra in today's Iraq, and then to Iran. Apparently, they had rented the Khorramshahr's Customs from the Qajars in 1900 for a period of 60 years. It is also believed that Khazal assassinated his own brother, Mazal, to replace him as the head of the tribe. It is further known that Mozaffareddin Shah had appointed Khazal as the governor of Mohammareh/Khorramshahr and vicinity. However, documents prove that Khazal had become a puppet and servant of the British Government. These words should not be taken as derogatory to him, or his descendants. They reveal cold facts in numerous documents, a part of one of which can be seen here. The entire page containing this part will be presented further ahead in the book. Per documents, when the British find out about Reza Khan's determination on creating a completely centralized country and realize the imminent success of his military campaign, they decide to take the side of the winning side and pressure Sheikh Khazal to heed to Reza Khan's central government authority—he says he **“could not serve two masters.”** This is revealed in page 6 of a report from Sir Percy Loraine sent to Austen Chamberlain, the British Foreign Secretary, on December 22, 1924 and received in London on February 4, 1925.




Sheikh Khazal

in his mind. The sheikh has a curiously obstinate mentality. It is amazingly difficult to get a new idea into his head, it is even harder to dislodge an old one. The idea that his primary duty is to His Majesty's Government and his secondary duty to the Persian Government appears to be quite ineradicable. His immediate preplexity was briefly this; if he gave his word to Sardar Sepah absolutely, he was bound by his own standards to keep it; but he had already given his word to the British Government; so long as the British Government remained on friendly terms with Sardar Sepah all would be well; but if they quarrelled or parted company, what was his position, for he could not serve two masters. The solution he had thought out, which he explained to me with much circumspection and regarding which he requested my advice, was to give his word to Sardar Sepah as binding so long as his Highness was on good terms with the British. I told the sheikh that in every situation there

Reza Khan's actions indicate that he wished for a united Iran with a strong central government. As stated before, this is exactly what all Iranian patriots longed for. When the Government's Financial Advisor, Dr. Arthur Millspaugh, on loan by the U.S. President to the Persian Government, writes a letter to Sheikh Khazal demanding payment of the tax arrears, he gets angry, states he doesn't owe anything, and does not recognize Millspaugh and Reza Khan's authority. Then, he tries to form a coalition with people such as Modarres in Tehran and Lur and Bakhtiari tribal leaders to topple Reza Khan's government. See the document below sent by Esmond Ovey.

British Consul: Sheikh can mobilize 25,000 Arabs and several thousand Bakhtiari



Eight days later, the British Consul in Ahwaz, Mr. Peel, sends a two-page telegram to the British embassy in Tehran that is quite revealing on the relationship between the British Government and the Sheikh!

PERSIA.

Decypher. Mr. Peel, (Ahwaz) 25th September, 1924.
 D. 8.a.m. 25th September, 1924.
 R. 9.a.m. 26th September, 1924.

No. -

Addressed to Tehran No. 69.

My telegrams Nos. 65 and 67.

I have received final answer from Sheikh. There is no appreciable modification of demands detailed in my telegrams Nos. 45 and 65. He still insists on the letter of guarantee referred to in my telegram No. 45.

In the last resort he would tolerate presence of a small force located at Behbahan instead of Shuster.

With regard to revenue he states that he has no desire to repudiate bond to pay 500,000 tomans on account of arrears although His Majesty's Minister officially informed him in 1919 that Persian government had agreed to waive all revenues unpaid during the war. His agreement regarding future revenues was however provisional and contingent upon subsequent ratification by Ministry of Finance which has not been communicated to him. On the copy in possession of Sheikh Colonel McCormack wrote "Copy of arrangement which will be recommended to Minister of Finance by me".

He says that during the last two years his "recognised rights" etc., vide (2 groups undec:) treaties with Sheikh have been considerably undermined. If therefore he has made a stand now before his rights are completely whittled away His Majesty's

Government

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Government must not reproach him. In fact he insists that he is fighting their battle. If left alone he is confident that he can compel resignation of Riza Khan and protect British lives and property.

If His Majesty's Government are prepared to maintain ^{that} any of his demands (~~2 groups omitted~~) violate spirit of undertaking of 1914 he is ready to bow to their decision. He asks me to communicate it to him in writing so that he may prove to his tribesmen and allies that he is not yielding to threat of Sirdar Sepah but to express wish of His Majesty's Government.

In the circumstances conditions of Sheikh appear not unreasonable. They represent the minimum required to maintain his prestige in Arabistan and adequately safeguard vital British interests in this region. It seems probable that with further pressure Persian government could be induced to accept them.

Latest reports clearly indicate that Minister of War is in no position to undertake offensive at present and that feeling throughout the country is crystallizing in favour of Sheikh. Possible danger to pipe line is therefore much more remote.

Repeated to Foreign Office, Bushire No. 112.



Yet two days after that, the Consul sends another telegram, boasting that the "Sheikh can mobilize 25,000 Arabs and several thousand Bakhtiariis. He is confident of the result."

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E 8314
29 SEP 1924

PERSIA.

Decypher. Mr. Peel (Ahwaz),
27th September 1924.
D. 10.0 a.m. 27th September 1924.
R. 9.0 a.m. 28th September 1924.

No. -

.....

Addressed to Tehran No.72. *Hal A*
Your telegram No. ~~110~~ ⁴² (E 8294)

Following are my comments on your points.

One is incorrect, and therefore two does not apply.

Sheikh can mobilise 25,000 Arabs and several thousand Bakhtiariis. He is confident of result.

Three is not threat, because noone will believe it is intended as such.

Four is useless to Sheikh because it reproduces the very situation which has caused him to make this stand.

Five is a proposal I would hardly dare to put to Sheikh unless I had troops here.

Six is I believe sheer bluff. Prime Minister knows he would probably lose his majority if he tried to proclaim Sheikh a rebel.

Sheikh has not suppressed revenues demand. If you will consult Colonel ~~Misfor...~~ he will tell you that he always intended that both Sheikh and Persian government should have right to cancel agreement regarding future revenues.

If Sheikh visited Tehran he would certainly be ~~assassinated~~.


Repeated to Foreign Office, Bushire No.116.

.....

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY
29 SEP 1924
FOREIGN OFFICE


The story of Reza Khan's military campaign in Khuzestan in a pincer-attack in which he orders his army rush from Lorestan while he moves his other forces from Esfahan to Shiraz to Bushehr and finally to Khorramshahr, deceiving and startling the British and the Sheikh, is an interesting one that could fill volumes.

There is yet another revealing document. In a "Very Urgent" telegram from the Foreign Office to Mr. Ovey (Tehran) sent on 26 September 1924, the British Government advises his emissary: "...you have already been authorized in my telegram No. 132 to negotiate with Reza Khan on the Sheikh's behalf." How strange that a British envoy is authorized by the British Government to negotiate with the Prime Minister of Iran on behalf of an Iranian citizen!




A telegram from the British Mission in Moscow is interesting, as it reports that the Russian government newspaper, Izvestiya, has published a telegram speaking of

“Reconciliation between Reza Khan and Sheikh Khazal has not taken place in spite of the fact that the British took it upon themselves to act as intermediaries... the movement of Sheikh Khazal, who is entirely under British influence, is an instance of the duplicity of British policy and indicates an endeavor to destroy by military means the national progressive forces of Persia.”



In the second page of the telegram it is written: "It is reported that the Sheikh is continually receiving across the Southern frontiers new consignments of arms from the British."



A chain of interesting documents regarding the Khazal issue:

<p style="font-size: 2em; color: red;">E.</p>	<p>143</p> <p style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;">E 8215</p>
<p>Registry Number E 8215/263/34</p> <p>TELEGRAM FROM Consul Peel. (Ahwaz) (at Mohammerah)</p> <p>No.</p> <p>Dated 23rd Sept. 1924. Received 24th Sept. 1924.</p> <p>E: Persia</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Sheikh of Mohammerah.</u></p> <p>Addressed to Tehran No. 67. Refers to his telegram No. 65 (E 8192/263/34). Wali is starting offensive and resistance of Lurs is stiffening; Bakhtiari tribes solidly on side of Sheikh. Centralizing policy of Reza Khan appears to have failed, and if His Majesty's Legation continues to support him in face of opposition of south result will be collapse against which Sir P. Loraine sounded warning in 1922. If policy of neutrality is adhered to, predicts that necessity for sending British troops to Arabistan will never arise. (Repeated Bushire No. 110).</p>
<p>Last Paper.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">E 8197 8213</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">(Minutes.)</p> <p>Please see also E 8192/263/34 and E 8197/263/34.</p>
<p>References.</p> <p>E 10149/457/34 (1922)</p>	<p>It is clear from these two telegrams from Mr. Peel and the telegram in E 8197 from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's representative at Mohammerah that the Sheikh's attitude is viewed with more sympathy locally than by Mr. Ovey at Tehran. It is true that if we are forced by circumstances, in order to protect our interests in the oil fields, to bring serious pressure to bear upon the Sheikh of Mohammerah, we shall to a certain extent lose prestige amongst the Arab chieftains in the Persian Gulf; but, if we stand by and allow the Persian Government to oust the Sheikh on their own, it is submitted that we should equally be regarded by the Arabs as having let the Sheikh down, while at the same time getting less credit from the Persian Government. Mr. Peel thinks that Reza Khan's centralizing policy has definitely failed, and that if we stand aside in this quarrel Reza Khan will be beaten. We have no indication from Mr. Ovey that this appreciation of the position is correct.</p>
<p>(Print.)</p> <p>(How disposed of.)</p> <p>14) So. Co. W.O. Admt. Air Mins. Sept. 24.</p> <p>14) So. Co. W.O. Admt. Air Mins. Sept. 27.</p>	
<p>(Action completed.)</p> <p>1/29/24</p>	<p>(Index.)</p> <p>1/4/24</p>
<p>Next Paper.</p>	

correct.

If the Bakhtiaris are joining the Sheikh, we ought to lose no time in bringing the Sheikh to his senses. On the other hand Mr. Peel says that there is no question of the Sheikh's taking the field unless attacked. Mr. Ovey has told us in his telegram No. 203 (E 8049/263/34) that Reza Khan has made no military preparations and is not therefore likely to attack the Sheikh for some time.

We should, I submit, telegraph to Mr. Ovey that we adhere to our previous telegrams Nos. 132 (E 7964/263/34), 133 (E 8009/263/34) and 137 (E 8152/263/34). Our one object is to prevent a disastrous outbreak of civil war in the neighbourhood of the oil fields, and with that object we are prepared to endeavour to mediate. We have shown our sympathy with the Sheikh in attempting to obtain at least two of the four conditions which he proposes. It is absurd for the Sheikh to pretend that the small detachments at Digful and Shushtar are a menace to his position. They are outside the Sheikh's territory and have not been seriously reinforced since last year.

A draft telegram to Mr. Ovey is annexed hereto.

Copies of both Mr. Peel's telegrams to India Office, Colonial Office, War Office, Air Ministry and Admiralty.

M. H. Hallett
24/9

I agree. The situation is difficult for the local consul: but it is not for him

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1924	PERSIA	E 8314 29 SEP 1924
<p>Registry } E 8314/263/34. Number }</p> <p>TELEGRAM FROM Consul Peel. (Ahwaz)</p> <p>No</p> <p>Dated 27th Sept. 1924. Received 29th Sept. 1924.</p> <p>E: Persia</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Sheikh of Mohammedah.</u></p> <p>Addressed to Tehran No. 72. Comments on points raised in Tehran telegram No. 110 52 to Ahwaz (E 8294/263/34). (Repeated Bushire No. 116).</p>	
<p>Last Paper. E 8313</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">(Minutes.)</p> <p style="color: blue; font-size: 1.5em;">E</p> <p>Hear see also E 8313/263/34.</p> <p>Mr. Peel's comments on the first five points in Mr. Ovey's telegram in E 8294⁸²⁹⁴ (7/10/24) are perhaps overdrawn but contain, I fear, an element of truth. As regards point 6 Mr. Ovey is in a far better position than Mr. Peel to judge of the Prime Minister's strength in Tehran.</p> <p>The revenue question could probably be settled on reasonable lines with our assistance, but we may be sure that</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Colonel</p>	
<p>References.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">(Print.)</p>		
<p style="text-align: center;">(How disposed of.)</p> <p>Copies sent to ✓ Do. Co. Mr. Admiral Air Ministry. see E 8313.</p>		
<p>(Action completed.)</p> <p style="font-size: 1.5em;">11/3/10</p>	<p>(Index.)</p> <p style="font-size: 1.5em;">11/4</p>	
<p>Next Paper. E 8380</p>		

Colonel MacCormack, the American
 adviser who deals with this
 matter, will not go further in
 the Sheikh's favour than we
 succeeded in inducing him to
 go last year.

If civil war breaks out, the
Sheikh will have ^(at any rate) initial
successes, and it is probably
this the knowledge of this
which is the restraining influence
on Reza Khan.

Copies to { C.O.
 TO.
 W.P.
 Air King
 Admty }

H. H. Mallet
 29 SEP 1974

For action proposed
 please see jacket
 of Mr. Orey's Tel 214 [E 8380]

d. Dupont
 W. J. 30/4

<p>1924</p>	<p style="text-align: center; font-size: 2em;">E</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">91 392</p>
<p>Registry Number } E 9753/455/34</p> <p>FROM Mr. Ovey (Tehran) No. 492.</p> <p>Dated 23rd Oct. 1924.</p> <p>Received in Registry } 10th Nov. 1924.</p> <p>E: Persia</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">PERSIA</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>Anglo-Persian relations.</u></p> <p>Refers to Tehran despatch No. 440 of September 10th, (E 8403/455/34).</p> <p>Reports improvement in productive diplomatic relations since appointment of Muehar-ul-Hulk as Minister for Foreign Affairs, states future relations depend on outcome of Sheikh of Mohammerah's rebellion, records impression produced on American opinion by murder of United States Consul at Tehran, Persian disappointment at failure of appeal to America and comments on prospects of Persia turning again to Great Britain for financial support. Discusses Russo-Persian relations and commercial treaty.</p>	
<p>Last Paper. E 9657</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">✓</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>The King. The Cabinet. Administ.</i></p>	
<p>References.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">This despatch shows how important a bearing on our future relations with Persia the outcome of the quarrel of Reza Khan with the Sheikh of Mohammerah will have.</p>	
<p>(Print.) Persia Printed</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">The Bolsheviks hope that they may be able to persuade Reza Khan that we have helped the Sheikh in his intrigue.</p>	
<p>(How disposed of.) Desp. Moscow No. 1385. (conf.) Nov. 20.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">The Northern Department will be able to say whether Mr. Ovey's suggestion that Mr. Hodgson should ask the Soviet Government for a copy of their commercial treaty with Persia is worth pursuing. It would be useful to have the text if we could obtain it.</p>	
<p>Off. Mr. Peters (from Mr. Messer) Nov. 20</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Cy. Copy to Mr. Hodgson asking him to attempt to obtain a copy of the treaty.</p>	
<p>14/ So Co. W/O Air Ministry. Nov. 21</p>	<p>Copies to I.O. C.O. W/O Air Ministry. Northern Dept. pp. 5-7.</p>	<p style="text-align: right;"><i>Ballmailli</i> <i>D.A. D...</i> <i>GREEN</i></p>
<p>(Action completed.) <i>[Signature]</i></p>	<p>(Index.) <i>[Signature]</i></p>	<p style="text-align: right;"><i>[Signature]</i></p>
<p>Next Paper. E 9829</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">[Handwritten notes and signatures]</p>	

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PERSIA

214

Decypher. Mr.Ovey, (Tehran),
November 5th 1924.

D. 8.30 p.m. November 5th 1924.

R. 9.0 a.m. November 6th 1924.

No.281.

Addressed to Ahwaz No.81. (E9630)

Your telegram No.63. (7103)

Capture of Zaidun was in accordance with statement made to me by Prime Minister already telegraphed to you. (Tehran tel. No 262 (Flag A)).

His Highness' assurances of yesterday include holding his forces there as well as at Chahar Mahal.

Sheikh has therefore obtained armistice desired. His Majesty's Government do not wish him to leave Arabistan nor does Persian government any longer wish him to do so.

I trust therefore you will keep him quiet till he has seen Loraine.

After my interview yesterday Prime Minister decided that situation was so serious that he left for Ispahan early this morning.

Minister for Foreign Affairs will telegraph at once to urge on him absolute necessity of extending his assurances of yesterday till Loraine actually has met Sheikh.

Loraine reaches Baghdad according to present arrangements November 13th. I will send Prime Minister similar message through Consul General Ispahan. Prime Minister complained bitterly of constant importation of arms by (grp. omitted) and with Sheikh's propaganda in Irak.

Repeated to foreign Office No.281 and India, Baghdad No.161, Ispahan No.29.

RECEIVED IN REGISTER

6 NOV 1924
FOREIGN OFFICE

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 8.—ARCHIVES.

94

PERSIA.

[November 10, 1924.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 3.

[E 9753/455/34]

No. 1.

Mr. Ovey to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 492.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 23, 1924.

IN my despatch No. 440 of the 10th September I had the honour, in reporting on the composition of Serdar Sepah's new Cabinet, to express the opinion that the prospect of productive diplomatic relations had been greatly enhanced by the appointment of Mushar-ul-Mulk to the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs.

This hope has been fully justified. In spite of his Excellency's frequent illnesses it has been possible to discuss matters in an entirely friendly manner and to achieve certain concrete results. Not only has his Excellency personally, in conjunction with the Prime Minister, pushed through the Majlis the ratification of the arrangement concluded for the settlement of the Urumia Lake question, which had completely hung fire in spite of the constant efforts of this Legation, but he has shown constant goodwill in the settlement of various minor questions, while the Persian Government have volunteered to recognise the Government of Irak and to negotiate a treaty with that Government.

It cannot perhaps be denied that to a certain extent this satisfactory willingness to meet His Majesty's Government may be due to a desire to buy our support in the unfortunate question arising from the rebellion of the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

I had the honour to report that his Excellency had spent three hours with me one morning in the endeavour to find out whether His Majesty's Government were displeased with the Persian Government and were endeavouring to "squeeze" some concession out of them. This frame of mind is particularly oriental, and in spite of my frequent assurances with regard to the entirely unprejudiced desire of His Majesty's Government to prevent the Sheikh of Mohammerah from persisting in his folly, such suspicions were bound to arise. I need hardly say that the most fantastic rumours have been in circulation with regard to our designs. Such rumours almost invariably include the demand by His Majesty's Government for the Northern Oil Concession. I took the opportunity of informing his Excellency that I quite understood the reasons for his enquiry, and that I was particularly gratified at the confidence he displayed in coming straight to me to ascertain the truth. In doing so he had acted in exactly the manner I had always hoped the Persian Government would adopt towards this Legation. Such rumours were bound to arise, and had he under their influence stayed away and nursed his own private suspicions it would have been a proof that I had failed in my task of gaining his confidence. I earnestly trusted that both he and the Prime Minister would always act in a similar manner and approach me with equal frankness should they begin to be impressed by the constant stream of anti-British innuendo, of which there is still apparently an unending source in certain quarters.

Our future relationship with the present and with future Persian Governments naturally depends on the outcome of the sheikh's rebellion. Unless that is satisfactorily settled the conviction that it was a British intrigue will be universal, and all the dawning confidence of the Persians in the genuineness of our desire to assist them in their regeneration will be ruthlessly destroyed.

I am not, as you will be aware, Sir, under any delusion regarding the imminence of a millenium in Persia. But I have always interpreted the policy of His Majesty's Government as consisting in the desire to afford every opportunity to the Persian people to emerge towards a state of greater security and independence, towards some progress moral as well as industrial, which will eventually enable the world at large to consider them more and more as a permanent and inviolable political entity than as the mere relic of an ancient civilisation, so decrepit and so worthless as to justify their absorption by their more advanced and powerful neighbours. The fact that this policy coincides, as I see it, with the highest strategical and military considerations regarding the defence of India which can alone prevent the Russians from adopting an expansionist policy on their side seems to afford additional proof of the soundness of this policy. While the Persian Government will, I hope, shortly have the opportunity of judging of the honesty of our purpose,

[789 k-3]

recent events have begun to lessen their confidence in the efficacy of extraneous sources of assistance.

The deplorable incident of the murder of Mr. Imbrie has, as far as I can judge, produced an indelible impression on the American mind. The Americans set out on their quest to reform Persia financially and morally with an unwarranted optimism. Disappointment had already succeeded this optimism when the murder took place. The peculiarly revolting circumstances attending the murder, the evasions and procrastination in the investigation of the culprits, and all the minor manifestations of cowardice and corruption put the seal on this disappointment. Dr. Kornfeld, in addition to the inherent difficulties of his position, incurred the greatest ill-will from his Christian compatriots for his alleged weakness in dealing with the Persian Government. This ill-will actually culminated in a personal telegram from the widow of the deceased consul to the President of the United States. Dr. Kornfeld, therefore, left Persia finally in a state of despair. All his schemes for the regeneration by personal influence and the gradual infiltration of ethical ideas had been prostrated.

In addition to this, the American advisers have become distinctly unpopular and the increasing discredit into which Dr. Millspaugh has fallen is well indicated by the fact that praise of the virtues and regret for the departure of Mr. Armitage-Smith has become a frequent theme in private conversation.

I dwell at some length on the position of the Americans, as Persian disappointment at the failure of their appeal to America to provide a panacea, as they thought, for all their ills, will leave a void which will cause them to direct their hopes again to Great Britain. I have recently been strongly impressed with this frame of mind on the part of the Prime Minister, who is undoubtedly now contemplating a new orientation and is prepared to look towards Great Britain for financial support, an attitude which will itself involve the necessity of welcoming a reasonable settlement of the question of our outstanding debts and claims.

The present Prime Minister is by no means averse to a policy of industrial development. He is perhaps particularly interested in road construction, and if he remains in power will encourage reasonable development of the national resources of his country. The criticism is levelled at him that so disproportionate a share of the national income is devoted to the army. This fact is indisputable, but it does not bear the same significance that it would in an European country. The Persian army is not an instrument of aggression. It fulfils the rôle of protector of the peace. Apart from the unpopularity accruing to it from its high-handed acts of oppression and venality, it is the Persian army which enables the traveller to pass in security from the frontiers of Persia to the capital and to circulate throughout the country. A comparison of the relative cost of the Persian army with that of the British army, for instance, would be misleading. The safe passage of British travellers and British goods between London and Manchester is fortunately independent of the size of the British army; in Persia the marked increase in security of travel is directly due to the existence of a relatively strong military force.

In respect of Russo-Persian relations, it is more difficult to speak with confidence I have before now referred to an understanding between the Prime Minister and the Soviet Legation. I have every reason to know that the Soviet Legation is ostentatiously supporting Reza Khan; that they still pose as his only friends. In this connection I would emphasise that the Soviet Legation and Government are entirely personal in their policy. Their intrigues take the form of direct personal support of individuals. They make no attempt to disguise these manoeuvres or to pretend that they are merely dealing with whatever Government the Persian people may select in a normal diplomatic manner.

It is no exaggeration to say that the Soviet Government has renounced nothing of the old Russian plans to dominate Persia, although they employ other and more subtle means and have contributed a personal measure of suspicion and crooked dealing which only actual knowledge of their methods can render believable.

Reza Khan is sufficiently astute to distrust them and sufficiently alive to their intrigues to keep in well with them, reserving as final defensive weapon an almost indefinite procrastination. The Russo-Persian Commercial Treaty, for instance, still remains unratified.

On the whole, Russian influence, which, like British, is always present, can be said to be less potent than was perhaps the case a few months ago. The accusation levelled in certain quarters against Reza Khan that he is entirely under Russian influence is unfounded. He might be driven by circumstances more closely into their arms, but he would infinitely prefer any other course.

Urgent telegram: I am without news of the Prime Minister's Movements

305-97

E10094

20 Nov 1924

PERSIA.

Decypher. of telegram from the High Commission for Irak
to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Dated 18th November 1924.

(Received Colonial Office 1.30 a.m. 19th November 1924.)

.....

URGENT.

Following from Loraine for Foreign Office No.601.

Latest telegrams from Shiraz Ahwaz Bushire and Tehran are not encouraging. They suggest that R.K. may be using our intervention with Sheikh to get complete military hold in Arabistan for which he would otherwise have had to fight and so reach position where he can dictate terms to the Sheikh of Mohammerah. Best construction is that local commanders are forcing the pace independently.

Remonstrance to Premier in my telegram No.276.S. of to-day to Shiraz and Bushire is the strongest I feel justified in sending in the light of your instructions. If however, it fails to bring Persian troops to a standstill you may have to reconsider the position. There will not be much time if things develop disagreeably.

I am without news of the Prime Minister's movements but I have telegraphed urgent enquiry. My idea in order to do my best to carry out your instructions is to leave here 20th November and reach Bushire on H.M.S. "Triad" 22nd November. If however, I find R.K. does not arrive at Bushire as soon I shall wait at Mohammerah. If I start tomorrow I shall miss Mr. Ovey here whom I wish to consult.

Sheikh makes a great point of proceeding on the same vessel as myself. Have you any objection to this?

Repeated to Tehran No.183, India and Bushire No.281.S.

Dobbs.

Since the above telegram was sent from the “high Commission for Irak/Iraq,” it would not be inappropriate to digress a bit to mention that today’s country of Iraq used to be part of the Ottoman Empire. The British struck a deal with Imperial Russia and destroyed the Ottoman Empire in WWI. Then, the British and the French started partitioning the Ottoman-held territories with the consent of the Russia and Italy, carving out countries such as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, etc. The British-supported kingdom of Iraq was established in 1921 and gained independence from the UK in 1932. The carving of the Ottoman territories was done in the most bizarre manner. Mr. Mark Sykes, representing the U. K., and Mr. François Georges-Picot from France, placed a map on a desk, and used a ruler and a pencil and divided up the area into different territories that later became countries, some of which would be under the British influence and the others under French influence! Sykes put his signature at the bottom of that map with the pencil and Picot used his pen in doing so!



The next three pages show British Foreign Ministry officials’ reaction to the Loraine’s telegram:

We have not received sufficient information to be able to judge what is happening

<p>1924</p>	<p style="text-align: center; color: red; font-size: 2em;">E.</p> <p style="text-align: center; color: green; font-size: 1.5em;">PERSIA</p>	<p style="text-align: right; color: red;">303 95</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; width: fit-content; margin: auto;"> <p>E 10094 20 NOV 1924</p> </div>
<p>Registry Number } E 10094/263/34.</p> <p>TELEGRAM FROM SIR P. LORRAINE (at Baghdad) Via Colonial Office)</p> <p>Date 18th Nov. 1924. Received 20th Nov. 1924.</p> <p>E - Persia.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Sheikh of Mohammerah.</u></p> <p>Comments on attitude of Reza Khan, suggests action he should take and enquires whether Sheikh may travel on same boat as himself to Bushire.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Repeated Tehran No. 183, India and Bushire No. 2815).</p>	
<p>Last Paper. E 10093</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">(Minutes)</p>	
<p>References.</p>	<p>Please see also E 10095 -</p> <p><u>We have not received sufficient information to be able to judge what is happening.</u></p>	
<p>(Print.)</p>	<p>It is quite possible that the local commanders are acting in the absence of instructions from Reza Khan.</p>	
<p>(How disposed of.)</p> <p>Tel. Baghdad No. 12 - Nov. 24</p> <p>Repeated Tehran No. 184.</p> <p>Lo } CO. } WO. } Admty. } Air Wing } Nov. 26</p>	<p>Persian Staff work is primitive and the news of the Sheikh's submission may not yet be common knowledge.</p> <p>We can only leave matters to Sir P. Lorraine's judgement.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">He</p>	
<p>(Action completed.)</p> <p>18/11</p> <p>(Index.)</p> <p>20/11</p> <p>Next Paper: E 10095</p>		

I can hardly believe that Reza Khan would have deliberately tricked Sir. P. Loraine

He is on the spot and best able to offer advice when the full facts are available.

If Reza Khan is really breaking faith with us, Sir P. Loraine will be justified in using strong language to him.

By. send off the Telegram, a draft of which is submitted herewith

J.P. Waller
20 NOV 1924

Copies to Co.
F.O.
150.
Admiral
Air Ministry

I can hardly believe that Reza Khan would have deliberately tricked Sir P. Loraine at the moment of his return to Persia. It may well be that his troops ~~may~~ ~~be~~ ~~action~~ have acted in ignorance or defiance of his orders. We shall soon know.

D.G. Osborne
20/11

96 304

I think that this is right
 & I have initialled the draft
 telegram — but we must avoid
 if we can too many crises at
 one time. Well — indeed can
 Sir P. Loraine see this question
 in perspective? If you think
 a word of caution wise, please
 add it & resubmit draft urgently
 otherwise send at once AL

✓ Sir W. Tyrrell 20/11

See E 10146 which cancels
 this telegram. W.S. 21/11

No action except copies.

A few days later, on November 24, 1924, Loraine, who appears to be very upset for being outfoxed by Reza Khan, dispatches a telegram to Foreign Office, Tehran, India and Bushire (Bushehr)!

Reza Khan has now broken every pledge and has taken the law into his own hands.

We have largely paralysed Arabistan (Khuzestan) and Bakhtiari powers of defence against attack. We must in common fairness now restore their liberty of action. I have therefore instructed His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz to inform Sheikh and Murteza Kuli (Gholi) Khan that I consider them released from their promises.

As Prime Minister has chosen to resort to force and broken his promises to refrain there from if Sheikh sent his in his submission, and as he has rejected friendly advice of His Majesty's Government and ignored offer of their friendly good offices in securing an amicable settlement...

Reza Khan has now broken every pledge and taken the law into his own hands

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PERSIA

Decypher. Sir P.Lorraine, (Baghdad),
November 24th 1924.

D. 12.5 a.m. November 25th 1924.
R. 10.30 a.m. November 25th 1924.
No.304/S.

URGENT.

Tehran telegram No.164.


Reza Khan has now broken every pledge and has taken the law into his own hands.

We have largely paralysed Arabistan and Bakhtiari powers of defence against attack. We must in common fairness now restore their liberty of action. I have therefore instructed His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz to inform Sheikh and Murteza Kuli Khan that I consider them released from their promises - see my telegram No.303/S.

I beg you to authorise legation at Tehran most urgently to make communication on following lines to Persian government with request for its instant transmission to Prime Minister.

As Prime Minister has chosen to resort to force and broken his promises to refrain therefrom if Sheikh sent in his submission, and as he has rejected friendly advice of His Majesty's Government and ignored offer of their friendly good offices in securing an amicable settlement His Majesty's Government now state that:-

1. Their offer is withdrawn.
2. They are unable to continue their pressure
which



Loraine's next telegram contains several important points:

- British Foreign Secretary directs to "acquaint Persian Government with our obligation to him (Khazal),"
- Loraine is warned of "dangers of direct British intervention on Persian soil," yet he repeats his request for urgent dispatch of one advance battalion...

Loraine writes: "my difficulty hitherto has been to get any pressure to bear on Prime Minister (Reza Khan). Sheikh is well under my control."

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PERSIA

Decypher. Sir P. Loraine, (Baghdad).
November 29th 1924.

D. 1.10 a.m. November 29th 1924.

R. 9.00 a.m. November 29th 1924.

No. 328.S.

Bushire telegram No. 1136 offers chance of peaceful settlement which I am exploiting see my telegrams 317 and 318.S. to Ahwaz and 320.S. to Bushire.

In the circumstances I request your authority to suspend action on your telegrams NOS. 14 and 15 and to take it later at my discretion.

In any case I respectfully suggest omission from your telegram No. 15 of passage "provided always that nomination" down to "satisfactory to that Government" this is an obligation of Sheikh towards us, whereas you propose to acquaint Persian Government with our obligations to him. Question of his successors is not vital to present difficulty, is comparatively unimportant, invites a controversial digression and lends itself to misapprehensions. Do you approve?

I am fully alive to dangers of direct British intervention on Persian soil. You can rely absolutely on my doing everything possible to avoid it. In discussing precautionary measures on November 25th with Air Officer Commanding, I used the same language as in your telegram No.14. He entirely agrees. He also agrees with me that in case of overwhelming necessity we should first endeavour to secure acceptance of Persian Government of our assistance in policing disturbed areas pending restoration of authority.

I/

the two roses to the Persian Govt regarding our obligations to Sheikh -
W.S.

...my difficulty hitherto has been to get any pressure to bear on Prime Minister. Sheikh is well under my control

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(2)

10

I have now received your telegram No. 16. I have given no fresh pledge or encouragement to Sheikh. Indeed the moment I knew that Prime Minister would receive Oriental secretary and without awaiting result of interview I sent message to Sheikh and Bakhtiari not to prejudice this last hope of peace by any provocative or aggressive action.

If meeting at Mohammerah can be brought off in manner suggested by Prime Minister I have hopes of securing satisfactory settlement and of definitely averting contingencies which you apprehend. Until we all meet there situation will remain critical. You will realise my difficulty hitherto has been to get any pressure to bear on Prime Minister. Sheikh is well under my control.


I nevertheless maintain my request for urgent despatch of one advance battalion to Basrah in order to strengthen my hands in forthcoming negotiations and be ready in case of eventualities. Its mere presence at Basrah will be a guarantee against such eventualities. Air Officer Commanding concurs.

I am most grateful for your approval and support.

Addressed to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, repeated to Tehran, Government of India and Bushire.



And here is the response to Loraine's telegram.



Perhaps the most striking revelation can be found in the following document made by Mr. Mallet from the British Foreign Office:

It would be disastrous if the Persian Government were to obtain so complete a control of the oil area in Arabistan (Khuzestan)...to eclipse the local authority of the Sheikh of Mohammarah (Khorramshahr) and the Bakhtiari Khans. The establishment of full Persian Government authority in Arabistan (Khuzestan) would mean that the oil fields and pipeline would be at the mercy of a Persian Government which might at any time become hostile to us at the instigation of the Bolsheviks. Under the regime hitherto prevailing, the *Sheikh of Mohammarah (Khorramshahr) and the Bakhtiari Khans have been able to safeguard British interests in the oil area even when the Persian Government has been definitely anti-British*; this happened during the war when, in spite of a pro-German Government at Tehran, *our agreements with the local chieftains in South Persia enabled us to keep the oilfields working and supply the British Navy with oil.*

230 1924	E. PERSIA	12 E 7052 2 Dec 1924 46
Registry Number E 10692/263/34. TELEGRAM FROM Sir P. Loraine. (Bagdad). No 358. S. Dated 1st Dec. 1924. Received 2nd Dec. 1924. E: Persia.	Situation in Arabistan. Refers to F.O. telegram No. 24 of November 29th (E 10562/263/34). Degree of danger to British community fluctuates with situation. As regards ability to protect them if compelling necessity arises, submits that there are no means of affording protection in time. Acting Officer Commanding cannot spare ground troops from Irak command. To land parties from His Majesty's Ships destroys their mobility. Request for one battalion at Basrah is minimum precaution in state of preparation for emergency. (Sent to Tehran and India.)	
Last Paper. E. 10191	(Minutes.)	
References. (Print.)	The views of the Air Ministry on this fresh request for troops from Sir P. Loraine are given in Sir Hugh Trenchard's letter to Sir William Tyrrell which is included in this jacket below Sir P. Loraine's telegram. When Sir P. Loraine last appealed for a battalion to be sent to Basra (E.10562/263/34), he did so for two reasons, (a) to be ready "in case of eventualities", (b) to strengthen his hand in negotiating with Reza Khan. In this telegram Sir P. Loraine is preoccupied solely with contingency (a). As regards the danger to British lives and property it is submitted that the arguments in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Sir H. Trenchard's letter are sound. Sir Arnold Wilson, whom I saw again to-day, is not personally alarmed about the danger to British subjects at this stage, although he admits, of course, that there is a certain risk. He particularly emphasised a point which has all along been made by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, that it is impossible to divorce the question of the protection of the property of the company from that of the lives of its employees. The Company cannot afford to abandon any of its activities and must keep its men at work on the spot until the last moment. I think the fact that the Anglo-	
(How disposed of.) 14) So. Co. W.O. Adm. Air Min. Dec. 2. Tel. Sir P. Loraine (Bagdad) no. 27, Dec. 2. (Repeated Tehran no. 199 and India) 14) So. Co. W.O. Adm. Air Min. Dec. 3.	(Action completed.) (Index.) Next Paper. E 10643.	

Telegram...it would be disastrous if the Persian Government were to obtain complete control of the oil area

Persian Oil Company have not even now thought fit to evacuate the women and children of their employees from the danger area, tends to show that the local representatives of the Company do not reckon that the immediate danger to life is very great.

Moreover Sir H. Trenchard has shown Sir W. Tyrrell a private telegram which he has despatched to the Air Officer Commanding in Irak, warning him that in the event of a really grave emergency involving danger to British lives in Arabistan, steps ~~must~~ ^{may have to} be taken to send a small mixed force of aeroplanes and infantry immediately, in order to create a demonstration.

I submit therefore that, on the grounds of protection, Sir P. Loraine has not yet made out a strong enough case to justify H.M.G. in moving a battalion from India.

On the other hand, it is useful for us to know that the Air Ministry are expecting a British battalion from India a month hence to relieve one of the battalions now stationed in Irak. It may well be that Reza Khan will prove obstinate in his desire to encroach upon the local autonomy of the Sheikh of Mohammerah to an undue extent. Our undertakings to the Sheikh are definite on this point and, even apart from the need to have regard to our reputation for keeping our word in the East, it would be disastrous if the Persian Government were to obtain so complete a control of the oil area in Arabistan as to eclipse the local authority of the Sheikh of Mohammerah and the Bakhtiari Khans. The establishment of full Persian Government authority in Arabistan would mean that the oil fields and pipe line would be at the mercy of a Persian.....

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Persian Government which might at any time become hostile to us at the instigation of the Bolsheviks.
Under the régime hitherto prevailing, the Sheikh of Mohammerah and the Bakhtiari Khans have been able to safeguard British interests in the oil area even when the Persian Government has been definitely anti-British.
this happened during the war when, in spite of a pro-German Government at Tehran, our agreements with the local chieftains in South Persia enabled us to keep the oilfields working and supply the British Navy with oil.

The moment, however, for moving troops from India with the political object of supporting the Sheikh of Mohammerah does not yet appear to have arisen, and will only arise in the event of Reza Khan proving recalcitrant in his negotiations with the Sheikh and with Sir P. Loraine.

Query. Reply to Sir P. Loraine that we are not convinced that the danger to British lives is sufficiently serious to warrant moving troops at present and that we intend to await the outcome of the meeting between Reza Khan and Sheikh Khazal.

J. H. Mallet

2nd December 1924.

I agree. I think the ^{inherent} disadvantages of sending a battalion outweigh its potential capacity for protecting British lives & property.

The next document shows how desperate the British statemen are in dealing with Reza Khan in Khazal case. The change in the political attitude in the UK's Parliament requires military withdrawal whereas "... Loraine may be able to do nothing with Reza Khan without resort to threats: on the other hand, it is no use to employ threats if we are not prepared to carry them out if necessary."

E.	
<p>Registry Number } E 10780/263/34</p> <p>TELEGRAM FROM</p> <p><u>Sir P. Loraine,</u> (Baghdad).</p> <p>No. 363/S</p> <p>Dated 2nd Received Dec. 1924 3rd E: Persia.</p>	<p><u>Sheikh of Mohammerah.</u></p> <p>Repeats Ahwaz telegram (repeated Bushire No. 179 and Tehran No. 121) reporting 1,000 Government troops have reached Dizful, to be followed by more shortly; that Sheikh insists on leaving for Mohammerah; adds that provided meeting at Mohammerah can be arranged with least possible delay and troops do not advance beyond Dizful, Consul is hopeful of coping with situation. Sheikh is prepared to go to Hindijan by sea provided Reza Khan definitely promises to return with him to Mohammerah. (Repeated Tehran and India).</p>
<p>Last Paper.</p> <p>E. 10776</p>	<p>(Minutes.)</p>
<p>References.</p>	<p>Appended below (Flag A.) is a telegram received to-day by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which is somewhat reassuring as regards the immediate question of the safety of their property.</p> <p>The position to-day, however, is considerably complicated by this definite news that Persian Government troops have succeeded in passing through Luristan and have reached Dizful (see annexed map). The <u>Sheikh of Mohammerah is clearly not in a position to offer military resistance to Reza Khan. He is in fact at the mercy of the Persian Prime Minister and his only hope of a reasonable settlement lies in the support which Sir P. Loraine may be able to give him in negotiating with Reza Khan.</u> In other words he will probably call upon Sir P. Loraine to implement the pledges given to him by Sir P. Cox in 1914 and previous similar undertakings. If Sir P. Loraine is not able to do this by diplomatic negotiations with Reza Khan, the <u>Sheikh and his whole family will leave the country.</u></p> <p>Sir P. Loraine's task is much complicated by the Sheikh's....</p>
<p>(Print.)</p>	
<p>(How disposed of.)</p> <p>14/20 Co W.O. Admtg Air Mngy. } with E 10781 See E 10781 Dec. 3</p> <p>Tel Mohammerah No. 4 Dec. 4. (Repeated Tehran no. 201 and India)</p> <p>14/20 Co W.O. Admtg Air Mngy. } Dec. 5</p>	
<p>(Action completed.)</p>	<p>(Index.)</p>

Sheikh's collapse and it is difficult to see how he can succeed without resort to threats and possibly even action against the Persian Government, unless Reza Khan suddenly shows himself to be more reasonable than we can anticipate. The effect of the Sheikh's departure with his family would be most damaging to our reputation all over the Middle East. Locally the withdrawal of the Sheikh's guiding hand might well be followed by a period of lawlessness among the Arab tribes, who might refuse to submit to the control of Persian troops and might indulge in guerilla warfare in the neighbourhood of the pipe line. Of course we have told the Persian Government already, and can do so again, that we hold them responsible for the safety of British lives and property in Arabistan. If they fail to afford us this protection we should be entirely justified in sending troops to protect our own interests and theirs. I am convinced that the disappearance of the Sheikh of Mohammerah would render the operations of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company more liable to friction with the Persian authorities than in the past. While the Sheikh remained we could, insofar as our interests in Arabistan were concerned, ignore the pin pricks of unfriendly governments at Tehran under Bolshevik influence.

I submit therefore that the time has arrived when a decision should be reached whether, in the event of Reza Khan making demands upon the Sheikh so excessive as to be unacceptable, H.M.G. are to take steps to fulfil their assurances to the Sheikh of Mohammerah or are to let him down. For the reasons given....

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given above I venture to submit that it would be better to adopt the former alternative both from a moral and from a material standpoint.

It would be well to learn from Sir P. Loraine what measures he considered could be applied in order to put pressure upon the Persian Government to exercise moderation in their dealings with the Sheikh. I do not think that these measures need necessarily entail a military expedition, but this could not be entirely ruled out.

In the meanwhile, it might be well to ask the India Office whether they could arrange for the battalion referred to yesterday by Sir H. Trenchard to be held in readiness in India to embark at short notice if required to do so.

Sir P. Loraine may be able to do nothing with Reza Khan without resort to threats: on the other hand, it is no use to employ threats if we are not prepared to carry them out if necessary.

A draft telegram to Sir P. Loraine is annexed hereto.

(Signed) V. A. L. MALLETT.

3rd December, 1924.

I think the telegram and the request to India Office should certainly go forward. The decision as to the fulfilment of our pledges will have to be examined and adopted unless we have better news from Sir P. Loraine within 48 hours or so. It might be well that we should prepare in the Department a memorandum on the various methods of implementing our pledges in various possible contingencies?

(Signed) D. G. OSBORNE.

31/2.

See E 10919/27/24

I fear we have no choice but to proceed as suggested in view of Sir P. Loraine's telegram No. 366S (see E.10785) which shows that he looks upon the departure of the Sheikh as a likely contingency.

The truth is that Reza Khan probably realises our disinclination to take action if we can possibly avoid it.

W.T. 3/12

*Make the enquiries,
but do not take action
without the P.M.'s approval.*

*I cannot direct this
question from Home or in the
last hours before my
departure.*

als

3/12

In view of Sir P. Loraine's insistence on request for a battalion, & Mr Peel's hint that "a call for assistance will be answered very urgently", would it not be well to consult the P.M. at once?

RMM

Dec 4.


*I have explained to Mr McNeill
that all we can do today is
to make enquiries about the
result of Sir P. Loraine's meeting
with Reza Khan.* W.T. 4/12

SEEN BY
-4 DEC 1924
SHEPHERD CROWNE

The following telegram sent to London indicates three salient points:

1. The British agents have gotten hold of a telegram sent by Reza Khan pertaining to his military campaign progress.
2. "...one particularly persistent rumor saying that Prime Minister (Reza Khan) has captured 30 British soldiers amongst Arab forces and refuses to surrender them to the British."
3. "I hear from a good source that Soviet Government offered to land troops 'to protect Persia.'"

One ponders if items 2 & 3 are true, or a psychological warfare conducted by Reza Khan.




And Mr. Mallet, one of the players in the international strategic/political chess game, reveals his thoughts on the above report by writing:

One of the possible sequences of armed British intervention... might be the occupation of Tabriz by Russian troops

One of the possible sequences of armed British intervention in [A]rabistan (Khuzestan) might be the occupation of Tabriz or Resht by Russian troops, in reality to serve the end of the Soviet Govt., but under a specious pretext of a desire to assist Persia to protect her neutrality.

<p>1924</p>	<p style="font-size: 2em; color: red;">E.</p> <p style="color: green; font-size: 1.5em;">PERSIA</p>	<p>E 10833 DEC 1924 93</p>
<p>Registry Number } E 10833/263/24.</p> <p>TELEGRAM FROM <u>Mr. M. M. M. M.</u> <u>(Tehran).</u></p> <p>No. 312 (R).</p> <p>Dated 3rd Dec., 1924.</p> <p>Received 4th</p> <p>E: Persia.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Sheikh of Mohammerah.</u></p> <p>Addressed to Mohammerah No. 94. Quotes text of telegram of December 1st from Reza Khan - published in Tehran - regarding movement of troops in south Persia and announcing intention to advance in two days. Reports rumours of British participation in Sheikh's rebellion, Soviet protest against British intervention and Soviet Government offer to land troops "to protect Persia." (Sent to India.)</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>(Minutes.)</i></p>	
<p>Last Paper.</p> <p style="font-size: 1.5em;">E 10806</p>	<p style="font-size: 1.5em;">I cannot find Lankir on the map, but presumably it is near Dehnullah.</p>	
<p>References.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>(Print.)</i></p>	
<p><i>(How disposed of.)</i></p> <p>14/12 } with Co. } E 10834 wp. } Admty } air being. Dec 4</p>	<p><u>One of the possible sequences of armed British intervention in Arabistan might be the occupation of Tabriz or Resht by Russian troops, in reality to serve the end of the Soviet Govt., but under a specious pretext of a desire to assist Persia to protect her neutrality.</u></p> <p style="text-align: right;">D. G. Owen 4/12</p>	
<p><i>(Action completed.)</i></p> <p style="font-size: 1.5em;">J. G. Owen</p>	<p><i>(Index.)</i></p> <p style="font-size: 1.5em;">906</p>	<p>SEEN -5060- 4/12</p> <p style="font-size: 1.5em;">D. G. Owen 4/12</p>
<p>Next Paper.</p>	<p style="font-size: 1.5em;">D. G. Owen 4/12</p>	



Interesting statements by the Russian Ambassador in Iran published in Izvestiya:

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Interview with Comrade Shumyatsky,
Soviet Plenipotentiary Representative
in Persia.
"Isvestiya" December 4th, 1924.

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Even if there is a definite antagonism between the English and Persians, commonsense somehow cannot reconcile itself with the possibility of a landing of English troops in the ports of the Southern (Persian) Gulf for the further movement into the region of the large oil fields (Mohammerah, Shuster, etc.,)

And indeed there would be nothing for them to do there if they did, as Persian troops are already dealing admirably with the task of liquidating the mutinous acts of Sheikh Khazal, and there are no other dangers of this kind so far as one can see, in Southern Persia. Consequently there is simply no reason for the presence of English troops in the South.

Though in the eyes of the man who has drawn Persia together the Premier and Commander-in-Chief, Riza-Khan, Arakistan (where the feudal lord of the local tribes, Sheikh Khazal has now stirred up a rebellion based on foreign support) and Fuzistan (the feudal province where the Persian Government troops lately suppressed a movement) are but parts of a single national territory, for the English on the other hand these regions are their sources of supply of oil (Arakistan contains all the oil fields of the so-called Anglo-Persian Oil Company), as a zone in which British capital has predominant influence.

That is why every attempt of the Persian Government to centralize the separate tribal sectors of this region, and still more every attempt on their part to suppress the feudal rebels, who live in peace and concord with the English oil people and co-operate with them - encounters definite opposition from the English side.

The mechanism of the English concessions in the South of Persia - the Southern oil fields, the ports on the Southern (Persian) Gulf, the Silk road and navigation on the Karun - has now clashed with the work of subjecting the rebellious regions to the national centre of Persia: that is to say to the Government and Army of Riza-Khan.



There are two possible alternative solutions of this contradiction - either the central Government of Persia should give up the idea of subordinating the Southern provinces to itself in matters of administrative justice, taxation etc., - which would amount to turning these provinces into a de facto British Protectorate - or else the matter must be settled by a struggle. And although Riza-Khan has chosen the second way, and although his young national army is, as you already know, now moving on the plains of Arakistan to quell the rebellious sheikh, it is, none the less still difficult to say which of these two methods he will finally choose.

One thing is certain, that up to now Riza-Khan has considered it his mission not to dismember but to unite Persia, and that if we may judge by his past conduct such a statesman as he cannot agree to hand over to foreigners a mandate for the best part of his own country.


/HAS

Izvestia: ...Persia is no longer what she was a few years ago, and that she may return a worthy reply to the British "ultimatum"

And a clipping from the London Times with an important paragraph pertaining to Iran:



One should take into consideration the reason of British apprehension of occupation of Iran by Russians at that time was that India, which was the highest prized possession of British colonialism, had common borders with Iran, as Pakistan did not come into existence until 1947. A map in the National Geographic published in 1939, shows India and Iran as neighbors.



On December 22, 1924, Sir Percy Loraine sends a comprehensive seven-page report to London in which he attempts to not only downgrade his, and by extension Britain, being outfoxed by Reza Khan, but to put the events in a positive light. He also tries to blame the setbacks on everybody including the statemen in London who had not heeded his warnings from two years prior about Reza Khan's resolve in asserting Iran's central government authority over Khuzestan province. Additionally, he blames Sheikh Khazal for not heeding the British "friendly" advice. At the end of the third paragraph in page 1, the British diplomat writes a duplicitous sentence, which requires special attention. He writes:

The situation, as regards British action, was governed by the policy of neutrality, with a bias in favour of the Central Government, laid by Mr. Ramsay McDonald.

How is it possible to be neutral and biased at the same time? The most important lesson for any non-English speaking person—statesman, or official translator/interpreter—here is that in international negotiations with big powers, extreme diligence must be employed to every single nuance, word, phrase and sentence used by the other party. One should always keep in mind the danger of "lost in translation" and its potential devastating consequence for a country. Additionally, the wealth of information, statesmanship and diplomacy contained in these seven pages is so immense and profound that not only does it command special attention to its details by any reader, but also makes it a requirement for making a course out of it to be taught for those involved in foreign relations.

CIRCULATED TO THE CABINET

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

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No 8. ARCHIVE

PERSIA.

[February 4, 1925.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 3.

137

[E 649/136/34]

No. 1.

Sir P. Loraine to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 4, 1925.)

(No. 578. Confidential.)

Tehran, December 22, 1924.

Sir,

THE vicissitudes of the quarrel between the Persian Prime Minister and the Sheikh of Mohammerah, and their reaction on British interests in this country, whether particular or general, have been so fully reported in the telegrams which have been exchanged, that I do not consider it necessary to add any further description of them to the already voluminous correspondence on this subject.

I have the honour, however, to submit to you in this despatch a more detailed account than has hitherto been furnished of the action which I took under your instructions to facilitate a peaceful solution of the dangerous crisis which had arisen in Arabistan, and to offer some observations of a more general character on the crisis and its fortunate solution.

Before leaving London I had been supplied by your Department with a file of the relevant papers showing the course of events and negotiations up till the 26th October, and I was able during the voyage from Marseilles to Alexandria to study this correspondence attentively. The salient points appeared to me to be the following: The Persian Government was resolved to carry out the intention, of which I had warned His Majesty's Government as long ago as 1922, of asserting its authority over the Province of Arabistan in one form or another; the Sheikh of Mohammerah has undoubtedly put himself in the wrong by his overtly rebellious and defiant attitude, and had been unfaithful to his promise to be guided by our advice, for, had he followed the advice embodied in my telegram to him of the 5th September, 1922 (see the enclosure to my despatch No. 551, Confidential, of 1922), reiterated to him in the autumn of 1923, when I visited him in Ahwaz (see my despatch No. 484 of the 30th October, 1923), and impressed on him with great insistence by His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, it is hardly conceivable that a crisis so acute as the recent one could have arisen. The situation, as regards British action, was governed by the policy of neutrality, with a bias in favour of the Central Government, laid down by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald.

The instructions in your telegram to Beirut, which reached me at Jerusalem, to proceed to Arabistan with all haste and carry out Mr. Ovey's proposal that I should in the first place interview the Sheikh of Mohammerah and induce him to make his submission to Serdar Sepah, appeared to me to constitute a fresh development in the attitude of His Majesty's Government, as well as a variation of the previous proposal, which had been approved by His Majesty's Government just before I left England, that I should meet Serdar Sepah and the sheikh, either at Bushire or Khanikin, and bring pressure to bear on both to come to an amicable arrangement which should, in the first place, give satisfaction to the Persian Government, in respect of its authority which the sheikh had flouted; in the second place, should preserve the sheikh's special position and privileges so far as was compatible with his allegiance to the Tehran Government; in the third place, should avert the necessity for any direct action by His Majesty's Government for the protection of British lives and property at the oil-fields and elsewhere in Arabistan, or in support of the sheikh.

I anticipated that this deviation from the procedure at first laid down for my guidance would be to weight the scales in Serdar Sepah's favour, for the fact that British pressure was first brought to bear on the sheikh would speedily become known in Persia and would undoubtedly be interpreted both in Tehran and Arabistan as meaning that His Majesty's Government had, in point of fact, abandoned their neutrality, were backing up the Tehran Government and were withdrawing support from the sheikh, notwithstanding the special position in which his Excellency stood towards them. It was certain that Serdar Sepah would not be slow to grasp force of such representations as I might eventually make to him; and therefore the weakened, for the more cards were placed in his hands, the better his position

[873 d-3]

for disregarding our representations should he be bent on employing *extreme* measures against the sheikh. Two results were, therefore, possible: either *some* amicable arrangement would be reached, in which case we should be *more committed* and support his policy; or Serdar Sepah would attack the sheikh, in disregard of our wishes, and confront us with the gravely embarrassing choice between implementing our assurances to the sheikh by direct intervention, and acquiescence in a civil war, most dangerous to British lives and property, and probably ending in the military subjugation of Arabistan, the humiliation of the sheikh and the destruction of the privileged position in which we had guaranteed him.

Everything, therefore, depended on the real intentions of Serdar Sepah and their consistency. If he were willing to act with restraint, a peaceful solution was probable; if not, it was unlikely that anything short of a threat of more forceful measures, and perhaps even their employment, would avail to deter him. While, on the one hand, Serdar Sepah's attitude when in Tehran and his language on many occasions to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires revealed a strong inclination for a peaceful solution, it had to be remembered that the concentration of strong bodies of troops in the direction of Arabistan was being steadily proceeded with and that certain factors were urging the Prime Minister to have recourse to armed force: firstly, the opposition in the Majlis, which demanded the destruction of the "rebel" sheikh; secondly, the fear of being accused of having been "warned off" by the British and having thus capitulated to foreign interference in a Persian domestic affair; thirdly, and by no means least, the persistent pressure of the Russian Legation, determined to leave no stone unturned which might bring about a quarrel and a breach between the Persian and British Governments, and grasping eagerly at the Arabistan question as the best opportunity offered since the exodus of the ulama from Irak for the execution of this design.

The urgency of the situation was clear, and I therefore proceeded with the utmost despatch to Bagdad and Mohammerah to carry out your instructions, after outlining briefly (see High Commissioner for Palestine's telegram to Colonial Office, No. 353 of the 7th November last) the possible consequences of the new procedure.

I was fairly confident, owing to my previous relations with the Sheikh of Mohammerah, of being able to convince his Excellency of the necessity of making his submission to Serdar Sepah; I was less confident of my ability to secure from the latter terms satisfactory both to the sheikh and ourselves, without resorting to pressure of a sort which risked the necessity of our direct intervention. I felt strongly, however, that I could not be really certain of Serdar Sepah's intentions, or bring the maximum amount of suasion to bear, until I could see his Highness myself. My anticipations that this personal interview would be difficult to compass proved to be well founded, and, until it was actually achieved at Ahwaz in the early days of December, the situation passed through various anxious phases.

As soon as I had secured the sheikh's act of submission, made in a telegram which I had myself drafted for him, I put pressure on Serdar Sepah, through His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz, to fulfil the assurances which he had given to Mr. Ovey. It then became apparent that his Highness was not prepared wholly to implement those assurances, and the situation assumed a very disagreeable aspect. It also transpired that his Highness was unwilling to meet the sheikh and myself at Bushire, as had been intended; Serdar Sepah did not suggest any alternative procedure, nor did he display any wish for a meeting with myself at all. Reluctant as I was to draw the obvious inference that his Highness wished to dispense altogether with our good offices, and intended to deal summarily with the sheikh as soon as his concentration of troops was completed, I was bound to admit that the evidences of its accuracy were very strong. Should it prove to be correct our position in the matter became exceedingly embarrassing: we should have either to leave the sheikh to his fate, after he had accepted our advice and placed his case in our hands, or stop Serdar Sepah by some methods more cogent than long-distance arguments. This last alternative was most unwelcome to His Majesty's Government, as it meant that they would be directly involved—not merely in Arabistan, but also, perhaps, in international complications of a graver kind with Russia. In the circumstances it was evidently necessary to push conciliation to the utmost limits, and indispensable to get into contact with Serdar Sepah. It seemed to me impossible, as matters stood, for me to seek him out except in response to an invitation, and I therefore despatched the Oriental Secretary, Mr. Havard, to Bushire, with instructions to visit his Highness at Shiraz and make a vigorous representation in

my name. As Serdar Sepah moved southwards Mr. Havard waited for him and caught him at Bushire. Before, however, his report of this interview, which was of a somewhat more reassuring character, reached me, news arrived from Tehran of the issue of an official communiqué stating that as Serdar Sepah's fresh demand for an unconditional surrender by the sheikh had met with no response, his Highness was going to place himself at the head of the imperial troops and march into Arabistan.

There now seemed to be no way of escaping the conclusion that Serdar Sepah had chosen war rather than peace and friendly mediation to effect his purposes, and I therefore made certain recommendations to His Majesty's Government as regards measures with which to confront this new situation, and to provide protection for the lives and properties of British subjects in Arabistan in the event of hostilities, sabotage at the oil-fields, or plundering by demoralised tribal levies. These measures, with one exception, met with your approval and were put into execution. Thereupon I received Mr. Havard's report of the Bushire interview, which led me to hope that after all the way to a peaceful solution was not yet barred, and that the Prime Minister's communiqué was really meant to stifle the opposition and silence his critics in Tehran. His Highness had agreed to meet the sheikh in Arabistan, and had said that my presence on that occasion would be welcome provided the sheikh sent a further message amplifying his previous submission. I therefore turned all my attention to bringing about this meeting: the difficulties were very considerable, and I need not here recapitulate the story of how they were gradually surmounted: it will suffice to recall the fact that Serdar Sepah and the sheikh reached Ahwaz, from different directions, on the 5th December, and that I joined them there on the following day.

My first interview was with Serdar Sepah on the 6th December. I explained to him the enormous interest which His Majesty's Government had in the preservation of peace, the great claims which the sheikh had on their consideration and friendly assistance, their extreme reluctance to intervene in Persian domestic affairs, and the value to Persia of the services they had rendered by bringing the sheikh to his senses. I went on to say that, as always hitherto, my policy in this difficult and intricate Arabistan problem had been to align and find a common denominator for the interests of the Persian Government, the Bakhtiari, the sheikh and His Majesty's Government, and to promote agreement and solidarity among all four. I added that it was entirely due to His Majesty's Government that the sheikh and the Bakhtiari had now lived for many years in amity and concord instead of strife and enmity: a sort of triangular understanding had been established and had given the best results to common interests: His Majesty's Government would be only too glad if the Persian Government came in to stabilise further the situation. Serdar Sepah replied with a very pertinent question. He asked whether, in advocating this policy of an alignment of the various interests, His Majesty's Government expected the Persian Government to treat the sheikh as an equal, and as a free negotiating agent. I said I was able to answer this question without embarrassment, hesitation or ambiguity. His Majesty's Government had always regarded the sheikh as a Persian subject, and such assurances as they had given to him in the past were conditional on the proper observance of his obligations towards the Persian Government. This reply evidently reassured his Highness. I then dealt more particularly with the crisis which had arisen, and pointed out that international as well as Persian affairs were involved. I knew by then that the Russians, and no doubt other persons also, had been deliberately employed in an endeavour to embroil his Highness in an armed conflict with the sheikh and the Bakhtiari. His Majesty's Government, on the other hand, had done everything in their power to avert it. I could myself see no reason, now that the sheikh had made his submission, for not coming to an amicable arrangement with him, which would in no way be derogatory to Persian sovereignty or independence. My constant advice to the sheikh had been to reach such an understanding; the sheikh no doubt had his faults, but we knew from experience that his word, once given, could be relied on, and I felt sure that Serdar Sepah would find the same. I finally said that I could make one statement which his Highness might quite probably regard as altogether undiplomatic, but my previous personal relations with him and my desire to enlighten him in regard to the true situation were my justification. When I heard of his last bellicose communiqué issued at Tehran I had been within an ace of informing His Majesty's Government that the time had come to implement their assurances to the sheikh. I had refrained from doing so in the almost forlorn hope

that a way might even yet be found to solve the difficulties without resort to force. I did not think that anyone cognisant of the circumstances could have blamed me had I reported in this sense. Had I done so, what, I enquired of his Highness, would have been the result? A senseless quarrel between Persia and England, without a vestige of hope of profit to either; all kinds of passions and animosities aroused; a state of acute danger for the greatest material interest common to both countries—the oil-fields. Who, on the other hand, would benefit by such a state of affairs? None but those who wished to embroil Persia with England, and to weaken Persia by strife and tumult. I need not mention any names: his Highness would understand perfectly well to whom I referred.

This statement evidently made an impression on Serdar Sepah. He showed no annoyance at my having spoken to him in a personal manner with such frankness, and told me that unless he had come to Arabistan himself he would never have understood, as he then did, what a labyrinth of mystery and intrigue had been created and what deep mischief-making influences, including certain foreign ones, had been at work to foment trouble and misunderstanding; he admitted then that the sheikh's plea of having been misled by evil counsel was far more true than he had at first supposed. Earlier in the conversation he had given me the assurances reported in my telegram No. 8 of the 6th December, from Ahwaz, and he told me now that he was going to see the sheikh alone the following morning, and have a close discussion with him, and he hoped I would see the sheikh and talk to him myself as soon as possible afterwards. This I agreed to do. His Highness further explained that at his first interview with the sheikh there had been too many people about to admit of any real discussion; he himself had been obliged to maintain a rather stiff and formal attitude and to check the sheikh's attempts to give such a public interview a more intimate character.

I met Serdar Sepah again by arrangement in the afternoon of the 7th December at His Majesty's consulate, having learnt meanwhile from the sheikh what had passed between his Excellency and Serdar Sepah in the morning. I dwelt once more on the interest possessed by His Majesty's Government in the maintenance of the sheikh's position of authority, and asked his Highness, now that he had had the opportunity of hearing the sheikh's own views, to let me know what his design was. The substance of his reply was as reported in my telegram No. 9 of the 7th December from Ahwaz, the main point being that he did not intend substantially to alter the sheikh's position and privileges, though he considered it necessary to take certain temporary measures to assert the supremacy of the Central Government. There would, he said, be many points of detail to be worked out, and these would be discussed later on with the sheikh before he left Arabistan. I could, he assured me, be quite easy in my mind. He had given his word to the sheikh, as the sheikh had done to him; he considered the sheikh thenceforward to be under his special and personal protection, and he would instruct all his people, not merely to discourage persons who intrigued against the sheikh and made trouble, but even to give the sheikh all the assistance he might require in dealing with them.

I said that this seemed to me satisfactory, and the basis chosen was, I had long been convinced, the only sound and durable one. His Highness, however, during the few previous weeks had changed his mind more than once, and in circumstances which had given cause for the gravest anxiety; how then could I be assured that in this matter also he might not find some grounds for reconsidering his present statements? His Highness replied that his present assurances were quite positive, and that he intended to carry them out, even if his policy in so doing was criticised in Tehran.

I then said that I should be very glad to report these assurances to you, and felt sure they would be received with satisfaction by His Majesty's Government.

Now that a basis of settlement by agreement and friendship had been found, I wished, however, to make some concluding remarks. If by the action I had taken under instructions from His Majesty's Government I had contributed to a peaceful and lasting solution, that in itself was a great source of satisfaction to me, for I believed the result to be no less beneficial to Persia than to my own country. I had been through times of doubt and anxiety whether after all my efforts would not be unavailing; but, if ultimately successful, I saw the way open to an even more important result than a fortunate emergence from a serious situation. Among the friends of England in South Persia the Sheikh of Mohammerah occupied the most important position, and, indeed, a unique one, owing to the special relation in which he stood towards His Majesty's Government. Thus, the most serious danger of friction in South Persia between England and Persia would arise from friction

between the sheikh and the Persian Government. The possibility of such friction was therefore one of the greatest bars to closer relations between London and Tehran; if the possibility could be removed altogether, that bar would disappear. The efforts of His Majesty's Government, through the instrumentality of His Majesty's representative in Tehran, had throughout been directed towards bringing the sheikh into a close and regular relationship with the Persian Government, and if the results of that morning's meeting between his Highness and the sheikh and of the interview that afternoon with myself were to consummate those efforts, a very definite step would have been taken in the improvement of Anglo-Persian relations. I believed that a close understanding between Serdar Sepah and the sheikh would, besides having the very considerable advantage already mentioned, directly strengthen the position of his Highness and his Government in Tehran. I welcomed this result; it was in accordance with the desire of His Majesty's Government to see a united, stable and friendly Persia, and it seemed to me wholly compatible with Persia's own best interests. But I went further than that. I wished all the friends of England in South Persia to be the friends of Tehran, to stand by and help their own Government; I wished the Persian Government, who had many anxieties, to feel that the south was safe, loyal and peaceful, so that, should danger arise from other quarters, the south could be relied on. Then peace would ensue, and with it would come progress, development and prosperity. Relations with the Sheikh of Mohammerah were the test case; if this were solved on the lines we had discussed that afternoon, I firmly believed the wider results would shortly follow, with the greatest benefit to all concerned; for my part I was willing to contribute to that result.

Serdar Sepah was evidently not expecting a statement of this sort, and it quite took him aback. He asked whether I really meant what I said, and, when I assured him of my complete sincerity, he expressed the deepest gratitude. He said it was quite true that the Persian Government had anxieties in many directions, and that he could not keep his eyes turned to all the points of the compass at once; if he and the Persian Government could feel that they could safely turn their back on the south with perfect freedom from anxiety, to meet possible danger from another quarter, the feeling of relief would be immense. The British Government could give no more convincing proof of their sincerity than by encouraging what I had suggested.

In making this statement I went somewhat beyond any specific instructions which you had given me, but in view of the extent to which Serdar Sepah had shown his willingness to adapt his policy to suit our interests I felt confident that my language would meet with your approval. The line indicated therein is, I am persuaded, the one most consonant with our abiding interests, for a stable and united Persia is a far more valuable asset to us than a weak and divided one. To bring the south into agreement with Tehran, to make Serdar Sepah himself realise that, so far from supporting a separatist policy in the south we are genuinely desirous of uniting the south with Tehran, and to carry this policy into effect gradually, will make not only Persia's position, but also our own far stronger than hitherto and will give us the best guarantee obtainable in present circumstances against any attempt by Russia at absorption or aggression. What it amounts to is making Serdar Sepah and his Government a present of our friends in the south, and of the so-called "Southern alliance," the principal members of which are the Sheikh of Mohammerah, the Bakhtiari Khans, the Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh and Kawam-ul-Mulk. This alliance, as my previous reports have shown, has been gradually evolving itself during the last three years, and its object was collective resistance to encroachment on semi-autonomous positions by the Tehran Government. The alliance wished to place itself under our aegis, but this we could not and did not admit. It is nevertheless true that had we ever wished to use this instrument against the Tehran Government, at the risk of a partitioning of Persia, the instrument was ready to our hand. But we stood loyally and scrupulously aloof, we gave this combination no encouragement, and, when matters came to a head, in the recent crisis, as they were bound to do one day or another, we stood uncommitted and perfectly free in every respect, except that of our written assurances to the sheikh. Nor, as events have proved, did this attitude weaken in any way our influence with the members of the alliance. The turning point came with the reconciliation between Serdar Sepah and the Sheikh. The formation at Ahwaz of a personal friendship between the two protagonists. It will take some time no doubt for this friendship to become a permanent and reliable factor, but so long as Serdar Sepah keeps his promises and we give our encouragement, there is no reason why it should not succeed. In that case the whole situation in the south will have improved almost beyond recognition and instead of seeing our

British envoy: Khazal could not serve two masters (Britain & Iran)

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relations with the Persian Government perpetually embarrassed by having to take up the cudgels on behalf of our southern friends, and risk the ever damaging accusation of interfering in Persian domestic affairs, we shall actually be able to influence Tehran through those same friends and entirely turn the tables on those—and I mean principally the Russians—who are perpetually seeking to embroil our relations with Persia and, in nine cases out of ten, are taking our "Separatist policy" in the south as the text of their unfriendly insinuations.

I must apologise for having dwelt at such length on this point, but I have done so in the firm belief that it must be a fundamental principle in the future conduct of our policy in this country. It was not possible so long as Serdar Sepah and the sheikh remained apart and full on either side of jealousy and suspicion; it becomes possible now that we have succeeded in bringing these two important personages together on a basis of friendship and mutual understanding. At Ahwaz we secured a happy issue out of many present afflictions, and averted a defeat and a loss of prestige which could only have been retrieved by a form of intervention which was thoroughly repugnant to the wishes of His Majesty's Government and no less alien to the ruling principles of their policy. The policy herein advocated, of which I staked out the main lines in my interview with Serdar Sepah, should, if consistently carried out, lay the foundations of a much happier future and a far more stable and welcome basis for British influence and enterprise.

I must now turn to the sheikh. Once he had made up his mind to meet Serdar Sepah, and, heartened by my return to Arabistan, had overcome his fears of personal danger and public humiliation at the hands of the Prime Minister, he played his part and carried out my recommendations with skill and dignity. When he found that he was treated with real kindness and consideration by Serdar Sepah, he realised even more fully the folly of his previous behaviour and in this way the Prime Minister scored a real personal success. The sheikh accepted our advice to make friends with Serdar Sepah, but it soon became apparent that he was revolving certain reservations in his mind. The sheikh has a curiously obstinate mentality. It is amazingly difficult to get a new idea into his head, it is even harder to dislodge an old one. The idea that his primary duty is to His Majesty's Government and his secondary duty to the Persian Government appears to be quite ineradicable. His immediate perplexity was briefly this: if he gave his word to Serdar Sepah absolutely, he was bound by his own standards to keep it; but he had already given his word to the British Government; so long as the British Government remained on friendly terms with Serdar Sepah all would be well; but if they quarrelled or parted company, what was his position, for he could not serve two masters. The solution he had thought out, which he explained to me with much circumlocution and regarding which he requested my advice, was to give his word to Serdar Sepah as binding so long as his Highness was on good terms with the British. I told the sheikh that in every situation there were always some risks, but that I did not think that any qualification of his promise to Serdar Sepah was wise or desirable, for the reservation would certainly wound his Highness's patriotic feelings and would be a wedge driven into the roots of the friendship which he wished to see initiated and cultivated; moreover, this friendship would itself remove one of the most important sources of difference between us and the Persian Government and its firm establishment was therefore necessary. If other situations arose they could always be considered; his duty was to carry out the advice now tendered to him by me on behalf of His Majesty's Government and do it wholeheartedly. I furthermore pointed out to the Sheikh that I wished him in future to deal personally with the Prime Minister in regard to his difficulties and any grievances he might have; we had extricated him from a very serious scrape and had set him on the right path again; we did not wish to be perpetually troubled with his affairs, and, by bringing him together with Serdar Sepah, we had opened to him a much easier road, both for him and ourselves, for getting his affairs settled. That did not mean that we disinterested ourselves in him or his affairs, but we found that his constant requests for our mediation with the Persian Government did neither him nor us any good. We were accused of interference; he of disloyalty. A working agreement between himself and the Prime Minister would put an end to this unsatisfactory state of affairs, and I thought it more than probable that he would often get more from Serdar Sepah first-hand than his Highness might be willing to concede under British pressure. I reminded him that he could be of use to Serdar Sepah and that the friendship need not be a one-sided one, but he should remember that in the same way as he himself had enemies and difficulties in Arabistan, so did the Prime Minister have enemies and difficulties in Tehran, and he

would probably find that by taking account of Serdar Sepah's difficulties he would predispose Serdar Sepah to help him in his difficulties. The sheikh promised to bear what I had said in mind and do all he could to place his relations with Serdar Sepah on a firm basis.

I have omitted from this despatch the mention of a great many matters of detail which cropped up during these interviews at Ahwaz because they are not essential to the main line of argument. It will be time enough to revert to them if they should assume enough importance to have a bearing on the general situation.

I do not, however, wish to conclude this report without an expression of my sincere gratitude to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad, not only for the generous hospitality which he and Lady Dobbs extended during the month in Bagdad, but also for the friendly counsel and support which he gave me at moments of great difficulty and anxiety. I also desire to express my high appreciation of the willing assistance given to me by all the members of Sir Henry Dobbs's staff, and especially the cypher officers, whose burden of work was more than doubled by the number of urgent telegrams, in and out, in connection with Arabistan. They were often working till late into the night, long after their regular hours, and they carried out the work with precision and regularity. It would give me the greatest satisfaction to learn that you are disposed to grant these officers some reward for the extra work involved and placed on them by another Department of His Majesty's Government than the one which they directly serve.

Copies of this despatch are being forwarded to the Government of India and to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak at Bagdad.

I have, &c.

PERCY LORAINÉ.

Lorraine's secret telegram, sent about forty days later, contains his assessment of Iran and Prime Minister Reza Khan's government, as well the new thinking of the British in seeing Iran as a strong, stable and developed country able to stand against Russians. This new policy happens to be in concordance and compatible with what Reza Khan desires for Iran.

...we now have a Persian government strong enough...

...by aiding and encouraging Persia...we should be rendering both her and ourselves the best possible service and forge the most potent weapon against Russian penetration.

... impossible three years ago, is possible now because Prime Minister has created basis of internal security.

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 PERSIA

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 3 FEB 1925
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Decypher. Sir P. Loraine, (Tehran),
 February 2nd 1925.

D. 11.35 a.m. February 2nd 1925.

R. 9.0 a.m. February 3rd 1925.

No. 25.

Secret.


Your telegram No. 11.

Accurate description of Soviet aims cannot well be doubted but their realisation as regards Persia is hardly I think a practical possibility until Soviet gain sympathy of Central Asiatic Moslem races which they have failed to do hitherto.

In this country Bolshevik ideas will not take root unless favoured by flagrant misgovernment and oppression, hunger, and misery among the people and demoralisation of armed forces. Except as regards question of régime we now have a Persian government strong enough politically to resist disintegrating tendencies; its weakness lies in financial paralysis and severe economic stringency both of which create restlessness and discontent. Financial and economic stabilisation would do more than anything else to ensure political stability and continuity.

It is my settled conviction that by aiding and encouraging Persia in her economic development and in solution of her financial problems we should be rendering both her and ourselves the best possible service and forge the most potent weapon against Russian penetration. Counter propaganda even if defensible


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In a private letter sent from Loraine to D'Arcy, while confirming the new policy, he admits how powerless Britain had become in that time:

British envoy: ...if danger arose to British lives...we should have been powerless to act

The fact was that if danger arose to British lives and properties, we had not the means to afford protection in time. Had the danger materialized we should have been powerless to act in time.



-2-

tracted to us rather than to Russia: a Persia weak
 and divided, besides the disadvantages to which I
 have already alluded, inevitably leads us into a
 struggle with Russia for power and influence to
 prevent a Russian move southwards and towards
 India. There is one idea, however, which I should
 like to stamp out altogether, and that is that there
 is any danger of our losing our hold over the
 Sheikh. Only the loss or abdication of our sea
 power could bring about that result. If Persia again
 relapses into a state of dislocation, the stronger
 local elements in the South will automatically
 gravitate towards British power.

You might be able to get definite
 guarantees for the Sheikh from Reza Khan himself,
 for Reza now understands the situation, but you
 won't get them from the Majlis. It is possible,
 however, that Reza Khan by himself will get them
 or create their equivalent: but the more we appear
 in the foreground, the worse are his chances of
 settling the matter. We must therefore let the
 situation evolve and I shall try from time to time

-3-

to influence Reza Khan personally. But I want to keep in the background and I especially want to establish direct contact between the Sheikh and Reza and get the former out of the pernicious habit of referring his every grievance, etc. to us. We have been far too long the Sheikh's diplomatic representative at Tehran, and it is not a comfortable or profitable position. The letters given to the Sheikh by Reza, copies of which go to you officially by this bag, are all to the good, and if the Sheikh's firmans are confirmed, the basis of what we want will be even more firmly established.

Also we must now attend to our own affairs, and especially concentrate on the settlement of the debt question. A recrudescence of the Sheikh difficulty - if it involves us - will merely set back the clock again, and check the revulsion of opinion in favour of good relations with England which is growing every day.

I must therefore ask you to leave the Sheikh's business as largely as you can in my hands and not ask me to commit myself too closely as regards procedure: we must, I think, keep the main considerations in mind and, as questions arise, bring our action and attitude

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
attitude into relation with those considerations.

AS regards my request for ships and
battalions. The fact was that if danger arose to
British lives and properties, we had not the means
to afford protection in time. Had the danger
materialized we should have been powerless to act
in time. The request for battalions was not a bolt out
of the blue, but a logical outcome of the resolutions
passed by the Committee of Imperial Defence for the
protection of the oilfields: moreover, I did not ask
for troops to be sent to a foreign country, but to
British mandated territory; nor to act, but to be
in readiness.

Fortunately, however, all this is now a
matter of speculative historical interest; it is easy
to be wise after the event; it is not so easy to
carry responsibility for protecting the lives of fellow-
subjects without the means to do so at your back.

Lastly, the Sheikh is, I agree, an
anomaly: also an anachronism. We must give things


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Another interesting report by Loraine appropriate to be taught as a course in diplomacy and foreign relations, in which he reveals:

...a Persian attempt to introduce and establish American interests in this country as a counterpoise to those of Great Britain and Russia.

Persian attempt to establish American interests as a counterpoise to those of Great Britain and Russia...



Great Britain is the country to which she should most suitably turn for such assistance, and the country most likely to be interested in granting it. There is, of course, nothing new in this statement, but what is new is the growing realisation by the Persians themselves that such indeed are the facts of the situation. Since the denunciation of the convention of 1919, Persia has had her flirtations, firstly with Russia, secondly with America; neither have brought her the advantages or the profits which she rather optimistically discounted, and she is now wondering whether, after all, the old friends are not the best friends.

There is this important difference, however, in the situation of to-day, as compared with previous similar phases in Anglo-Persian relations: Persian nationalism has become a permanent and active element which cannot be left out of account in any dealings with Persia. Persia wants a share or a participation in all new enterprises on her own soil; she wants to have a controlling voice in those which are of importance to the State; she is hardening her heart day by day against the grant of fresh concessions, even on really most favourable terms, in the belief, however erroneous in many cases, that the foreign concessionaire reaps a rich harvest of gain, leaving but a miserably small percentage for Persia or her Government, and that these purely foreign enterprises are in some way an encroachment on her sovereignty.

As regards Russia, the disillusionment is very nearly complete. I cannot myself see any trace of confidence or cordiality in the relations of the Persian Government with Russia, though the old reluctance to displease her still lingers on. On the other hand, Persian merchants and traders find their dealings with the Soviet State trading institutions highly unsatisfactory and often actually unprofitable, and their complaints of the way in which the Russians abuse their position to force down the prices of goods and produce unexportable except to Russia, and to control consignments by their monopoly of the Caspian shipping, are loud and numerous. This, indeed, is one of the reasons underlying the desire to create better communications with the south, which, it is hoped, will bring some liberation from the economic bondage to which the Russians are endeavouring to reduce the Persian provinces adjacent to their own frontiers. I am therefore of opinion that any measure which tended to make Persia economically less dependent on Russia would be heartily welcomed by the majority of influential Persians.

We desire, it is true, some more concrete evidence than is at present available of Persia's goodwill and desire to stand well with us. I am not without hope that this evidence may be produced in the next few months by the settlement of the Persian debts to His Majesty's Government on the lines of the compromise terms which the latter have agreed to accept. Should this come about, and should the Persian Government, as I anticipate, thereafter show a continued desire to treat British interests with friendly consideration, the time will have come, and should be immediately employed, to give active help to Persia in re-establishing her financial position and in creating productive economic activities. I should myself like to lay down a programme of principle, as follows:—

1. A loan for the final discharge of Persia's current liabilities, and the funding of her foreign indebtedness.
2. A loan for specific productive enterprises, in which the Persian Government should themselves be directly interested and Persian shareholders admitted.
3. A sympathetic attitude by His Majesty's Government towards any legitimate efforts of the Persian Government to increase their sources of revenue, so long as British interests received due consideration and no attempt was made to discriminate against them.

The proposal may seem a rather far-reaching one, and admittedly it presupposes a set of circumstances which have yet to come about, but my purpose here is rather to indicate the ends towards which we should shape our course, rather than any steps which can actually be achieved at the present moment. We do not wish to fight Persia's battle with Russia, but to endow her with sinews to enable her to fight her own battle, and so to relieve us to the greatest possible extent of ulterior responsibilities. Political action by us need not, in my view, be extended beyond its present limits; if extended it would only be pro-Persian to the extent that it was anti-Russian; and anti-Russian it would essentially be. Finance and economics are far more potent weapons, and these weapons we possess while the Russians lack them. We are therefore in a position of great superiority, and it only needs a friendly disposed Persia to give us the full advantage of that superiority. The programme

which I have roughly sketched would give us the friendly Persia, and its fulfilment would, I believe, found British influence and prestige on a firmer and more durable basis than they have ever yet enjoyed in this country.

As regards the use of the personal influence of His Majesty's consuls in Persia, I have the honour to enclose herein copy of the circular instruction issued to them by me, to which allusion was made in my telegram under reference. This instruction, though anterior to your telegram No. 11, conveys to His Majesty's consuls, in a more developed form, the idea which you express in regard to the advantageous use of their personal influence in inspiring confidence in His Majesty's Government.

As regards consular tours, I confirm the view expressed that these could be usefully undertaken more frequently than at present; it may be that in order to ensure this some increase would be required in consular establishments, and I will enquire into this. I doubt, however, whether the creation of a vice-consulate at Astarabad would give an adequate return for the considerable expense entailed by its establishment. I do, however, most emphatically maintain that the numbers of Levant consular officers in Persia require strengthening, for, as I have pointed out on several previous occasions, it is extremely difficult with the present establishment to keep the consulates manned and the consular service properly maintained in the various provincial centres, while there is less than no margin for any extra duties or for any emergency. My view is therefore that an increase of personnel rather than an increase of consular posts is needed.

The matter of philanthropic or educational work is a difficult one. The Persian Government will always claim a voice in the management of any new hospital or school in which Persian patients are treated or Persian students educated; furthermore, if funds were granted to maintain or develop an existing institution, the Persian Government would undoubtedly claim the right to control those funds. It has occurred to me that the institution most useful here in Tehran and most likely to be welcomed by the Persians would be a modern technical school for the teaching of handicrafts, engineering and, may be, science, which must be free from any denominational character. I even think that the Persian Government would themselves be willing to contribute towards the expenses of such a technical school. A question of this sort, however, requires careful elaboration, and may for the present be left in abeyance.

I shall be anxious to learn whether the views expressed in this despatch meet with your general approval, and I shall meanwhile continue urging the Persian Government to co-operate in settling the questions which have so long proved an obstacle to more cordial relations.

I am forwarding copies of this despatch to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department and His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak, Bagdad.

I have, &c.

PERCY LORAINÉ.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Circular Telegram No. 1, dated January 7, 1925, to His Majesty's Consular Officers.

FOLLOWING is for confidential information and personal guidance:—

Although not yet counting any chickens, I anticipate during next few months a marked improvement in Anglo-Persian relations. Persian Government seems at last genuinely desirous of liquidating outstanding difficulties with us, and may quite likely turn to us again for help in economic reconstruction. Among Persians here generally there is a wish for closer and more friendly relations with England, but they want their faces saved in the transition stage. In this we can and should help them.

If good results which I anticipate mature, they will be due to our patience during last few years and our steadfast dissociation from Persian internal affairs and local politics. This policy must be strictly continued.

It is obvious that Prime Minister's recent visit to South Persia and the happy issue out of the Arabistan crisis have been the turning point. Reza Khan, who is now stronger and more popular than ever, has realised himself how loyal and helpful our attitude has been and how perfidious that of the Russians, whose one object was to promote civil strife, make a quarrel between us and Persian Government, and fish in the troubled waters.

The upshot of the Arabistan crisis is that we have not only dispelled Reza's suspicions, but also shown him that we want our friends in the south to be his friends, that we will use our influence to make the south a source of strength to Tehran instead of a source of weakness, so that he can attend to dangers from other quarters with the knowledge that the south is loyal, solid and peaceful. If this policy is pursued, and I rely on all consular officers in the south and south-west to forward it, we put the so-called Southern Alliance behind Reza and entirely turn the tables on the Russians.

We do not want to strike any triumphant note, and best attitude as regards the Russians is a rather contemptuous indifference to their sordid and shifty intrigues. Points for us to insist on when conversing with Persians are: essential community of main Persian and British interests; friendly British attitude towards Persian difficulties and our strong desire to see Persia emerge therefrom a stable, peaceful, prosperous and friendly neighbour; our desire to strengthen the old friendship by new bonds of common economic and commercial interests and to have a strong Persian Government with which to deal; our determination not to interfere with Persian internal affairs; our sympathy with all genuine attempts at reform, and with all Persians who have the welfare and progress of their own country at heart; our wish to see Persia united and not divided.

You can in your own intercourse help events by constantly emphasising these points. I wish you to do your best to convince all Persian officials with whom you have to deal that you are fundamentally friendly and conciliatory, ready to adjust differences equitably if you are met in a like spirit, and never to exacerbate them. Try to confirm those who are friendly in their friendship and wean those who are not from their attitude. But do not compete with Russians; stand on a higher level.

PERCY LORAINÉ.

The following report, sent from Moscow, shows how great powers collude and deal over smaller countries! Only pages 5 and 6 relate to Iran, but due to its importance, the entire document is offered here.

31 # N

No. 347

BRITISH MISSION,
M O S C O W.

22nd May, 1925.

Sir,

2 JUN 1925

With reference to my despatch No. 535 of to-day's date, I have the honour to report that at a reception given by Madame Litvinov two days before the opening of the Congress of Soviets Monsieur Chicherin made an opportunity for a long talk with me on the subject of the relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

When I listened to his speech at the Congress I realised that I had already been the audience in a private rehearsal; his references to Great Britain, which are reported in full in the despatch referred to above, in general coincided with what he had said to me in private conversation. One or two points were however discussed privately but were omitted from the speech; of these I propose to give a brief outline.

M. Chicherin said that I had once told him that I had noticed when in the United Kingdom a diminution of interest in the Soviet Union: now, he said, too much interest was being shown, but it was interest of the wrong kind, hostile interest. I asked to what he referred and he began to talk of how everywhere the representatives of the Soviet Union encountered opposition on the part of British agents. I asked what was his precise grievance: as regards British representatives I was sure that they had

/ preserved




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preserved a correct attitude, the Soviet Government had been recognised by the British Government and naturally representatives of that Government would do nothing inconsistent with the fact of recognition. As regards his hint at some concerted action against the Soviet Government he had already been told by you through Monsieur Rakovski that it was not true that you had been engaged on the work of building up an anti-Soviet bloc. When M. Chicherin went on to refer to statements to the contrary made by M. Sauerwein in the "Matin" and by the Polish Foreign Minister M. Skrzymsky, I told him frankly that he must really decide whether he believed the plain direct statement he had received from you or preferred to rely on press reports of speeches by third parties. But if he preferred the latter course I honestly did not see that there could be much prospect of arriving at the agreement which the Soviet Government, as he said, was anxious to reach with Great Britain.

What exactly, I asked, did the Soviet Government want? The Soviet Government, he replied, wanted to conclude an arrangement as a result of which the Soviet Union would cease to encounter British unfriendliness all over the world. Here — as inevitably happens when the relations of the Soviet Government with the outside world are concerned — the question of the Communist International crept in. I said that what he suggested was an agreement with the Soviet Union as a concrete geographical and political unit with definite frontiers.

/ He



He had said that all attempts to reach an agreement broke down over the question of propaganda. He was quite right in assuming that the question of propaganda was of fundamental importance, but the British attitude in this matter was quite simple: all that Great Britain asked was to be left alone.

M. Chicherin declared that the Soviet Government was most scrupulous in refraining from interfering in the internal affairs of foreign states. If any agent of the Soviet Government transgressed this rule and his action became known to the Government disciplinary measures were at once taken (He instanced the recall of M. Volin, First Secretary in Paris). If the British Government had any complaints to make regarding the actions of Soviet representatives, they would be examined and action would be taken. As an example of the kind of thing he meant, he said that Soviet representatives were careful to respect the desires of the governments to which they were accredited as regards the circles with which they should have direct contact. For example in Great Britain the Soviet Government recognised the Trade Unions as playing a more or less official part and M. Rakovski had been in relations with them. In other countries, for example in Poland, the Soviet official representatives did not enter into contact with the Trade Unions. If by any chance the British Government objected to M. Rakovski's actions in regard to the Trade Unions it was open to the Government to say so and the Soviet




government would give corresponding instructions, although, he added with a smile, he did not think M. Rakovski's speeches did much harm.

M. Chicherin repeated over and over again that the Soviet Government would give absolute undertakings not to engage in, nor in any way to assist or facilitate, propaganda against Great Britain. But no Government could demand that the Communist Party should cease to be communist.

When I remarked that what he asked was that we should recognise a divorce between the Soviet Government and the Communist International he seized on the expression and declared that given recognition of the divorce — which involved that no representative of the Soviet Government would in any way support or lend assistance to any individual who might be sent by the Communist International to the country to which the representative was accredited — the Soviet Government would be prepared to go a very long way to meet the British Government (he said, 90% of the way).

M. Chicherin proceeded to argue on the ground of historical precedents that there was nothing new in the relative positions of the Soviet Government and the Communist International: his references ranged from the Second International in London to the Pope in Rome and I cannot pretend that I was able to cross swords with him, as I was simply ignorant of many of



the facts or alleged facts which he quoted (M. Chicherin's memory is prodigious and his knowledge of Modern History astonishingly wide). I contented myself with the remark that he must try to imagine how matters appeared to the ordinary man in the street: there had been a congress of the Communist International recently; was it not held in the Kremlin, in the same hall in which the Central Executive Committee of the Union meets, and were not special facilities provided for all the delegates ?

M. Chicherin talked of the necessity of coming to a general arrangement on all matters outstanding between the two Governments (see his speech of 14th May on this question) and mentioned in particular Asia, as a sphere where difficulties continually arose. I told him I could not even after all that he had said quite grasp what precisely he had in view when he talked of an agreement regarding Asia. To take a concrete example, he had mentioned Persia; well, did he propose that what should be arrived at was a kind of 1907 Agreement expressed in another form. He said this was precisely what he had in mind. There could of course be no talk of spheres of influence but concrete questions could be settled by arrangement. For example the Soviet Government might say that in exchange for absence of British representation on the Caspian Great Britain would be given a free hand in Mohammerah. In the same way in China it could not be put in an agreement that Manchuria was a Soviet sphere of influence,

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but it might be arranged that British abstention from interference in the affairs of the Chinese Eastern Railway would be balanced by Soviet abstention from action in some other area in China -- say Shanghai.

(I can give only the sense and not the precise wording of his remarks).

M. Chicherin was obviously desirous of impressing me with a sense of the earnest desire of the Soviet Government to reach an agreement with Great Britain, and he indeed emphasised the desirability of your being acquainted with the true position of affairs. In other words he desired to utilise the friendly atmosphere associated with caviare and champagne cup to lend support to action taken in London in more official surroundings.


In submitting this report of the conversation I wish to make the following comments.

(1.) I believe that the Soviet Government is indeed anxious to come to an arrangement with Great Britain.

(2) The Soviet Government being what it is, this desire on its part is the result of the pressure of circumstances.

The main plank in the foreign platform of the Soviet Government has been the commercial advantages to be derived from close economic relations with the Soviet Union. That there are advantages to be derived from trade with the Soviet Union it would be foolish to deny, but there seems to be a general and growing opinion in foreign business circles that these advantages

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have in the past been exaggerated. This sense of disappointment on the part of foreign countries is the counterpart of the disappointment of the Soviet Government to which M. Rikoff referred in connection with recognition by France (see my despatch No. 333 of today's date).

In these circumstances it is natural that the Soviet Government should feel alarmed at its position: M. Chicherin's speech might almost be summarised as stating that where the Soviet Union is not ignored, it is disliked.

The Soviet Government above all things cannot bear to be ignored.

I have the honour to be,
with the highest respect,

Sir,

Your most obedient

humble servant,

William Peters

The report sent by Loraine to London on September 29, 1925 draws a picture of the political situation in Iran during the last days of the Qajar dynasty when Ahmad Shah has been in Europe for almost two years. Because of the significance of its content, it was "Circulated to the Cabinet by direction of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs."

Circulated to the Cabinet by direction of
 The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
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No. 8.—ARCHIVES.

PERSIA.

[November 3, 1925.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 3.

[E 6723/18/34]

No. 1.

Sir P. Loraine to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 508.)

Sir,

Gulhek, September 29, 1925.

IN my despatch No. 507 of to-day's date, I had the honour to describe the recent disturbances in Tehran which resulted from an apparent shortage of bread, and to analyse their causes and development. These events offer a suitable occasion for summarising the general internal political situation in this country and for indicating its inflexions and tendencies.

2. As will be understood from my despatch under reference, the question of the return of the Shah to his own country was intimately connected with the disturbances in Tehran. The present Persian Government and, I think all, the important people on the Persian political stage regard it as axiomatic that His Imperial Majesty will not return to Tehran without a guarantee from a foreign Power, at least so long as Reza Khan retains his present position of power in this country. It is for these persons equally axiomatic that the only assurances which His Majesty would regard as satisfactory would be those given by Great Britain or by Russia. They assume that the Shah is more likely to seek them in London than in Moscow, and when the announcement reached Tehran that the Shah intended to sail from Marseilles on the 2nd October it was generally assumed, either that he had obtained some assurances from His Majesty's Government, or that he had given His Majesty's Government guarantees that he would work in loyal co-operation with the present Persian Government.

3. I have explained personally and confidentially to the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Shah had approached His Majesty's Embassy in Paris with a request for British advice whether he should return to Persia or not, and that the same reply had been returned to His Majesty as was given to him last year, viz., that the question of his return to Persia was a purely internal one which lay between His Majesty and his own Government; that the British Government were unable to give him any advice in the matter at all and unwilling to be involved in any way in the issue. This information has now doubtless become the common property of the other Cabinet Ministers and the political supporters of the present Government. They therefore argue that one of two explanations must be the right one, it being certain that there is no kind of an arrangement between the Shah and His Majesty's Government. Either the Shah's announcement of his return to Persia was in the nature of a feeler to ascertain the effect produced in Tehran of his impending arrival—in which case it remains to be seen in which direction the recent disturbances have influenced his decision—or that he has reached some arrangement with Moscow. I have it on fairly good authority that the parties of the Right, who are essentially Monarchical, and even Modarres, will abandon the cause of Sultan Ahmed Shah if the second assumption prove to be the correct one.

4. I must here explain that the underlying ground on which the parties of the Right are giving their support to Reza Khan, for whom they have no especial personal or political affection, and are finding him a stable majority in the Majlis, is the conviction that he is the statesman best fitted and in the best position to protect and save this country from Bolshevism and the insidious processes of the Moscow revolutionaries. It will thus be seen that the pendulum has swung a long way since 1921 and that we now have a Government, homogeneous in respect of its internal policy and seeking homogeneity in its external policy, supported by a regular majority in the National Assembly, and pledged to resist subversive Russian penetration and the growth of Russian influence.

5. Indeed, this is the one consideration which at the present time binds together these otherwise heterogeneous political elements. Setting aside the jangle of personal jealousies and conflicting ambitions, which always obscure political issues in this country, it is fair to say that at the present time there are three main currents of thought. I will preface this analysis by saying that hardly a single Persian can now be

found who is in favour of Sultan Ahmed Shah as an individual. One set of political influences, animated by dislike of Reza Khan and his rather autocratic steam-roller-like methods, wish the Shah to return and Reza Khan to be swept away from power; this might be styled the ultra-Royalist and anti-Reza party; another set would like the Valiahd to be brought to the throne in his brother's place and are indifferent whether the Reza Khan Government remains in power or not, rather leaving to the new Shah to choose what Government suits him best; the third set is frankly in favour of Reza Khan and any Government that he may form round him, and regard the Shah and Valiahd and the whole Kajar dynasty as an effete and useless institution of which Persia would well be rid.

6. Therefore, from the point of view of the outside observer and from that of any Government intimately interested in the future of this country, two main issues are shaping themselves in Persia and seem likely to come to a head in not distant future. The one issue is internal and is concerned with the retention of the Monarch and the Kajar dynasty; the second issue is external and is concerned with the general orientation of Persian foreign policy. As things are developing now there is a distinct tendency towards rapprochement with England and perhaps resultant difficulty and tension with Russia.

Copies of this despatch are being forwarded to Government of India, His Majesty's High Commissioner, Bagdad, and to His Majesty's acting consul-general at Bushire.

I have, &c

PERCY LORAINÉ.

In the "Very Confidential" telegram transmitted by Loraine on 21 October 1925 to London, he relays what he has learned from the Iranian Foreign Minister about Reza Khan.

Minister of Foreign Affairs said **that Prime Minister was obsessed with the idea that in all Persian crises British influence had been felt and had prevailed, e.g. constitutional deposition of Mohammad Ali Shah etc., and could not believe that in this case it would be otherwise.**

PERSIA.

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22 OCT 1925

Decypher. Sir P. Loraine, (Tehran).
21st October 1925.

D. 2.20 p.m. 21st October 1925.

R. 9.0 a.m. 22nd October 1925.

No. 332.

.....

Very Confidential.

My telegram No.328.

Further conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs has made workings of Prime Minister's mind rather clearer. His Highness wants to get rid of Kajars, but fears disapproval of His Majesty's Government. He cannot believe our aloofness is genuine nor rid himself of the idea that without some encouragement from us Shah would never have dared to announce his intention to return. Till then he was confident of British friendliness. Now he has laid his ears back. He is conscious of having inflected Persia's policy ever since his advent to power towards England and away from Russia, and thinks that he has thereby rendered His Majesty's Government no inconsiderable service. If we saw him through this crisis he could come out into the open with a frank policy of friendship and co-operation with England in which he really believes. But he interprets our silence as an inconstancy and an indication that mediation of Kajars might have support. Foregoing are Minister for Foreign Affaires' own conclusions. According to my own information they are

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very likely to be correct. I told Minister for Foreign Affairs he must really try to clear these mists away from mind of Prime Minister, who was fighting shadows. If His Highness preferred his own ideas about our attitude towards the Shah to my statements made to him with full responsibility I really could not help him very much. If Reza Khan wished to see me I was quite ready, but I really could not seek an interview with him merely to protest sincerity of my own statements. If he wanted to know whether we thought his plans were in accordance with our interests we must at least know what the plans were. At present I had no knowledge and it was not my business to ask him. I did not myself see what Reza Khan could hope for more than our loyal and friendly attitude of strict non-intervention. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Prime Minister was obsessed with the idea that in all Persian crises British influence had been felt and had prevailed, e.g. constitutional deposition of Mohammed Ali Shah etc, and could not believe that in this case it would be otherwise.

Sent to India.

.....



On the same day, Loraine sends another telegram, this time classified as “Most Confidential.”

Some of the salient points are:

- No one is really acquainted with the Prime Minister’s true intentions, nor with the extent to which he is prepared to press them; and there is no Persian with sufficient courage or sense of personal security to ask him point-blank what means to do, and insist on an answer.
- ...The parliamentary majority is a sham majority and can always be split up by maneuvering the fraction leaders on the lines of their personal jealousies and antipathies. **The Prime Minister is the master of the situation**; he has got his Cabinet in complete subjection and can play on parliamentary forces as he wishes.
- ... Minister of Foreign Affairs has never seen the Prime Minister falter in his determination to prevent the extension of Bolshevik influence in Persia...
- ... [Ahmad] Shah would probably consent to abdicate in return for a handsome allowance payable by the Persian Government... guaranteed by a third party. (I can hardly doubt that this amiable role of guarantor is, in the view of the Shah, reserved for His Majesty’s Government [Britain].)
- ... moderates put Persia’s relations with England absolutely in the forefront of their desiderata; they would be quite willing to take their cue from England...
- The attitude of Reza Khan is certainly enigmatic.
- If he were to thrust himself into a position where the only choice lay between a complete recoil or the aid of a foreign Power, there might be some risk of his throwing himself into the arms of the Russians...I think he is too shrewd to commit himself to such an eventuality.
- ... keeps the Russians in play in order not to lose that possible counter-weight should he find that British views and his own do not coincide on some matter which he considers of essential importance.
- From the point of view of British interests the situation is an embarrassing one.
- The easiest one would undoubtedly be the voluntary abdication of Sultan Ahmed Shah in favour of his brother, the Prince Regent... The query mark to be placed against the replacement of the Shah by the Valiahd...is whether Reza Khan would accept this arrangement...
- The masses are still ignorant and prone to fanatical agitation; they thus fall easily under the influence of the priests, who would not be human were they to fail to take advantage of this power at a time when their future authority seems to be threatened.

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No. 8. ARCHIVES.

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PERSIA.

[November 11, 1925.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 4.

[E 6930/18/34]

No. 1.

Sir P. Loraine to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 550. Most Confidential.)

Tehran, October 22, 1925.

Sir,

IN my despatch No. 76 of the 10th February, and especially in the latter half of that despatch, I described so far as I was able the conditions and considerations which were urging Reza Khan Pahlavi to seek a higher and more unassailable position than the one which he now occupies. The solution of the crisis which then arose in that connection was reported in my despatch No. 107 of the 26th February. In my despatch No. 317, Confidential, of the 16th June, I pointed out that, notwithstanding the solution of February, the question of the Shah, and perhaps of the dynasty also, was not solved, and that the uncertainty in that regard was exercising a baneful influence on the situation here. I further expressed the opinion that Reza Khan would not attempt to raise the question a third time, but would rather bide his moment and await events.

2. As I have had the honour to report in a series of recent telegrams, this expectation has not been fulfilled, and the issue as regards the Shah and the dynasty has been reopened. It will be remembered that an invitation to His Imperial Majesty to return to Persia was issued several months ago, and that nothing but evasive replies were received. The inference drawn here was that the Shah did not intend to return, at all events unless he received some assurances of guarantees from a foreign Power (see my despatch No. 508 of the 29th September). In these circumstances the sudden and unexpected announcement of His Majesty's resolve to sail from Marseilles on the 2nd October came as somewhat of a bombshell. Failing that announcement, I think that Reza Khan would have been content to leave matters where they stood; in the presence of the announcement he evidently made up his mind that the issue must be raised again. His first step in that direction was presumably the so-called bread riots which were described in my despatch No. 507 of the 29th September. This manœuvre fell rather flat. The second attempt was through an agitation got up in Tabriz, as reported in my telegram No. 313 of the 10th October, against the return of the Shah, and later on against the retention of the Kajar Dynasty, which was reflected in other provinces such as Resht, Isfahan and Meshed, the agitation being accompanied by a round-up of suspected Communists and their agents in Tabriz and Meshed, following the one which had already taken place in Tehran. My telegrams No. 317 of the 13th October, Nos. 327 and 328 of the 19th October and No. 332 of the 21st October have acquainted you with the subsequent course of events and with the most reliable information I can obtain, throwing light on their causes and the motive forces at work.

3. The whole situation is extremely complicated and very difficult to analyse. I think the following points, which have been elicited from the Minister for Foreign Affairs in personal and confidential conversation with myself, are pretty reliable:—

- (a.) No one is really acquainted with the Prime Minister's true intentions, nor with the extent to which he is prepared to press them; and there is no Persian with sufficient courage or sense of personal security to ask him point-blank what he means to do, and insist on an answer.
- (b.) All serious work, whether in connection with internal or external questions, is in suspense, and will remain so until this question of the Shah and the dynasty is cleared up; and all other questions are being examined by the Prime Minister in their bearing on the main question and not on their intrinsic merits or importance.
- (c.) The expectation that a homogeneous Cabinet acting in close contact with the Majority *bloc* of the parties of the Right under Modarres would act as a steadying and guiding influence on the Prime Minister, and would lead to a clearer definition of Persia's policy, both internal and external, has been falsified. The parliamentary majority is a sham majority and can always be split up by manœuvring the fraction leaders on the lines

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of their personal jealousies and antipathies. The Prime Minister is the master of the situation; he has got his Cabinet in complete subjection and can play on parliamentary forces as he wishes.

- (d.) The Prime Minister has got the idea wedged into his head that until he reaches a position where he is free from the influence of the crown being used against him, either directly or as a political lever, he cannot press forward his projects for the political cleansing and economic reconstruction of this country.
- (e.) During his fourteen months of office the Minister for Foreign Affairs has never seen the Prime Minister really falter in his determination to prevent the extension of Bolshevik influence in Persia, to frustrate Russia's attempts at subversive action, whatever its form, and to conduct the foreign relations of Persia with a bias in favour of Great Britain.
- (f.) The desire frequently expressed by Reza Khan to settle outstanding questions with His Majesty's Government is a genuine one, but he knows that he has opponents in regard to what are believed to be his personal ambitions, and he therefore will not use his position of power to put these questions through, for fear lest these opponents should make them a battleground, either for the big internal question or for their own personal squabbles. When these questions with England come up, as they constantly do, in the Council of Ministers, Reza Khan fails to give a clear lead, and he acquiesces either in a fresh reference back to some commission or in the examination of objections, usually unintelligent or obstructive, raised by a particular Minister, and thus evades engaging his own responsibility. The Minister for Foreign Affairs consequently apprehends that our main questions with the Persian Government will remain in a state of suspended animation until the issue between Reza Khan and the dynasty is solved.
- (g.) The Minister for Foreign Affairs and other enlightened and moderate Persians recognise that the position with an obstinately absentee Shah hostile to Reza Khan cannot continue indefinitely and is harmful to the country. They are not averse from a change, provided that stability and continuity be not endangered; but what kind of change would be best, how to effect it, or what would satisfy Reza Khan, they frankly do not know. If left to themselves and not overshadowed by the dominating personality of the Prime Minister, they would probably favour the abdication of the Shah in favour of his brother, the present Crown Prince Regent.
- (h.) The Minister for Foreign Affairs considers that the Shah would probably consent to abdicate in return for a handsome allowance payable by the Persian Government; he anticipates, however, that His Majesty would stipulate that regular payment should be guaranteed by a third party. (I can hardly doubt that this amiable rôle of guarantor is, in the view of the Shah, reserved for His Majesty's Government.)
- (i.) These same moderates put Persia's relations with England absolutely in the forefront of their desiderata; they would be quite willing to take their cue from England in regard to the best solution of the present difficulty; they are rather nonplussed by the refusal of His Majesty's Government or their representative here to express a preference for any course, and are apprehensive lest, in the absence of some guiding light from England, the Persians should make a hash of the matter themselves or, still worse, fall into a Russian trap or follow a Russian lead.

4. The attitude of Reza Khan is certainly enigmatic. I might, perhaps, if I went to see him, elicit some more definite expression of his ideas and intentions. I have not, however, considered it advisable to seek an interview with him at this juncture; it is not for me to undertake a conversation which postulates any fundamental change in this country, and still less the dethronement of the Sovereign to whom I am accredited or the elimination of the dynasty to which he belongs. Were I to approach Reza Khan in regard to the principal questions outstanding between ourselves and the Persian Government, such as the debt question, the recognition of Irak, the differential tariff on the northern frontier, the settlement of the Sheikh of Mohammerah's affairs, &c., it is obvious that in the present state of tension no useful progress could be made with these questions, and something indeed

might be lost by urging them at an inopportune moment, when his Highness's mind is occupied with a totally different set of considerations. I have therefore decided for the present not to seek any interview with Reza Khan, more especially in view of the fact that he still seems to be deluding himself into the belief that His Majesty's Government are in some way sympathetic to the Shah and hostile to the realisation of his own projects in regard to the dynasty. I feel it to be more becoming that Reza Khan, if he wishes to hear what is the attitude of His Majesty's Government, should himself seek an interview with me in order to ascertain it. If he considers that attitude to be a matter of indifference to him, it would evidently be useless for me to volunteer any further exposition thereof. I therefore think it best to leave him alone; there is perhaps some risk of his being thus subjected to Russian influence, but unless my estimate of his character and ideas is altogether astray, he must realise that any suggestion of collusion with the Russians, or that he were seeking Russian assistance for the furtherance of his own plans, would wreck his popularity in the country, where it is already shaken by these recurrent perturbations brought about by the friction between himself and the Royal Family. If he were to thrust himself into a position where the only choice lay between a complete recoil or the aid of a foreign Power, there might be some risk of his throwing himself into the arms of the Russians; but I do not judge that matters have reached that point, and I think he is too shrewd to commit himself to such an eventuality.

5. I do not myself doubt the sincerity of his ultimate belief that more benefit is likely to accrue to Persia from a close connection with Great Britain rather than with Soviet Russia; he evidently cannot convince himself, however, that the policy of His Majesty's Government is quite what it appears to be or that it is entirely friendly disposed towards himself, and he therefore keeps the Russians in play in order not to lose that possible counter-weight should he find that British views and his own do not coincide on some matter which he considers of essential importance. I suspect that he does not wish to sacrifice this Russian pawn, except in return for some positive assurance of assistance or tacit support by His Majesty's Government which, like all other orientals, he would largely interpret in a personal sense. His argument undoubtedly is that he has to a very large extent created order out of chaos in this country, and that he has frustrated Russian attempts to acquire a preponderating influence in Persia. He would regard these two achievements as being so favourable to British policy as to outweigh the failure to settle certain questions at issue between the two Governments, and it may perhaps be at the back of his mind to keep these same questions in suspense until His Majesty's Government show him in some way or another that they are not going to oppose him in his struggle with the Kajars. If this reasoning be correct it follows all the more, in my opinion, that we should stand steadfastly on our present positions and refrain from any step which might lead him to believe, even indirectly, that our sympathies lay with one camp or one solution rather than another. He wants us to show our hand, but I think our best tactics are to make him show his. This is not, I think, in contradiction to the suggestion which I had the honour to make you by telegraph, that it would be desirable for an authoritative statement to be made in London of the firm resolve of His Majesty's Government not to intervene or be involved in this internal question, accompanied by an explanation of the considerations on which this attitude is based. Such a statement would, in my opinion, give some moral support to the political forces in this country, which shrink from sudden changes and the disorders and anxieties which are likely to accompany them, and prefer, if new departures are found necessary, to see them effected without danger to legality and constitutional continuity. At the same time, such an announcement would help to forestall any suggestion being made that we are not as disinterested in the question as we wish to appear, and of such suggestion being used to influence any solution in a manner which might be disadvantageous to our interests.

6. From the point of view of British interests the situation is certainly an embarrassing one. The present situation is unquestionably unsatisfactory, for, so long as this obscure struggle exists, a sense of uncertainty and perplexity necessarily prevails, and the chances of Persia adopting a clear and definite policy are small. On the other hand any change opens up a number of undesirable possibilities, each of which would have its necessary reaction on British interests. Even if the issue were one in which we considered we had a voice we should be rather on the horns of a dilemma. As it is one in which we have renounced any say, we can only wait upon events and carefully watch their developments.

7. As, however, we cannot ultimately be indifferent to a change if and when

made, it may be useful to examine the various possible solutions. The easiest one would undoubtedly be the voluntary abdication of Sultan Ahmed Shah in favour of his brother, the Prince Regent. I am inclined to think that the country as a whole is not anti-Kajar, and I think still more definitely that the establishment of a Pahlevi Dynasty, even if acquiesced in by politicians, would not be popular and might even encounter sooner or later popular resistance and raise a reaction in the favour of the Kajars. The query mark to be placed against the replacement of the Shah by the Valiabd—apart from the question of securing the abdication and a legal transfer of the Imperial authority—is whether Reza Khan would accept this arrangement and, if he did, whether a fresh campaign would not start before many months were passed against the new Shah and the Kajars generally. I must say that in my own personal opinion, and postulating Reza Khan's willing acceptance of the position, this solution would be the best one, and I believe that if only Reza Khan would give it a chance, it would work quite tolerably well. I must add that I have been particularly careful to abstain from giving the slightest indication to anyone here, whether Persian or foreign, that such is my own view.

8. Another solution is the creation of a regency, likewise after securing the abdication of the Shah and presumably the renunciation of the Royal power by the heir apparent. The regency could hardly be confided to other hands than those of Reza Khan, and in that case the personality of the titular Sovereign would never offer much importance. It might be one of Mohamed Ali Mirza's two younger sons, aged about 20 and 22, who are now returning to Persia from France with their mother. If, however, Reza Khan is bent on getting rid of the Kajars, this solution would likewise probably prove unworkable.

9. Another solution is the elimination of the Kajar Dynasty and the creation of a new dynasty. This is the solution which the large majority of people here believe that Reza Khan intends to pursue, planting himself on the throne as the first member of the Pahlevi Dynasty.

10. Lastly, there is the solution of a republic, with Reza Khan as its first President. This one has rather been lost sight of lately, but there is no guarantee against its cropping up again.

11. As I have said above, I greatly doubt whether the assumption by Reza Khan of the Imperial Crown, even if means were found to bring that actually about, would commend itself to the feelings of the country or be assured of the country's support. If Reza Khan forces the issue in that direction I think he will not succeed, or that, if he does so, it will only be by force and by physical repression of opposition. The republic is a more insidious idea; once Persia was launched on that course and had shed the monarchy with the reigning dynasty, there would, in my opinion, be very little likelihood of the republic functioning satisfactorily, and a very serious danger of its becoming weak and inefficient and falling an easy prey to the Moscow revolutionaries.

12. It would, I think, be a fair summary of the foregoing considerations to say that any change would be welcome to the Russians as giving them a fresh chance to achieve the designs with regard to this country which they have hitherto been unable to bring to fruition. On the other hand, while the present position is by no means satisfactory and cannot continue indefinitely with an absentee Shah, some changes might be beneficial to British interests in this country, but all changes have a dangerous aspect, both on account of the immediate disturbances they will create and of the impossibility of being certain that they will not go a great deal further than their authors intend.

13. In this connection the attitude of the clergy will have to be taken into consideration. Since Sayyid Hassan Mudarris undertook the leadership of the Majority *bloc* in the Majlis, a split had occurred in the ranks of the clergy by reason of the Sayyid's action, but since the present effervescence broke out and it became known that Sayyid Hassan is not favourably disposed towards the aims which Reza Khan is believed to have in view, attempts at a general reconciliation between the conflicting elements of the priestly body have been made and are likely to be successful. The attitude of the clergy was late in crystallising in March 1924, but when it did it became clear it carried in its train the masses of the ignorant populace and made short work of the Republican movement. Already in Tabriz the clergy have shown opposition and have telegraphed, it is said, to their colleagues in Tehran, who will, at the time considered best and most suitable to themselves, most probably follow the lead given by Tabriz. The reason of the clergy's opposition is fundamental, as any basic change which would seem to

promise progress for the country must of necessity mean loss of influence for that body and even be accounted a menace to its means of livelihood. The masses are still ignorant and prone to fanatical agitation; they thus fall easily under the influence of the priests, who would not be human were they to fail to take advantage of this power at a time when their future authority seems to be threatened.

14. Although the possibility of a legal and generally acceptable solution cannot be altogether excluded, there is at present no very bright hope of any such being found.

15. The course of events may, therefore, depend on the passing mood or caprice of a single individual, Reza Khan. Those who might offer him good counsel fear that their advice would not be welcome, or are far too timorous of his possible displeasure to tender it. Those who give him bad advice, who perpetually flatter him to the top of his bent, for the furtherance of their personal interests and the satisfaction of their petty ambitions, are capable of urging him to any folly, and no great man in the East, few perhaps elsewhere, is without his swarm of parasitical sycophants, humouring his fancies, pandering to his whims, cloying his mind with their contemptible adulation, and preying on his judgment with their crapulous but treacherous protestations of loyalty and devotion. If the wise men hold their peace, the counsel of knaves and time-servers may prevail. That is the danger. It is quite possible that if Reza Khan sought a frank exchange of views with me, I should be able to clear his mind and make him see the dangers lurking ahead; but, for the reasons which I have explained above, in paragraph 4, I feel myself debarred from broaching the subject with him. At the same time I am conscious of numerous sinister influences striving to keep him away from me and to poison his mind in regard to the British attitude. There is nothing novel in that, it is a difficulty with which I have always had to contend, but on other occasions when he has shown a tendency to fly off at a tangent I have always expected, and have been justified in my expectation, that he would come back from his excursion and return to a saner appreciation of the position; on this occasion I cannot feel so confident, for he may take some irrevocable step which will compromise the whole future.

16. I propose, nevertheless, to maintain my present attitude of reserve, unless any emergency arises which appears to me to need personal intervention on my part in order to counteract a challenge to British interests. I trust that such a juncture may not occur, and that Reza Khan's better nature and judgment may prevail and permit a continuance of the conspicuous services which, in spite of many mistakes and lapses, he has rendered to this country.

I am forwarding copies of this despatch to the Government of India and to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad.

I have, &c.
PERCY LORAINÉ.

The comments by the officials in London are revealing. I spent a lot of time trying to decipher the bad handwritings to assist the readers. The first one by Mallet reads:

Since this despatch was written Reza Khan has overthrown the Kajar dynasty. Some Therefore, of Sir. P. Loraine's questions have already been answered, but there still remains the question whether Reza Khan will want himself Shah or whether, after all, he will go in for a republic. The former course seems to be more likely, for, as Jowett once remarked, a republic cannot exist without republicans.

Oliphant writes:

It is difficult for anyone who remembers the old regime to believe that the old Princes and their supporters can tamely accept such a usurper.

Even if it appears to work at first, it will be surprising if a reaction does not follow.

Reza Khan may have been of great use as Prime Minister, see paragraph 3 (E) about his anti- Soviet attitude, but if he assumes supreme power as Shah, his utility will vanish.

There are difficult times ahead. L. Oliphant 12 Nov.

I agree W.T. 12/11

I do not like the prospect, but I think that Sir Percy's attitude has been the right one.

Our countrymen want no new responsibilities and are averse from all adventures. Concurrently a change has come over international relations with the advent of the League [of Nations] and we would not if we would carry off a situation by that high hand. So we must adopt or adapt this battle and say: Patience whilst they shuffle the cards.

One could assume that the sentence "There are difficult times ahead" indicates that he, too, was not in agreement with Reza Khan to become Shah. Also, when he says if Reza Khan "assumes supreme power as Shah, his utility will vanish," could be interpreted that at least some statemen in London were against Reza Khan's ascendance to kingship.

Further, "So we must adopt or adapt this battle and say: Patience whilst they shuffle the cards" sounds very ominous, as it can be interpreted as the British opposition to Reza Shah, and a plot to topple him on an opportune opportunity. They found that opportunity in 1941 to once again occupy Iran militarily with the help of the U.S. in the south and a coordinated Soviet invasion in the north under the pretense of helping Russia in the war against Nazi Germany, and to force him to abdicate. Very dirty political chess game!

<p>72 Q 1925</p>	<p>E PERSIA</p>	<p>E-6530 143 11 NOV 1925 147</p>
<p>Registry Number } E 6930/18/34 FROM Sir P. Loraine, (Tehran) No. 550 (most confidential) Dated 22nd Oct. 1925 Received in Registry 11th Nov. 1925 E: Persia.</p>	<p><u>Political situation in Persia.</u> Refers to Tehran despatch No. 76 of February 10th (E 1593/18/34) Discusses events resulting in deposition of Shah, part taken by Reza Khan therein, attitude of His Majesty's Government towards question, and probable outcome. (Copies sent Government of India and Bagdad)</p>	
<p>Last Paper. E 6928</p> <p>References. 6473 } 6429 } 18/34 6413 } 6723 } E. 6295 } 6185 } 3980 } 1571 } 6722/5708/34 } (Print) Persia</p>	<p>(Minutes)</p> <p>The King ✓ Cabinet ✓ Dominions ✓</p>	
<p>(How disposed of.) 14/50 50 Nov 23</p>	<p>Since this despatch was written Reza Khan has overthrown the Kajar dynasty. Some, therefore, of Sir P. Loraine's questions have already been answered, but there still remains the question whether Reza Khan will make himself Shah or whether, after all, he will go in for a republic. The former course seems the more likely, for,</p>	
<p>(Action completed.)</p>	<p>(Index.) 46</p>	

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W. T. 12/11

12/11

Copies to } I.O. ✓
 } C.O. ✓

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~~144~~

So, I do not like the prospects, but I think that Sir Percy's attitude has been the right one.

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
Reza
12. 11.

The handwritten part of the next document reads: If Reza Khan's coup d'état is really successful, we may look to a solution of many of the major points at issue between us and Persia, such as the debt question and the tariff differentiation on the northern frontiers.

But there is considerable risk in Reza Khan's move to supplant the Kajars, and it is not easy to see why he finds the present situation impossible.

This Londoner, Mr. Oliphant, is wondering why Reza Shah cannot tolerate the status quo of corruption, illiteracy, economic ruin, backwardness...!

<h1>E</h1>		<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;"> 114- E. 6649 30 OCT 1925 </div>
<h2>1925</h2>		<h2>PERSIA</h2>
<p>Registry Number } E 6649/18/34.</p> <p>TELEGRAM FROM</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Sir P. Lorisine, (Tehran).</p> <p>No. 340. Very Confidential.</p> <p>Dated 29th Oct. 1925</p> <p>Received 30th Oct. 1925.</p> <p>E: Persia.</p>	<p><u>Attitude of His Majesty's Government towards towards question of Kajar dynasty.</u></p> <p>Refers to Foreign Office telegram No. 228 of October 26th (E6615/18/34). Has handed message personally to Minister for Foreign Affairs and since had interview with Prime Minister, with apparently good results. Prime Minister stated question of dynasty will now be brought to decision, he did not fear public but young army might be troublesome. Sir P. Lorisine informed him uncertain situation adversely affected Anglo-Persian relations, but His Majesty's Government were determined to let Persia settle own affairs, expecting in return to have outstanding questions settled, which he promised to see to as soon as possible. (Sent Government of India).</p>	
<p>Last Paper.</p> <p style="font-size: 1.2em;">E. 6552</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">(Minutes)</p> <p style="text-align: center; font-size: 1.2em;"><u>No distribution.</u></p>	
<p>References.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">(Print.)</p>	<p style="text-align: center; font-size: 1.2em;"><u>If Reza Khan's coup d'état is really successful, we may look to a solution of many of the major points at issue between us and Persia, such as the debt question and the tariff differentiation on the northern frontiers.</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;">But there is considerable risk in Reza Khan's move to supplant the Kajars, and it is not easy to see why he finds the present position impossible.</p>	
<p style="text-align: center;">(How disposed of.)</p> <p>14) Do. } and amended copy of total no. 228 to Tehran (E 6629) Oct. 31.</p>	<p>(Action completed.)</p> <p style="font-size: 1.2em;">AM 2/4</p>	
<p>Next Paper.</p> <p style="font-size: 1.2em;">F 6664.</p>	<p>(Index.)</p> <p style="font-size: 1.2em;">JOL 5/5/25</p>	



The last document for your review is the report sent by Loraine to Austen Chamberlain, who had become the Foreign Secretary in 1924. All the pictures of the documents in this book were edited and cropped in order to make them pleasing to the eye. The last page of this document shows how these documents initially looked.

Salient points in this long and partly repetitious report are:

...for the Kajars themselves I do not think a single tear has been shed, nor even a sigh heaved; they have been a mediocre lot at best... and Ahmad Shah has done nothing to earn either the affection or the respect of his people, who despise him for his cowardice and condemn him for his avarice and callous selfishness.

...a change was getting more and more inevitable and an attitude of expectancy to see whether anyone would be strong and bold enough to effect it...Reza Khan had dared and done.



Reza Khan

Reza Khan, as you are well aware, always maintained in speaking with me his firm belief in an orientation of Persian policy, in Persia's own interests...

...his obsessing anxiety to appear as an absolutely **independent patriot, holding Persia's head high among the other nations**, and taking counsel with or for none but Persia...

If, however, he applies his convictions fearlessly and wholeheartedly, I think he will pull through, and I hope that he will thereby lay the foundation of a more stable Persia than has existed for many

generations.

This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.

No. 8. — ARCHIVES. 12

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PERSIA.

[November 23, 1925.]

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION 5.

[E 7222/18/34]

No. 1.

Sir P. Loraine to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 592. Confidential.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 6, 1925.

IN my despatch No. 587 of to-day's date I have had the honour to offer an account of the events which led up to and have followed the fall on the 31st October of the Kajar dynasty, which has held the throne of Persia continuously since the coronation in 1796 of Aga Mohammed Khan Kajar, the eunuch Shah.

2. The actual events passed off so rapidly and so quietly that to record them is easy enough; to peer into the future is a much harder task, and I think I must content myself with an appreciation of what has happened and a survey of the possibilities which this momentous change opens up.

3. My immediate impressions, which may very possibly need correction later on, are that the change as regards the disappearance of the Kajars is final. There are doubtless many Persians who regret and are bewildered at the summary dismissal of a long-established dynasty and at losing from one day to another the sense of continuity which it represented; for the Kajars themselves I do not think a single tear has been shed, nor even a sigh heaved; they have been a mediocre lot at best, and Sultan Ahmed Shah, the present head of the house, has done nothing to earn either the affection or the respect of his people, who despise him for his cowardice and condemn him for his avarice and callous selfishness. In spite of this, there has been a general reluctance to contemplate a change; side by side with that reluctance a feeling that a change was getting more and more inevitable and an attitude of expectancy to see whether anyone would be strong and bold enough to effect it.

4. That question has at all events been answered, for Reza Khan has dared and done. The belief that everything can be settled by negotiation, in course of time, and that force is a rather unfair argument, however conclusive a one, has become so ingrained in the Persians that a rapid and decisive act leaves them in a state of resigned bewilderment, even though in this case they anticipated it and have been asking each other for months past whether it is not on the point of happening. The general feeling is therefore a mixture of numbness and apathy; they are not at all displeased at having been rid of the Kajars, but they are by no means reassured as regards the future; they cannot be sure that they have not merely exchanged King Log for King Stork, but they think, in a faint sort of way, there may be a chance of better things—in a more definite way, of more taxes.

5. Probably more than half the *intelligentsia* is slightly in favour of the change, but only a considerably smaller proportion will commit themselves definitely to supporting it except by lip service. Far be it from them, however, to oppose a man like Reza Khan, who does ruthless things like making armies that fight and deposing dynasties that do not!

6. This, I think, accounts for the lack of enthusiasm and opposition alike. The same considerations apply roughly to the choice between a monarchy with Reza Khan as Shah, or a republic with Reza Khan as President. The argument is more or less this: rather something else instead of the Kajars, provided it succeeds; rather the Kajars even than a republic; but, as Reza Khan has taken the decision into his own hands, let him keep the responsibility, and we will judge him by results; if he succeeds, we will forgive him his humble origin and applaud him; if he fails, we are probably done for, for we have not even a dynasty, however bad, to fall back on, but our wisdom in showing no enthusiasm will be justified and no blame can be fixed on us.

7. In these circumstances the whole initiative and the decision rests with Reza Khan. I have it on first-class and first-hand authority that Reza Khan had determined, should the Majlis fail to pass an Act abolishing the Kajar dynasty, himself to form and proclaim a provisional Government. It may be assumed that the Deputies were aware

of this resolve, and that their deliberations were correspondingly influenced. It seems likely that similar circumstances will govern the action of the Constituent Assembly, now about to be convoked, when the time comes to fix the final form of government. In my opinion, if Reza Khan intends to have himself crowned as Shah, the sooner he does it the better, for the longer the transition period the more numerous are the hostages given to fortune. As the first phase has passed off so quietly, and has been acquiesced in all over the country, so the second phase may likewise be accomplished smoothly, so long as the interval between the two is not too long and does not give time for oppositions to crystallise or counter-mancœuvres to develop. It is significant that the clergy have hitherto uttered neither protest nor dissent, and it must be supposed that Reza Khan's proclamation regarding the observance of the Islamic laws, reported in my despatch under reference, has largely conciliated them. Certainly, if Reza Khan can avert opposition in that quarter, he becomes more secure against it from any other, but he will be remarkably astute if he succeeds in doing so without incurring some obligations towards the priesthood which are likely to embarrass him later on. He is of course anything but pro-clerical, and the probability is that he is humouring the clergy until he has safely ascended the throne and feels himself in a strong enough position to disregard them.



8. The general attitude of the country is, I think, tolerably well depicted in a leading article published in the "Iran" of the 2nd November, a French abstract of which I have the honour to enclose herein.* It might roughly be described as a marked tendency towards optimism, qualified by some serious doubts.

9. The future trend of events, no less than the immediate decision to be taken, likewise depends on Reza Khan. His Government as a Prime Minister has been somewhat better than those of his immediate predecessors, but not very conspicuously so. Where it, like the other ones, has principally failed has been through the lack of a clearly defined policy, especially as regards foreign relations. This is the issue on which, in my opinion, the new régime will stand or fall, and it is an instance of the abnormally close interconnection between foreign and domestic affairs which is so characteristic of the Persian body politic, and has been such a terrible trap in the past for foreign diplomatists accredited to this court.

10. Reza Khan has, as you are well aware, always maintained in speaking with me his firm belief in an orientation of Persian policy, in Persia's own interests, towards Great Britain. I have many reasons for thinking that his professions in this respect are genuine. He has equally maintained hitherto that neither the time nor the circumstances were ripe for giving that definite inflection to Persian policy in a clear and open manner. It has been evident to me for some time that the main barring circumstance was the question of the dynasty and his own personal position, that is to say, he feared to take the open country lest his doing so should provoke unpopularity or oppositions, at home or abroad, which would prejudice his own position; there has also been his obsessing anxiety to appear as an absolutely independent patriot, holding Persia's head high among the other nations, and taking counsel with or for none but Persia; in fact, a rather demagogic turn, which became more pronounced the nearer he approached his final tussle with the Kajars.

11. When, as we may assume, he has gathered supreme position as well as supreme power into his own hands, and need call no man in this land even his titular master, one might suppose that the bars to the inception of the policy in which he believes would be removed. Though I am hopeful that such may be the case, I cannot be entirely confident. He is, after all, an Oriental, and an Oriental constitutionally detests putting his cards on the table. If he wants to find excuses for not coming out with a clear policy he is fully resourceful enough to make out a most excellent and plausible case for himself. It will of course be rather irritating for us if the event shows that he has not the courage of his convictions, but by no means disastrous. We have faced in the last few years a good deal of unfriendliness and a great many anxious moments, but our situation is rather stronger than weaker for having faced them frankly, openly, sympathetically and without losing our temper. For Persia, however, I think the issue is a vital one. She must have friends abroad, and only the best ones can be of any real assistance to her. She is too apt to think that others should make sacrifices to win her friendship, and that any sacrifices to earn theirs are unnecessary and undignified. Reza Khan will now have to decide, and he will, in my opinion, find himself at the parting of the ways before many months have passed. Evading the decision will not help him; he may not founder so soon as if he took a wrong decision,

* Not printed.



One should not forget that in one of his foregoing assessments of Reza Khan, Loraine had written:

“Last two and a half years have proved conclusively that none of the regular politicians are capable of governing the country.”

Reza Shah, in 16 years as the leader of the country, laid the foundation of a modern Iran by adopting an ambitious development plan including building a modern university, army, airports, Justice Ministry, Education Ministry, a nationwide railroad system, without borrowing a penny from foreigners... the effects of which are still evident in Iran.

It is interesting to note that the late Dr. Mohammad Mosaddegh, who at the time was a member of Majless, in opposition to Reza Shah's nationwide railroad plan, said the government should build a sugar factory instead! Reza Shah, whose enemies tried to denigrate him by calling him an uneducated soldier, had such a vast progressive vision for the country to realize that transportation was vital for the economy of the country, whereas an European-

educated politician who had lived in the modern world and had utilized the rail system there, preferred a sugar factory instead.

Reza Shah's reign came to an end in 1941 when British and Soviet forces along with Americans invaded Iran under the pretense of—grossly exaggerated—German influence in Iran as well as providing military supplies to Russia, which was partially invaded by the Nazi Germany. The two other obvious reasons were defense of India and safeguarding Anglo-Persian oilfields in Iran. The British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin attended a summit in late November 1943 in Tehran.



Below is a photo of Russian technicians and pilots in Abadan assembling U.S. delivered aircraft to be used in Stalingrad front against Germans.



Iranian Historical Photographs Gallery : iran.fourman.com

As no more British Foreign Office communiqués pertaining to Reza Shah are available, I find my task completed here. However, I wish to offer you two articles by Time Magazine published in 1938 and 1941, along with a very interesting part of a book called *Inside Asia* by John Gunther, published in 1939. Parts of the book are provided for your review in the following pages.


"I am a soldier—and I love my job."

FIFTEEN CENTS

April 25, 1938

TIME

The Weekly Newsmagazine



Painted for TIME by S. J. Woolf

Volume XXXI

REZA SHAH PAHLAVI

"I am a soldier—and love my job."
(See FOREIGN NEWS)

Number 17

Foreign News—(Continued)

Abaha-Djibouti Railway, in which France and Italy each have stock interests, would pass wholly into Italian hands by amicable purchase of the French shares; 3) Italian and French encouragement by *agents provocateurs* of native uprisings in each other's colonies would cease; and 4) France, following Britain's acknowledgement that Italy has certain rights in respect to Palestine, would agree that Italy also has certain rights in respect to Syria, a French mandate. As a preliminary to these far-reaching plans, the Quai d'Orsay this week announced that Premier Daladier and M. Bonnet had "gladly" accepted the British invitation to confer on the matter in London on April 28.

While all this might seem as though France was backing down last week, the whole reason for the immense majorities voted to Premier Daladier was nationwide French confidence that he will resolutely take and maintain the firmest line with Italy and Germany, after first realistically taking losses which France has to take whether she likes it or not.

IRAN

20th-Century Darius

(See front cover)

No country is more anxious to demonstrate its freedom than Iran, no ruler anywhere is more conscious of his dignity.

Imperial Majesty Reza Shah Pahlavi, Shah-in-Shah ("King of Kings") of Iran. This week Iran's 60-year-old, 6-ft., grey-mustached King of Kings celebrates a coronation anniversary. Twelve years ago on April 5, the former Persian Cossack officer, born of middle-class landowners on the shores of the Caspian Sea, placed a specially-made crown of diamonds, emeralds and rubies on his own head.

This week the monarch whom the elaborate-tongued Iranians often call "Most Lofty of Living Men," "Agent of Heaven in this World," "Brother of the Moon and Stars," will drive down Teheran's broad avenues, reflection of the glory of his reign, to famed Gulistan Palace. There the King of Kings will be pleased to stand in front of the \$50,000,000, 17th-Century Peacock Throne and watch file past him diplomats, ministers, army officers, notables, all clasping their hands on wrists to show they carry no weapons, all bowing heads in profound deference to the August Presence. Unhappy the lot of a mere commoner who should by chance say "Your Majesty" instead of "Your Imperial Majesty," or by a slip of the tongue call Iran "Persia."

Emancipator of his country from British domination, Shah Reza has commanded world attention during the last twelve years by deeds which, in other times, would have spurred British naval and military forces to action. Fresh proof that once-helpless Persia, now aggressive, heavily-soldiered Iran, could stand manfully up to her former master came early this month. A giant, tri-motored Junkers low-wing monoplane, with swastikas gleaming on tail, roared down to Teheran airport, inaugurating Lufthansa's new commercial

airline between isolated, mountainous Iran and the Near East and Europe.

The bustling American and European salesmen who made the inaugural trip were delighted that they had been spared the hitherto unavoidable, tedious, 48-hour journey from Bagdad, Iraq to Teheran over Iraq's slow railroads and Iran's slower, often impassable dirt mountain roads. Better still, they had missed having to put up for a night in one of Iran's insect-ridden rest houses. What the plane's arrival meant to Middle Eastern diplomats, however, was that the German-controlled Lufthansa had just won a significant battle with British Imperial Airways over flying concessions.

"Shadow of God." Formerly divided into spheres of influence by Imperial Russia and Imperial Britain, Iran shook off Russian influence when Cossack officers retired from the country at the end of the World War, but waited five years for the British-officered South Persia Rifles to disband. With a newly-created army of 40,000 men, commanded in person by the then Reza Khan, supplied with second-hand rifles, machine guns, tanks, Iran first dealt with her own warring, rebellious Kurds, Kashgais and Bakhtiars, then began shaking a determined fist at Great Britain.

First real shock to reach Downing Street from Teheran was arbitrary cancellation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Co. concession scheduled to run until 1961. Surprised British statesmen, suddenly realizing that protection of this oil lease would involve great military effort and huge expenditures, ended by negotiating. Anglo-Persian's basic holdings were enormously decreased and the Shah obtained increased royalties which were promptly earmarked for the army. This highly successful instrument of national freedom, now 100,000 strong, still receives its daily orders from His Imperial Majesty.

Another move was an Iranian hint that His Britannic Majesty's naval forces in the Persian Gulf were no longer welcome to make their base in Iranian waters. Result: The British Naval Base was moved across the Gulf to the oil-laden Bahrein Islands, territory of more tractable, independent H. H. Sheik Sir Hamad bin 'Isa al Khalifa, leaving His Britannic Majesty's diplomatic agent for the Persian Gulf uncomfortably high & dry in Bushire's British Residency (see map, p. 19). Meanwhile protection-loving Imperial Airways revised its flying route to India, establishing its regular Persian Gulf stop for seaplanes at Bahrein instead of Iranian territory.

Since Iran was bent on proving her independence, lean pickings were in store for British advisers, British business. Ships were ordered from Italy and Italian officers were engaged to teach Iranian landlubbers theories of navigation. Barter trade was established with Soviet Russia and German goods began to pour into Iran under a clearing agreement arranged by the wily Dr. Hjalmar Schacht. Among the first arrivals were 100 German warplanes for the Iranian air force: Danes, Czechs,

Swedes, Italians, all chipped in to build new beet-sugar factories, power plants, cotton mills. Road builders arrived from Europe and America and construction companies were not long in learning that Teheran, "City of the Shadow of God," was to undergo a facial operation. The King of Kings guaranteed prompt payment in foreign cash.

Iran the New. By this spring thickly-populated bazaar districts were condemned and destroyed, new, broad, straight avenues plotted through once narrow, crooked streets. Magnificent, many-roomed, multi-storied government buildings stood where once sagged ancient one-story huts. A handsome post-office building covering a city block has arisen and a Ministry of War Building, with sufficient space to house the general staffs of Germany, France and Great Britain at the same time, is being utilized by the ever-expanding but still relatively small Iranian staff. The Imperial Bank of Iran, set back from the street, needed an entire square. Slowly rising to completion is an Imperial Opera House to cater to the hitherto undiscovered musical tastes of Iran's citizens.

The shortcomings of the Shah's dozen years in office, the ludicrous anomalies, misappropriations and mass suffering bring laughter and tears only to the eyes of Westerners. By Oriental standards, his own, the Shah is the man of his generation in the Middle East.

Iranian public building has all been under direct orders of the Shah. He approved plans, altered details. Little did it seem to matter to the King of Kings that an architect omitted plumbing detail when building a hotel, that Teheran's water supply still came through the streets in half-open, easily contaminated cement drains, that Teheran's old electric power plant had a limited capacity. When His Imperial Majesty drove at night through a street not sufficiently lighted for his tastes, he ordered more powerful bulbs installed. Upshot of this was that the rest of Teheran was plunged into semi-darkness.

Most Lofty. Almost illiterate when he came to the throne, speaking only Persian with a smattering of Russian, Reza Shah Pahlavi had a strong historical sense, pictured himself as a 20th-Century Darius even when he was still only a cavalry colonel. When he became Minister of War in a Shah-less government (the former do-nothing Shah had moved to Paris), he acted more like the great Persian monarch. He imposed his will on hitherto independent fierce tribes, hanging dozens of warring sheiks, making other suspected local chieftains his permanent "guests." On a group of disobedient mullahs (Moslem priests) he applied the whip in person. Strong-willed, previously healthy followers of the absent Sultan Ahmad Shah, whom Reza Khan later had deposed, developed mysterious maladies from which they never recovered. One chief of police committed suicide, and a foreign minister underwent a fatal operation for a vague ailment. Summed up the Most Lofty of Living Men several years ago: "I am a soldier—a simple soldier—and love my job."

Foreign News—(Continued)

Westernization. The King of Kings combines his knowledge of time-honored Iranian political methods with a passion for reform and an incorrigible interest in blue prints. Despiser of meddling, dictating European governments, he nevertheless admires Western habits and dress, Western technical achievements. Just as Kamal Atatürk had ordained in Turkey a few years before, Reza Shah Pahlavi ordered jail sentences for turban-wearers, forbade veils for Iranian women. Robbed, turbaned mullahs were obliged to carry licenses. The Iranian habit of contracting temporary marriages, sanctioned by the Shia sect of Mohammedanism, was so

doctors or hospitals, as well as for sheer pleasure. More important was that the opium trade, transported by camel caravan into Russia, then carried over the Transiberian Railroad to China by the obliging Soviets, accounted for more than half of Iran's exports (excluding oil revenues, used exclusively for the army), bringing the King of Kings needed foreign money.

Receipts and Expenditures. Money was needed to make Teheran a city worthy of the residence of the "Most Lofty of Living Men." His Imperial Majesty must have expensive macadam roads for his occasional visits to the summer palace on the Caspian Sea—a palace convertible into

gap so that His Imperial Majesty can soon ride by rail from his estates on the Caspian to his lands on the Persian Gulf.

The first few hundred miles of the King of Kings' expensive railroad toy was paid for by a heavy tax on tea, favorite Iranian beverage. When this tax failed to produce sufficient money, large portions of Iran's silver reserve were sold. The Iranian rial lost more than half its value (worth about 6½¢ today), necessitating creation of Government monopolies for imports and exports, prohibition of entry or departure of Iran's paper or silver money. Food prices doubled, taxes trebled. To meet clearing agreement promises, large stores of grain, rice, dried fruits, some needed for home consumption, were exported. In one area His Imperial Majesty decreed that cotton should be grown instead of wheat. Drought ensued, the cotton crop failed, and to make matters worse the world's cotton market just then fell. To the Iranian masses this meant extreme privation, to foreign visitors scenes in Iran's villages were shocking.

Forgotten Men. This spring Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. operators began to report they were unable to buy vegetables for their staffs. Other meats not available, chicken reached price levels reminiscent of early oil-rush days. Eggs were soon unobtainable. No Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. employe suffers unduly from this lack of foodstuffs, for the rich concern, having profited from cash sales of oil to warring Italy three years ago, can import vast quantities of canned foods.

But all through southwestern Iran what had been for years a chronic famine has now deepened into acute starvation. Emaciated Iranian citizens can be seen sitting around in streets and doorways, their bones almost sticking through their skins, their eyes seeming to pop out of their heads, lacking the energy even to brush away the swarms of flies covering their bodies. Scores of beggars greet incoming travelers. Still greatly flourishing is the opium poppy, which withstands drought, is immune from locust attacks. Despite the bustling, superficial prosperity of Teheran, all was not well last week in the Empire of the Shah-in-Shah.

That little opportunity exists for outward manifestations of unrest was evident from the fact that His Imperial Majesty keeps a tight rein on the army, maintains a force of 20,000 of his best-clothed, best-fed, best-paid soldiers in Teheran. This week the stern dictator's men were making the rounds of households along the route of the contemplated state drive of His Imperial Majesty, warning citizens to display flags, hang out banners.

When an American automobile agent in Teheran recently suggested to the King of Kings that he might be interested in a bullet-proof car such as was formerly supplied to Al Capone & Company, the sensitive monarch resented the none-too-subtle comparison. A multilingual secretary replied briefly and pointedly: "His Imperial Majesty, beloved of his people, certain of his subjects' affection, has no conceivable need for such a conveyance."



curtailed by the Shah that polygamy became difficult. The number of wives decreased, the number of prostitutes increased among Iran's heavy female population.


Instead of religious schools government-controlled secular education was expanded. Boy Scout movements were encouraged, the army was taught to read and write. Mohammedan law was largely nullified. The vexing problem of land titles was solved, one major result being that suddenly vast, rich areas became known as "crown property"—i.e., were simply taken by the Shah.

Once healthy, abstemious Shah Reza considered outlawing opium smoking, but factors other than reform weighed heavily. Important was the fact that an estimated half of the adult population smokes opium, that it is used as solace for the famine victim, to quiet crying babies and pleading children, to deaden the pain of a disease-ridden population largely unserved by

a summer hotel for commoners when the royal master is not in residence.

More expensive than all other modern improvements put together, however, scheduled to cost \$160,000,000, nearly three times the annual revenue of Iran, is an 865-mile railroad line. No foreign country is to own any part of this line, no foreign loans are to be accepted. Conceived as a strategic railway, to enable the Iranians to repulse possible British invasion from the Persian Gulf, Russian invasion from the Turkomen Soviet Socialist Republic, the railroad line carefully avoids all Iran's big cities except Teheran, skirts round the Empire's more fertile districts, spans wide rivers, crosses mountain passes as high as 7,200 feet, bores into numerous tunnels, connects with no foreign lines. Foreign engineers, not interested in strategy, chuckled that the railway goes from "nowhere to nowhere." This spring Scandinavian engineers were doubling shifts to finish before autumn a 200-mile

***Inside Asia*—John Gunther writes about Persia and Reza Khan**



prices.

In *Asia Magazine* Vincent Sheean has preserved a precious anecdote of this period. “Corruption was at its height in Teheran in those days, but it is yet to be proved that anyone got anything for his money. Rothstein, the Soviet Ambassador in Teheran at the time, told me long afterward in Moscow that he had come to the conclusion that Persia was ‘fundamentally sound.’ Asked to give the reasons for this view, he found an almost unanswerable one. ‘They will take money from anyone,’ he explained, ‘from the British today and from the Russians tomorrow, or from the French or the Germans or anybody else. But they will never do anything for the money. You may buy their country from them six times over, but you will never get it. Therefore I say Persia can never go under. Persia is fundamentally sound.’ ”

But then something happened—something more significant than anything in Persian history since Genghis Khan and Tamurlane.

Reza Khan, the veteran Cossack trooper, now in command of his division, advanced into the picture.

tains in the south.

The Grocer-Boy Shah, Sultan Ahmed, returned from the ladies of Biarritz and Deauville to take one quick peek at his transformed country. He looked with approval, and apparently was not interested enough in Reza’s growing strength to combat it. He went back to Paris, gave more rubies to chorus girls, and retired to the American hospital there, where he died after a fantastically expensive illness. Reza, meantime, unusually among Oriental figures, did not bother to revenge himself on the old dynasty, members of which still live peaceably in Teheran.

It is recorded that the Queen, quite by accident, let part of her face be seen while worshipping some years ago in Kum, the burial place of Fatima, daughter of the prophet. She was rebuked by the priest in charge, and there was a demonstration against her. The Shah sent tanks and armored cars to Kum, walked into the mosque with his shoes on, and with his own hands administered a severe beating to the priest.

His political sense, his shrewdness and cunning are highly developed. Once he was suspicious of the loyalty of a minister of war who was a representative of the powerful Bakhtiari tribe. So the Shah launched a *ballon d'essai* to the effect that he himself was ill. Duly the tribe became restive. Promptly the Shah "recovered," dismissed the minister of war, and broke the Bakhtiari power.

There is virtually no public debt in Persia, and the Persian budget

He works enormously hard, like almost all modern dictators; he rises usually at five, and any cabinet officer or other high official may expect a call at any time of day or night. No matter what the time is, the person summoned is supposed to be at the palace within fifteen minutes. At cabinet meetings he scourges his ministers, pumping them full of his own vitality, making them work, making them proud to work, making them proud of Iran. He works too hard to have any hobbies—except the precious railroad he is building. He likes French wine, and smokes a little opium occasionally. He always carries a short string of amber beads which he fingers while talking.

When the Shah travels, and he travels incessantly, he puts up an impressive show. He likes to go out and see the country himself, to investigate conditions on the spot, to check local affairs with his own eyes. He generally uses a big, very old Rolls-Royce, bullet-proof; his eldest son, the Crown Prince, usually rides with him. The

But most fair-minded people think that the Shah's merits of character far outweigh his defects, which are mostly the product of lack of education and eastern environment. The Shah has courage, he has vitality, he has vision. He ended the terrible debility of the old régime, he brought the breath of new life to a decaying country. Every day of the week, every week of the year, he struggles manfully to make the people cognizant of themselves, proud of their history. He is a patriot, completely unselfish, and considerably in advance of his own people. His only ambition is to put the country in working order, advance it to modern times, and turn it over to his son.

Women in the old Persia had about as many rights as cattle, and early in his reign Reza set about emancipating them. First, women were permitted to go to restaurants and other public places, something previously unheard of in Persia, and to accompany men in public. The minimum legal age for women to marry was raised from nine (the age authorized by the Koran) to fifteen, and women were given the right to divorce their husbands. The question of the veil was difficult. Not even the Shah dared outlaw the veil by decree. So, very cautiously, he set about discouraging its use. For instance, the Queen appeared in public without a veil, and school girls began to wear modern costumes. Then the Shah—subtle fellow!—set apart the most fashionable streets of Teheran, including the shopping center, and suggested that here, at least, women might dispense with

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the veil. Then came an officially inspired whispering campaign that only prostitutes still really cared for veils!

Iran is a difficult place. Not only the *mullahs* have opposed the Shah. Centuries of backwardness, of obscurantism, oppose him too. For instance, in an attempt to broaden the basis of government, he decreed that any citizen with a complaint might telegraph it to him personally without charge. But in practice the local police often interfere with such messages.

has been growing.

The foreign policy of Reza Shah is simple and traditional: to play Russia and Britain against each other, to prevent the Russians from being too influential in the north, and the British in the south. He has been successful in both courses. Nor has he had much difficulty lately, since both the Russians and the British want a reasonably strong buffer state in Persia, and Reza gives it to them. Far better an autocratic and occasionally idiosyncratic Shah than Iran in chaos.

The other object of Reza's policy is peace, good relations with his smaller neighbors. He envisages a sort of middle Asian community of border states—Afghanistan, Iraq, and Turkey combined with Iran to hold off the great powers and work for their common good. To this end his government signed the pact of Saadabad in July, 1937, linking the border states in a non-aggression treaty. He is very careful to keep the prestige of his small neighbors high. For

The new railway is Reza's chief d'œuvre, his masterpiece, and his precious toy. Persia has never had a railway before, and the difficulties of construction were judged to be insuperable. The line traverses the plateau for a thousand miles from northeast to southwest, and crosses two mountain masses, one of which is 120 miles

^a The British Legation—a minor point but perhaps one that shows again the wonderful British luck or skill in being in the right place at the right time—contains a well with the only good drinking water in Teheran. The whole town uses it. Another point—perhaps it indicates that the British aren't much interested in Iran any more—is that Teheran is the only capital between Cairo and Peking without an English daily newspaper.

wide, the other sixty, as well as a desert where communications have hitherto been impossible. There is one stretch of fourteen kilometers which cost \$5,000,000. The cost as a whole will be \$150,000,000, not including two new towns being built as termini. Every cent comes from within Persia, out of taxes or other revenue. No foreign loans for Reza Shah!


Linking Teheran with both the Caspian and the Persian Gulf, the railway has great strategic and political as well as commercial importance. The British wanted Persia to build an east-to-west railway, from Bagdad to the borders of India. The Russians wanted a railway up to their end of the Caspian. Very carefully the Shah contrived to defeat both British and Russian aims; his line is exclusively Persian, linking the two Persian coasts. The northern port, Bandar Shah (King's Harbor), is removed as far as possible from European Russia, and the egress at the south is not Mohammerah, which would have been the most convenient spot, but Bandar Shahpur (Harbor of the King's Son) which is further from the Iraq frontier. Bandar Shahpur is not ideal from one point of view; not only has

Things went along fairly smoothly until 1932. The Anglo-Persian drilled wells, explored territory, paid Persia a sum running to £11,000,000 in royalties, spent another £22,000,000 inside Persia on wages and so on, built the great plant at Amadan near the Persian Gulf, and was by far the largest enterprise in the country. On November 27, 1932, with hardly a hint of warning, the Shah suddenly canceled the concession.

What he wanted was, of course, a bigger share of the profits. He got it handily. For six months the British piously protested at the Shah's "confiscatory" tactics, denounced him vigorously, and put the case before the League of Nations. The Shah stood firm, and issued a long list of complaints, for instance, that the original concession was obtained under pressure, that the amount of royalty had been unfairly calculated, that the company had refused to pay income tax, and that the cost of oil in Persia was prohibitive. The company, backed by the British government, denied these charges. Finally a compromise was worked out. It was called a compromise, but in reality the Shah won hands down, by holding to his implied threat to close down the Anglo-Persian establishment. The British had to give in.

erty should revert to Iran. The new agreement greatly increased Iran's income from the company. In 1931, for instance, the Persian government received £306,872 in royalties; in 1934 it received over two million pounds.

This achievement may seem less exciting than the railroad, but it is spectacular just the same. The Shah has done something almost unique. It isn't everybody who so successfully grabs Britain by the throat and shakes until the sterling flows.



A few observations:

The above map of Asia, published in the same book in 1939, designates several countries/territories as "British possessions." These are Singapore, Borneo, Hong Kong, Burma, India, today's Pakistan, Cypress, British Somalia, part of Yemen, Kenya, part of today's Jordan, Israel and Lebanon. Other countries/territories are designated as "Under British influence." These are today's Egypt, Iraq, U.S.E, parts of Saudi Arabia as well as parts of Afghanistan.

Iran, thankfully, is not under either category. In the eyes of a fair person, this means Reza Shah's Iran was considered independent and not under British influence.

The map also designates North and South Korea and Taiwan as "Japanese Possessions" and vast parts of China as "Under Japanese influence." The fact that China, South Korea and Taiwan have not only gotten rid of colonialists, but also have become very modern and economically strong, gives Iranians the hope that they can make Iran independent, modern and economically powerful.

(See enlarged description following.)

The Japanese Empire:

1. Japan proper, with 70,000,000 people jammed into an area less than that of California, is bursting outward. Country of discipline, conformity, *Shinto*, imperial ambitions, earthquakes, no humor, a wonderful sense of mimicry, and raw fish. Observe its growing empire, Korea (2), where the farmers wear white, Formosa (3), which the Japanese call Taiwan, and the southern half of Sakhalin (4). Recently Japan took Hainan (5), and the Spratly Islands (6) far in the south.
 7. Manchukuo. This state, as big as pre-Munich Germany and France combined, is Japan's great foothold on the mainland. Ruled by the Kwantung army under the puppet Emperor Henry Pu-yi. Economic experiments in progress. Carved out from China in 1931-32. The opium province of Jehol (8) annexed in 1933.
 9. Inner Mongolia, above the Great Wall, still being fought over in 1939. Part of it may soon become a new puppet state. "Ruler" is Prince Teh.
- Russia in Asia:**
10. From the Urals to the Pacific the Soviets are busy: prodigious timber and coal development, new steel towns, Arctic fisheries, gold. Across the Amur river frontier they watch the Japanese balefully. At Vladivostok and Khabarovsk their military machine stands defensively ready. The Japanese, if they attack, will try to push the frontier back to Lake Baikal (11), thus free Tokyo from threat of air bombardment. Along the Soviet fringes are a dozen autonomous republics, populated by Mongoloid folk and Buryats, Turkomans, Uzbeks (near Golden Samarkand—12). One which has its own postage stamps, and colorful they are, is Tannu Tuva (13).
 14. Outer Mongolia. Perhaps technically this vast area, over a million square miles, belongs to China. But the Mongolian Peoples Republic rules it in fact, which is to say that it is a Soviet sphere of influence. Bound to the U. S. S. R. by a military pact. The people are nomads, try to sell hides, die of thirst in the Gobi desert.

15. The great, little-known province of Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan) is in theory under Chinese sovereignty, but China's writ here is pale. Sinkiang is not quite a Russian "sphere of influence," but almost.
- The Chinese Republic:**
16. Colossal China, the most durable of nations, one of the most finely civilized, resists the "Dwarf Monkeys," which is what the Chinese—when they are impolite—call the Japanese. China stands for charm, intelligence, poise, and a fierce new national spirit to overcome the past few generations of corruption and decay. Methodist Chiang Kai-shek and the great Soong family are its leaders. Population between 400 and 450 million—the biggest in the world. Land of anarchic rivers, ethical religion, famine, the family system, and western imperialism at its most predatory.
 17. These are the five northern provinces, those above the Yellow River—Shantung, Chahar, Hopei, Shansi, Suiyuan—which the Japanese are trying to nip off. Scene of heavy fighting, heavier intrigue. Here the Chinese Red Army and its guerrillas have been active.
 18. Chungking, in Szechwan, is the present (April, 1939) headquarters of the Generalissimo. He lost Hankow (19) and Canton (20) last October, but the Japanese have not yet consolidated their gains. The country has risen behind Japan's front line. The Chinese have lost most of the coast served by railroads, as well as the Yangtze valley (21) draining to Shanghai. Chinese supplies come chiefly from the Soviet Union via Lanchow (22), or from French Indo-China and Burma to Yunnanfu (23).
 24. Tibet. This is technically part of China, but is in essence a British sphere. Rival imperialisms find their greatest activity in China. A theocratic state, Tibet is complexly ruled by priests.

The book also mentions that Reza Shah emancipated the women in Iran. It is worth to note as a point of comparison that nine years prior to Reza Shah's order of women emancipation, Ms. Jeannette Pickering Rankin, a women's rights advocate, was the first woman in the U.S. elected to the U.S. House of Representatives as a Republican from Montana in 1916.



Jeannette Pickering Rankin
Wikipedia



Amelia Earhart
Smithsonian Institution

Also, three years before Iranian women were able to throw away their forced hijab, Ms. Amelia Earhart, a lioness, became the first female pilot to fly solo across the Atlantic Ocean from the United States to Europe. She achieved a lot in flying, authored many books about her flying experiences and helped the formation of an organization for female aviators.

Time Magazine 1941: He played both ends until they met

FIFTEEN CENTS

SEPTEMBER 8, 1941

TIME

THE WEEKLY NEWSMAGAZINE



Ernest Hamlin Baker

IRAN'S REZA SHAH PAHLAVI

He played both ends until they met.

(World War)

WORLD WAR



LAVAL AND DÉAT

Collaborated on by Nazi surgeons.

Sted Jones, International

was helped into Ambassador de Brinon's car and sped to the Versailles municipal hospital. Two German surgeons, whom the Nazi Army of occupation obligingly dispatched from Suresnes, arrived to help dig the German slug out of his chest. They decided not to, but collaborated on M. Déat's case and both men were given a good chance to pull through. Laval felt well enough to phone his wife at their dark little castle down in Auvergne and to receive Otto Abetz, the Nazi Ambassador to France.

Locked up in jail, as so many of his countrymen had been in the past few weeks since they began to get up off their knees and strike back at their Nazi tormentors (TIME, Aug. 25), Paul Colette was cheerful enough, although he kicked himself for not having "finished the job." He probably did not realize that what he and many other courageous Frenchmen had started last week was something terrific. They were showing that terrorism cuts both ways, that there are some men who will die before submitting to a conqueror's brutality and kill rather than see their country sold out. The news of the Versailles shooting reached Vichy that evening while old Chief of State Pétain was attending Berlioz' opera *The Damnation of Faust*.

Up France! The Nazis' attitude toward the Versailles shooting showed clearly that they regarded the case as a case of dynamite. They first said that Paul Colette was a Communist, later admitted that he was just another De Gaullist, had in fact tried to escape to Britain and join the Free French forces. He had been incited to the shooting, said the Nazis, by the treacherous British radio. (They blandly added that Admiral Darlan, Laval's successor as Vice

Premier, was next on the assassination list.) A part of the Nazi-controlled Paris press was permitted to recommend leniency for Paul Colette. So was Pierre Laval. More amazingly, so was the Volunteer Legion to Combat Bolshevism.

The shooting seemed to turn the Nazis sour on the Legion idea anyhow. Formed to confuse and demoralize the French (and possibly to serve as a tough band of mercenaries if the Nazis decided to fake an anti-Vichy revolution), the Legion was suddenly told it was not going to the Eastern Front. There might be a lot of other Colettes in the Legion.

On less spectacular French patriots, the Germans spared no mercy. Day before the shooting at Versailles, three men were decapitated for operating an underground printing press and anti-Nazi agitation. Nazi justice was especially revealing here. One man had originally been given a light sentence and fines. He made the fatal error of appealing.

Following the Versailles shooting, 16 other French and Belgians went before German firing squads, including Henri Louis Honoré Count d'Estienne d'Orves. He was a 40-year-old naval lieutenant, had served with distinction in the Mediterranean, joined the De Gaullists, landed secretly in Brittany to do underground work and got caught crossing the demarcation line on his way to see his wife and five children. Chief of State Pétain tried to save him. The Germans not only turned thumbs down but ordered that the news of the executions be prominently headlined in the French press.

It took more than headlined executions to handle the aroused French. In Paris there had been an anti-German demonstration in front of the Montparnasse

station one day and a train wreck outside it on another. Someone had pulled up a double length of rails. At near-by Poissy, saboteurs dynamited the right-of-way and the subsequent train wreck tied up the line 30 hours. In downtown Paris young men sang the *Marseillaise* and near the Porte St. Denis three enthusiasts jumped out of a car with a bundle of patriotic leaflets the size of a cotton bale, slit it open and whizzed away. Twenty thousand German troops were concentrated in Paris at week's end and the Germans began taking all the radios in France—from Jews first, as usual.

If the Germans let reports like this out of France, it was safe to say they suppressed plenty more. The French were hearing that the Germans were not finding Russia a push-over; they were hearing of British raids on Berlin and the heroic resistance of the Yugoslav mountain men. The French were hungry, out of work; prices were soaring and what money they had the Germans were systematically debauching. The French were at last aware that what Naziism grasps it must utterly destroy.

IRAN

Persian Paradox

(See Cover)

Over a suburb of Teheran, Iran's capital, suddenly appeared four Soviet bombers one day last week and dropped six bombs which exploded a half-mile from the home of U.S. Legation Secretary James S. Moose Jr. Within 30 minutes the Cabinet of new Premier Ali Furanghi ordered Iranian troops to cease resistance to the Anglo-Russian advances. The order took a while to filter through. Next day hard-of-hearing Russians bombed Kazvin, set afire thousands of gallons of gasoline Russia could have used. But 1,500 miles to the east on a mountaintop at Simla, General Sir Archibald Wavell, commanding the Indian Army and the British share of the Iranian operation, could collapse his figurative telescope, order himself a great big literal drink. Because:

- 1) The Allies now had a Burma Road to Russia.
- 2) Russia was given her first concrete evidence that Britain was an actual ally. Diminished was the possibility that Russia might make a separate peace with Hitler out of distrust of the democracies.
- 3) One more hole in the dike around the Axis was plugged.
- 4) Empire troops could cooperate in the defense of the Caucasus oil field if the Germans pass the Dnieper.
- 5) Four thousand German "specialists" were hustled away from contact with the inflammable tribes of India's Northwest Frontier.*

* With an Axis army on the Thracian border, Turkey last week worried lest the Nazis demand she eject all British and Russian "specialists" within her borders, then, if she did not, invade her and try to seize the Dardanelles.

WORLD WAR

6) Britain's oil supplies in the East were safeguarded.

Beside the *Götterdämmerung* thunders of the Russo-German War, the 80-hour campaign to achieve all these desirable things sounded like the popping of a little corn. Down either side the Caspian came the Cossacks—horsed, mechanized and propellered. Their western column rapidly took Tabriz; their eastern the port of Bandar Shah (*see map*). To the south the British crossed from Iraq and made sure of the richest single oil field in existence; their warships in the Persian Gulf squashed Iran's minuscule Navy, sinking two sloops, capturing seven Axis ships. Indian troops landed at Bandar Shahpur and, after a brief brush, made sure of the world's largest oil-cracking plant, at Abadan. Not needed were more Indian troops poised on the border of Baluchistan, where shaving the head and varnishing the skull is the poor man's pith helmet.

Fighting on the same side again, Brit-

ain and Russia were delighted to have Iran, and with so little trouble. But there was one party to the taking who could not have shared their delight, and that was Iran's 65-year-old Shah in Shah ("King of Kings").

Last week the Shah held aloof from any official notice that his country was occupied. All that officially happened was that Premier Ali Mansur, to whom the Anglo-Russian ultimatum demanding the Nazis' expulsion had been handed, turned down the ultimatum and ordered resistance. Twenty-four hours later Ali Furanghi was in and the war was off. This week he was arranging peace terms.

Ali Furanghi is a prominent Iranian. Prime Minister once before, thrice Foreign Minister, onetime Ambassador to Turkey and onetime President of the Council of the League of Nations, he is a historian and economist of considerable local note. But he does not give the orders in Iran. The Shah does.

Minus Times Minus Equals Plus. If ever a man had reason to be bewitched, bothered and bewildered by recent history's queer swerves, it was His Majesty Reza Shah Pahlavi. For 20 long years he had played with London, played with Moscow and never lost a trick. Actually he never played both ends against the middle, for he never needed to. During most of the 20 years, London and Moscow felt towards each other much as Georgia's Governor Eugene Talmadge feels towards Negro Ph.D.s and vice versa. But now, somehow, crazily, incredibly, these two irreconcilables stood shoulder-to-shoulder on the soil of his beloved Iran, using it for a meeting ground of mutual assistance. Within his lifetime the Shah has seen some strange quirks in Russo-British-Iranian relations, but never one like this.

Flashback. Scion of an Army-officer family, the Shah was born in 1876 in the Firuzkuh district east of Teheran. Iran was Persia then; and in the '80s Russia,



WORLD WAR

which had steadily picked off Persia's northern provinces, conspicuously strengthened her position at Teheran by organizing under Tsarist officers the Persian Cossack Brigade, most effective military force in the country. This rough & tough outfit Reza, a youngster of 24, joined as a trooper in 1900.

While the Russians staked out their bailiwick in the north, the British did beautifully for themselves in the south. Oil had been smelled, and in 1901 for \$20,000 bleak-brained Shah Muzaffar-ed-Din gave an English financial adventurer named William Knox D'Arcy a 60-year monopoly to explore and exploit all Persia for petroleum except the five northern provinces in the Russian stake-out.

Britain worried about possible Russian encroachments on India, and there was much talk about the Bear that Walks Like a Man. To lubricate diplomatic friction, in 1907 an agreement was solemnly signed which defined each country's sphere of influence in Persia. Britain was to influence in the southeast; Russia in the north. As for the poor Persians, their attitude was aptly summed up in a *Punch* cartoon of the period. It showed a Persian cat apprehensively sitting between a lion and a bear. "I will pat its head," says the bear, "and you shall stroke its tail." Pleads the cat: "But I have not been consulted!"

Ten years later the Tsar fell, and this ended the agreement. Britain's Foreign Secretary, the suavely arrogant Lord Curzon of Keelestone, then had a lovely dream. He dreamed of extending British control from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea, thereby adding a magnificent frontier province to British India. The Mesopotamian campaign had slopped over into always neutral Persia, but in 1918 the British drove the Turks out and garrisoned Persia's strong places. The next year Shah Ahmad, even bleaker-brained than Shah Muzaffar, had no alternative but to submit to an agreement by which his country came under Britain's political and military control.

In 1920, however, Lord Curzon's lovely dream was rudely shattered. The Bolsheviks overran large chunks of northern Persia. Along the shores of the Caspian the British, assisted by the Persian Cossack Brigade, vainly tried to stop them. Those of the old Tsarist officers who were not killed, fled; the brigade started to fall apart.

The story is told that a British colonel at Kazvin, whither the anti-Bolshevik forces had retreated, spotted among the Cossack Brigade's remaining officers a striking six-foot Persian with hard grey eyes. His name was Reza Khan. The colonel knew him for a brave man and, in a last desperate attempt to keep the brigade together, he put him in command. Had he not done so, the future King of Kings might have died an unknown old horse bully.

Persia into Iran. But luck intervened.

The U.S.S.R. decided against sovietizing northern Persia, fearing that Britain would grab the rest of the country. The British decided against grabbing the rest of the country, fearing that the U.S.S.R. would sovietize the north. For the time being, it was a stand-off. Taking advantage of the lull, on Feb. 21, 1921, Colonel Reza Khan rode into Teheran at the head of 2,000 Persian Cossacks and took over.

Shah of Persia then was the squat, pillow royal jerk, Ahmad (height 5 ft., 2 in.; weight 275 lb.), a member of the Kajar Dynasty which had leached on the Persian people since the late 18th Century. Ahmad's most solemn edicts, when there were any, were not obeyed outside of Teheran. He was known as the Grocery Boy Shah because he once cornered his country's entire grain crop during a famine

portation that fields of surplus wheat and barley might rot in one section while 600 miles away a bread famine would rage. The citizenry was saturated with corruption, ignorance and disease.

Through this horrible mess Reza Khan swept like God's wrath: first as War Minister, then as Premier, finally (1925) as Shah in Shah. He reorganized the Army on western lines, put down brigandage, overthrew rebel chieftains, stripped the mullahs of their judicial and political powers, drew up a code of civil law, hobbled child marriage by raising to 15 the age at which a girl might marry, removed the veils from the womenfolk and bettered their status in life, ran the royal Grocery Boy out of the land, fostered education, set up schools and colleges, tore down slums, erected beautiful build-



DARIUS' PALACE AT PERSEPOLIS
History kicked it down.

Oriental Institute

and sold it to his starving subjects at colossal prices.

The night boxes and gambling joints of France were Ahmad's sole passion. When he left Persia he took an alleged \$200,000,000 worth of jewels with him; gave an Oriental carnival for the whole town of Nice which lasted a week, and every night banqueted a thousand guests. On every damsel who tickled his fancy he bestowed a handful of precious stones. In 1930, aged 32, Ahmad died of cirrhosis. Gossip said that he had a liver like an old Spanish saddle. Provision for eight wives was made in his will (executed by Manhattan's Guaranty Trust Co.), but two more turned up whom he had apparently mislaid.

Of such kidney was the ruler of Persia when Colonel Reza Khan took over. The treasury was empty, the Army little more than an armed rabble. Brigandage and tribal disaffection were rampant. The country's roads were hardly better than camel tracks, and so dreadful was trans-

ings, updated agriculture, improved medical service and public health, founded Boy and Girl Scout movements, reconstructed roads and fomented trade and industry with all his being. His greatest accomplishment (next to getting Persia up on its feet) was the 870-mile railroad, which took eleven years to build, cost \$160,000,000 and runs from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian.*

A fanatic nationalist, in 1935 he changed Persia's name to Iran, which had been its name as a nation even before the great days of Cyrus and Darius and Xerxes. Persia ("Pars") was merely one of Iran's provinces. In the same spirit, he chose to add Pahlavi to his name. It means "the Parthian." In classic times, the Parthians were famed mounted bowmen.

Critics and Defenders. A man so furiously vigorous and drastic as the Shah in Shah is bound to have his detractors. They contend he is nothing more than another

* It has standard gauge track. Russia's has broad gauge.

WORLD WAR

Oriental despot who has caused shoals of his enemies to be murdered, tortured, kidnapped, imprisoned. They claim he slaps Cabinet Ministers in the face, beats up priests, kicks irksome subjects in the crotch. (It is said that for tiresome gabbling he once booted even Crown Prince Mohammed Reza into a palace fountain.) Iran is ruled entirely by fear, they insist; bribery is still prevalent, taxation overpowering; Iran's 136-man National Assembly, the *Majlis*, and all Cabinets are solidly enstooled. By this time, they add, the One-Man New Deal has turned into a One-Man Corporative State, owning everything worth owning and, furthermore, smoking opium.

On the other hand there are astute Occidentals who have watched the Shah work over a period of years and admire

never to interfere in Persia's internal affairs, but reserved the right to occupy it temporarily in the event another power used Persia for an attack on Soviet Russia.

As the Shah grew in power, his mistrust of British Imperialism grew with it and he began to spit in the Lion's eye. In 1931 he forbade Imperial Airways to fly over Iranian territory. Spit most staggering to the Lion was his sudden cancellation in 1932 of the old William Knox D'Arcy contract which had now burgeoned into the monster British Government-subsidized Anglo-Persian (later Anglo-Iranian) Oil Co. Iran was getting 16% of the net profits. The Shah wanted 21%. The British took the squabble before the League of Nations. The Shah got what he wanted; the British 30 more years on their concession. Things were great. He began hiring

was as heavy punishment as the Japanese could inflict.

But the Chinese no longer felt alone, as they did a year ago. Then the Burma Road was closed. Then the western democracies were trying to appease Japan. Then Japan seemed unbeatable.

Last week China was in the front of the anti-Axis fight. Over the Burma Road moved supplies from her western allies. A U.S. military mission was going to Chungking. Last week Chinese land forces launched an offensive that carried them to the gates of Nanchang and Foochow, the latter on the coast 880 miles east of Chungking. China's minuscule but growing Air Force bombed Hanshan and Tsingteh, nearly 700 miles from Chungking, and returned without a casualty. By 1943 China expected to be strong enough in the air to bomb the Japanese on their own soil.

Doubtless there were worse bombings yet in store for Chungking. But to China 1943 is barely tomorrow.

PROPAGANDA

Goebbels Hits *Der Snag*

Little Paul Joseph Goebbels, the lying official mouthpiece of the world's No. 1 liar, had some interesting remarks to make on lies by radio last week:

"Some Germans say they are strong-minded enough to listen to British lies and not be harmed by them. I reply this is not true. British lies get into the blood, making listeners weak and tired of carrying on, thus showing that the poisons transmitted by the British Broadcasting Corp. are beginning to work."

This little difficulty was nothing to the trouble experienced by the German long-wave station *Deutschlandsender*, which suddenly found its official news broadcasts interrupted by a voice from Russia that laughed, sang and injected in German such cracks as "Lies!" "A fairy tale!" "Hitler guilty!" This improvement of the jamming technique was quickly traced to the powerful transmitter RWL at Noginsk, 30 miles from Moscow, but the Nazis could do little about it. Sample broadcast, with interruptions by the voice, which Britons promptly christened *Der Snag*:

Announcer: New German victories have been won. . . .

Der Snag: In the grave.

Announcer: Fifteen Soviet planes were destroyed. . . .

Der Snag: And what about German losses?

Announcer: The *Luftwaffe* again attacked British airfields. . . .

Der Snag: Says you!

Announcer: German bombers went into action last night. . . .

Der Snag: Have you got any left?

Announcer: British bombers attempted to raid. . . .

Der Snag: You bet!



REZA SHAH'S PALACE AT TEHERAN
A cossack kicked it up.

Hecker-Black Star

him greatly. First of all they argue that it is unfair to apply Western standards to Iran, and then they point to some of the flowers of civilization which have blossomed in the West since 1933. They recall that, unlike Kamâl Atatürk, he had no elite of European-educated intellectuals to help him.* "Reza Khan made Iran out of nothing," they say and, knowing Persia and Persians, they insist that force was the only way. As for opium, 60% of the population smokes it. Descended from generations of opium smokers, it is said they are largely immune to its effects.

Kismet, etc. One of the first acts of the new Government after the 1921 ride-in to Teheran was to tear up the treaty the bleak-brained Ahmad had signed with the U.S.S.R. The Bolsheviks condemned the aggressive policy of the Tsar, promised

* The Shah called in U.S. Economist Arthur Chester Millspaugh to unsnarl the country's appalling financial tangle. For a time Iranian petitions began: "Oh, Allah! Oh, Shah! Oh, Dr. Millspaugh!"

German technicians to work his railroads, install his industrial plants and operate them. He detested Communism, but kept up friendly relations with Russia. Then came August 1939 and the Russo-German Pact. Things were greater. The war started. His British oil royalties waxed. Russia and Germany bought more goods and products. Nothing could harm Iran now. More & more Germans entered the country.


But eleven weeks ago Adolf Hitler turned on Joseph Stalin. Last week the two ends the Shah thought would never meet closed in on him.

FAR EASTERN THEATER

Waiting for 1943

Chungking withstood its 33rd bombing of the 1941 season last week. Of 135 Japanese planes that swarmed over Szechwan Province, 27 blasted the capital. Chinese huddling stoically in their shelters could tell by the way the earth shook that this raid, like those of the last few weeks,

Commemoration: Funeral of the Late Reza Shah the Great



Powerful is the one who is knowledgeable



Ministry of Culture

Office of Tribal Education

COMMEMORATION

Gathering of Tribal Chiefs in Tehran
At the
Funeral of the Late Reza Shah the Great

Edited/translated by

Badi Badiozamani

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اعلیہ حضرت وانشاہ کبیر سردودمان سلسلہ پهلوی

His Imperial Majesty, Reza Shah the Great, founder of the Pahlavi dynasty



His Majesty Mohammad Reza Pahlavi

His Majesty Reza Shah the Great in last days of his reign



Princess Shahnaz Pahlavi writes to her father

April 1925

His Majesty Reza Shah the Great officially sat on the monarchy throne, and the affairs of Iran were entrusted to his capable hands. [The parliament of Iran, pursuant to the Constitution, declared him the Shah of Iran on 12/12/1925. On 12/15/1925, he took his imperial oath, thus founding the Pahlavi dynasty. It is interesting to note that he had planned to declare a republic, as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, also an army officer, had founded the Republic of Turkey in 1923. Unfortunately, tremendous opposition asserted by the Iranian clergy made him change his mind-Translator]

From February 22, 1921 to August 25, 1941

For twenty years and one month this brave son of Iran was relentless in creating a modern Iran. Day or night, he never rested in his efforts to rescue Iran and Iranians from a sinkhole of misery and misfortune, to revive and restore lost honors.

Some of this genius' achievements during 7,330 days of his reign can be summarized as:

Revocation of Capitulation, creation of a unified and uniformed army and compulsory service, founding of military academy, Naval Force, Air Force, University, Bank Melli (National), creation of trans-Iranian Railway, Iran Radio, wireless communication system, sugar and textile factories and thousands of other measures to make the country a progressive land.

- ۶ -

اثر سوم شهریور ۱۳۲۰ تا ۱۷ اردیبهشت ۱۳۲۹

جنگ جهانی دوم و اختلافاتی که بین دول بزرگ بظهور رسید باعث گردید که رشته‌های امور کشور ما مانند اغلب کشورهای دیگر دنیا که در مسیر جنگ قرار گرفتند از هم گسیخته شود و در نتیجه شاهنشاه فقید از سلطنت استعفاء و زمام امور مملکت را بدست باکفایت فرزند ارجمندشان اعلیحضرت محمدرضاشاه پهلوی سپردند و بالاخره بر اثر نامالایمات روحی و جسمی که در نتیجه دوری از خاک وطن و فرزند ارجمندشان اعلیحضرت محمدرضاشاه پهلوی بایشان عارض گردید چشم از جهان فرو بستند و ایران را از وجود بزرگترین فرزند رشید و میهن پرست خود محروم نمودند سرانجام پس از ۹ سال فرقت و دوری از خاک وطن همان خاکی که در ایام هجران تنها مایه تسلی خاطر افسرده ایشان بود در هفدهم اردیبهشت ماه ۱۳۲۹ با تجلیل و تکریم بی سابقه‌ای که حقیقه در خورشان چنین رادمردی بود در خاک میهن مدفون گردیدند.

From August 25, 1941 to May 7, 1950

World War II and the acrimony created among super powers caused the affairs of our country, like most of the others that were caught in the path of the war, to fall into disarray. Consequently, the late Shah resigned and left the country's affairs into the capable hands of his venerable son, his majesty, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. Ultimately, due to mental anguish and physical frailty caused by being far away from the homeland and his venerable son, his majesty, Reza Shah Pahlavi, passed away. Thus, Iran was deprived of her grandest patriot. After nine years of distance from the homeland, a fistful of soil, of which was the source of his solace away from his motherland, on May 7, 1950 he was buried in his homeland's soil in an unprecedented glorifying funeral procession that he so richly deserved.



A photo of Iran's great soldier in his younger age



تاجگذاری اعلیحضرت رضاشاه کبیر



آخرین روزهای زندگانی اعلیحضرت رضاشاه کبیر (خارج از ایران)

Final days of His Majesty Reza Shah the Great (in diaspora)

-۱۱-

مراسم تشییع و تدفین

روز شنبه نهم اردیبهشت با کسب اجازه از اعلیحضرت همایون شاهنشاهی و الاحضرت شاهپورعلیرضا و الاحضرت شاهپور غلامرضا بمعیت هیئتی برای آوردن جنازه شاهنشاه فقید با هواپیما بطرف مصر پرواز نمودند. دربار مصر با تجلیل تمام از هیئت اعزامی استقبال و ساعت ۹ صبح روز چهارشنبه سیزدهم اردیبهشت برنامه رسمی حمل جنازه از مسجد رفائی تا فرودگاه قاهره که قبلاً بوسیله دربار پادشاهی مصر تنظیم شده بود بعمل آمد و در تمام طول راه که بالغ بر ۲۵ کیلومتر بود افسران و سربازان آرتش مصر با کمال نظم و ترتیب صف آرائی کردند و عبور و مرور وسائط نقلیه موقوف گردید. در تمام قاهره پرچمهای رسمی مصر بحال عزا و بصورت نیمه افراشته درآمده بود و در حقیقت ملت برادر و دوست ما مصر در این عزادارای هلی نیز شریک بودند و احساسات بی شائبه‌ای از طرف دربار و دولت و ملت مصر در این مراسم ابراز گردید.

پس از چهار ساعت و نیم پرواز هواپیمای حامل جنازه در فرودگاه جدّه بزمین نشست در فرودگاه و الاحضرت امیر فیصل فرزند اعلیحضرت ابن سعود و هیئت دولت سعودی از جنازه استقبال و تجلیل نمودند.

صبح روز پنجشنبه چهاردهم اردیبهشت جنازه اعلیحضرت فقید از جدّه حرکت و برای طواف مدینه بیرواز در آمد در مدینه نیز احترامات نظامی بعمل آمد و پس از طواف جنازه و زیارت مشایعین از اماکن متبرکه که شب را همراهان در مدینه توقف و روز جمعه پانزدهم اردیبهشت ساعت ۵ صبح هواپیمای حامل جنازه با تجلیل و احترام فراوانی از جدّه بطرف ایران پرواز در آمد.

ساعت سیزده و بیست و پنج دقیقه هواپیمای حامل جنازه اعلیحضرت فقید در میان تأثرات شدید اهالی اهواز در خاک ایران بزمین نشست و دوازده نفر از افسران ارشد

- ۱۲ -

بداخل هواپیما رفتند و جنازه را خارج نمودند. در فرودگاه پس از نطق آقای بهرامی استاندار خوزستان تاج‌های گل از طرف آقای حکیمی بنمایندگی دربار شاهنشاهی و آقای شکرانی و آقای بهرامی و تیمسار سرلشکر نقدی بنام ارتش و رئیس انجمن شهر بنمایندگی اهالی اهواز نثار جنازه شاهنشاه فقید گردید.

پس از انجام تشریفات جنازه بوسیله اراکه مخصوصی از فرودگاه اهواز به ایستگاه راه آهن حمل گردید و در دو طرف جاده جمعیت زیادی از اهالی اهواز با تأثر فراوانی از ۴ ساعت قبل بانتظار زیارت جنازه شاهنشاه فقید صف آرائی کرده بودند. ساعت ۱۴ جنازه بایستگاه رسید و با واگن مخصوص حمل گردید در اینوقت با احترام روح پرفتوح رضا شاه کبیر بوسیله سوت لکمیو ها یک دقیقه سکوت اعلام و پس از خاتمه سکوت قطار مخصوص بحرکت آمد. در کلیه شهرها و ایستگاههای مسیر جنازه مراسم تجلیل و تکریم از طرف اهالی بعمل آمد و ساعت هفده و پنج دقیقه روز شنبه شانزدهم اردیبهشت ترن بایستگاه قم رسید. در این شهر نیز طبق برنامه‌ای که از طرف اهالی تنظیم شده بود جنازه با تشریفات خاصی تشییع و در حرم مطهر حضرت معصومه ع بوسیله امرای ارتش طواف داده شد و ساعت ۸ بعد از ظهر قطار مخصوص بحرکت در آمد.

صبح روز یکشنبه هفدهم اردیبهشت کلیه وزراء و رجال و کلاهی مجلسین و هیئت‌های اعزامی نمایندگان دول خارجی و استادان دانشگاه و اعضای عالیرتبه دولت و سران عشایر که برای این منظور بتهران آمده بودند در میدان ایستگاه راه آهن حاضر بودند ساعت هشت و نیم بامداد اعلیحضرت همایون شاهنشاهی به ایستگاه راه آهن نزول اجلال فرمودند و موزیک سلام شاهنشاهی را نواخت. ساعت هشت و سی و پنج دقیقه ورود قطار حامل جنازه با صدای سوت لکمیو اعلان گردید در این موقع سکوت مخصوصی تمام فضای میدان و خیابانهای مسیر حرکت را که جمعیت انبوهی از ساعت‌های قبل بانتظار بودند فراگرفت. اعلیحضرت همایون شاهنشاهی بواگن مخصوص تشریف فرما شده و بی اختیار جنازه غرق در گل پسر تاجدار خود را در آغوش گرفتند و پس از نه سال هجران پسر بر جنازه پدر بوسه میزد و با صدای بلند گریه مینمود.

- ۱۳ -

بقدری این منظره در حضار تولید تأثر نمود که همگی بی اختیار بگریه در آمدند پس از اینکه اعلیحضرت را از روی جنازه بلند نمودند تاجهای گل را نیز برداشتند و روپوش مخصوص را در روی آن کشیدند و لباس و شل و کلاه اعلیحضرت فقید را بر روی جنازه قرار دادند جنازه روی دوش دوازده نفر از امرای ارتش بمیدان ایستگاه حمل گردید و در روی سکوی مخصوصی قرار گرفت موزیک سلام شاهنشاهی را نواخت و پرچم سلطنتی بحالت نیمه افراشته در آمد و بوسیله تیمسار سپهد شاه بختی فرمان پیش فنک داده شد و توپها بصدا در آمد و یکصدویک تیر شلیک شد. پس از بیانات آقای نخست وزیر پرچمهای ارتش با احترام فرود آمد و رژه از مقابل جنازه آغاز گردید. پس از خاتمه رژه جنازه در حالیکه روی دوش دوازده نفر از امرای ارتش قرار گرفت بحرکت در آمد در جلو جنازه قاریها و افسران حامل تاجهای گل و نشانها و مدالهای اعلیحضرت فقید و در پشت جنازه اعلیحضرت همایون شاهنشاهی و والاحضرتها و هیئت دولت و سایر مشایعین با کمال آهستگی تشییع پیاده را آغاز نمودند. در ابتدای خیابان پهلوی جنازه بر روی توپ قرار گرفت و تشییع پیاده تا چهارراه قزوین ادامه داشت. ساعت نه و چهل و پنج دقیقه اعلیحضرت همایونی سوار اتومبیل شدند و باین ترتیب تشییع سواره آغاز شد دو طرف خیابان در تمام طول خط سیر کلیه اهالی پایتخت و دانش آموزان و باشگاههای ورزشی با پرچمهای مخصوص صف آرائی نموده بودند و جنازه از بین تأثر شدید و آمیخته با سکوت اهالی عبور مینمود. در میدان سپه جنازه در مقابل شهرداری متوقف گردید و آقای شهردار تهران از طرف اهالی شهر بیاناتی فرمودند و با کسب اجازه از اعلیحضرت همایون شاهنشاهی یک دقیقه سکوت اعلام گردید و تاجهای گل نثار جنازه شاهنشاه فقید گردید.

سپس جنازه بحرکت ادامه داد و پس از طی کردن خیابانهای برق و ری و جاده حضرت عبدالعظیم بزایویه مقدسه رسید پس از طواف بوسیله امرای ارتش به آرامگاه ابدی انتقال داده شد.

در تمام مدت تشییع و مراسم تدفین و بیرون آوردن جنازه از تابوت قراء به

— ۱۴ —


تلاوت قرآن مجید مشغول بودند و مراسم مذهبی بوسیله یکی از آقایان علماء انجام
گردید در موقعیکه جنازه از تابوت خارج گردید کلیه حضار بصدای بلند بگریه
در آمدند .

ساعت يك بعد از ظهر مراسم تدفین خاتمه یافت و اعلیحضرت همایون شاهنشاهی
و خاندان جلیل سلطنتی بشهر بازگشت فرمودند .

در این موقع هیئت مشایعین دسته دسته بزیارت آرامگاه میرفتند و تاجهای گل
نثار آرامگاه شاهنشاه فقید مینمودند .

باین ترتیب مراسم تشییع و تدفین اعلیحضرت فقید رضاشاه کبیر پایان یافت و
فرزند رشید ایران برای ابد در زمین میهن در آرامگاه مجلل و ابدی خود آرامید .

— ۱۵ —



واگون مخصوص جنازه شاهنشاه فقید را بطهران حمل مینماید

A special train wagon carries the body of the late king to Tehran


-۱۶-



جنازه در روی سکونی مقابل در خروجی ایستگاه راه آهن برای
مراسم رژه قرار داده شده است

The casket is placed on a platform in front of the Railway Station entrance for the funeral procession

-۱۷-



اعلیحضرت همایون شاهنشاهی جنازه شاهنشاه فقید پدر تاجدار خود را در حالیکه
بوسیله امراء و فرماندهان لشکر حمل میشود پیاده تشییع مینمایند

His Majesty walks behind his royal father's casket carried by various armed forces chiefs

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اعلیٰ حضرت همایون شاهنشاهی و والاحضرت شاهپورها در میدان ایستگاه راه آهن
هنگام تشییع جنازه

His imperial majesty and princes at the Railway Station Square during the funeral process


-۱۹-



مقابل در ایستگاه مراسم احترام نظامی نسبت به جنازه شاهنشاه فقید بعمل میآید

Military salute ceremony at the entrance of the Railway Station


-۲۰-



اعلیه حضرت همایون شاهنشاهی و والاحضرت شاهپورها در خیابان
پهلوی در حال تشییع پیاده


His imperial majesty and royal princes in Pahlavi Street during the procession

— ۲۱ —



آرامگاه رضاشاه کبیر شاهنشاه قجید .

Mausoleum of the late Reza Shah the Great



The casket on a canon passing the statue of the late shah in Sepah Square



دو عکس از هیئت دولت در روز مراسم تشییع

Two photos of the cabinet members at the funeral procession



دو عکس از هیئت دولت مقابل در ایستگاه راه آهن

Photos of the cabinet members at the entrance of the Railway Station



چند نفر از آقایان وزراء در روز بجای آوردن مراسم تشییع

Some of the cabinet ministers on the funeral day

-۲۶-



هیئت محترم دولت در حین تشییع جنازه شاهنشاه فقید

Respectable cabinet members at the late shah's funeral

-۲۲-



يك منظره ديگر از تشييع بياده چند تن از آقايمان وزراء - از چپ بر است: جناب آقاي
 دكتور علي اميني ، جناب آقاي دكتور نخعي ، جناب آقاي مسعود كيهان وزير فرهنگ

Another view of some of the ministers at the funeral procession. Left to right: Dr. Ali Amini, Dr. Nakhaee, Mr. Masoud Keyhan, Minister of Culture

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جناب آقای مسعود کیهان وزیر فرهنگ (سمت چپ) در روز تشییع

Mr. Masoud Keyhan (left), Minister of Culture at the funeral

— ۲۹ —

بر حسب دستور جناب آقای مسعود کیهان وزیر محترم فرهنگ این اداره بر آن شد که در این موقع بمناسبت مراسم تدفین جنازه اعلیحضرت فقید رضاشاه کبیر و حضور سران عشایر شجاع و میهن پرست ایران در مرکز نشریه‌ای طبع و تقدیم هم میهنان عزیز و سران عشایر بنماید.

رئیس اداره تعلیمات ایلات و عشایر - دکتر محمد مگری

در ایام توقف سران عشایر در مرکز طبق برنامه مخصوصی که از طرف ستاد ارتش تنظیم گردیده بود از سران عشایر پذیرائی مفصلی بعمل آمد و مجالس باشکوهی برای ایشان ترتیب داده شد. در برنامه مخصوص عشایر شبی یک تا دو نفر از سران عشایر سخنرانیهائی دایر بزحمات شاهنشاه فقید و قدردانی از مجاهدتهای آن رادمرد بزرگ ایراد میگردید.

جناب آقای مسعود کیهان وزیر فرهنگ سخنرانی مبسوط و مشروحی در باب عشایر و همچنین اقدامات فرهنگ نسبت به تعمیم امر آموزش در میان ایلات و عشایر بدین شرح ایراد نمودند:

سخنرانی جناب آقای مسعود گبهان وزیر فرهنگ در حضور سران عشایر *

پس از درود و ستایش خداوندی و دعا و ثنای ذات مبارک ملوکانه ، بعرض آقایان

محترم میرساند :

یکی از مقاصد بزرگی که در تحت توجهات اعلی حضرت همایون شاهنشاهی اخیراً مورد توجه قرار گرفته است بسط و تعمیم فرهنگ در میان ایلات و عشایر نجیب ایران است که اینجانب نیز از روز آغاز بکار در وزارتخانه خود بدان اقدام کرده ام و آرزو مندم با تائیدات الهی و با تشریک مساعی و همکاری سایر مراجع و مقامات عالیه و همچنین با علاقه و استقبال شایانی که از طرف آقایان نمایندگان و برگزیدگان ایلات و عشایر میشود بتوانیم مصدر خدمات گرانبهای بشویم .

اصولاً عدّه زیادی از جمعیت ایران را افراد رشید و شجاع ایلات تشکیل میدهند که قسمتی از آنها بر حسب شواهد تاریخی همیشه حافظ و نگهبان مرزهای وسیع این کشور بوده اند و مرزبانان و مرزداران رشید و فداکار ایران اغلب اوقات از میان افراد برجسته این طبقه برخاسته اند خدمات گرانبهای که در طول ازمنه تاریخی از ایلات و عشایر سلحشور ایران بمنصه ظهور رسیده است باندازه ایست که نام آنها را با کلمه شاه دوستی و وطن خواهی توأم ساخته است . اگر آقایان محترم از لحاظ روحی و روانشناسی توجهی بآوازه ها و ترانه ها و قصه های دلنشین و دلکشی که در میان این طوایف شهرت و رواج دارد بفرمایند متوجه خواهند شد که لطیف ترین و عمیق ترین افکار و احساسات وطن خواهی و علاقه بآب و خاک و زادگاه و اجاق خاندان و مزار نیاکان در نهاد آنها سرشته و با شیر اندرون شده است .

* این سخنرانی در شب چهاردهم اردیبهشت ماه ۱۳۲۹ در مجلسی که از طرف وزارت

جنگ بمناسبت اجتماع سران عشایر در تهران برپا شده بود ، ایراد شده است .

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امروز از لحاظ فرهنگی میراث گذشته نیاکان با عظمت را نمیتوانیم تنها در خلال سطور کتب و یادداشت‌های کتوبی که بما رسیده است بیابیم بلکه مطالعه در آداب و رسوم و سنن ملی و علائق معنوی برای دریافتن چگونگی ساختمان فکری و دماغی از واجبات روز بشمار میرود. آهنگهای لطیفی که از سوراخ نی چوپانان کوه و دشت پیما همراه با زمزمه کودکان صحرا گرد در کنار چشمه ساران بگوش میرسد اسرار نهفته روزگاران را برای ارباب حقیقت و دانش و معرفت خواهان آنچنان حکایت میکند که شاید مردمان عادی آن رازها را در نیابند. حکیم بزرگوار فردوسی علیه الرحمه اغلب روایات و داستانهای تاریخی و ملی خود را از افواه دهقانان و دهقانان و صنعتگران و پیشه‌وران و روحانیان مردم را بطبقات چهارگانه سپاهیان و دهقانان و صنعتگران و پیشه‌وران و روحانیان تقسیم میکرده‌اند همیشه این طبقه مورد احترام و نیازمندی عموم بوده‌اند و در قرون اخیره رشیدترین سربازان و فداکارترین سپاهیان و سودمندترین تولیدکنندگان و صادق‌ترین افراد این کشور را تشکیل میداده‌اند. وجود مردان وطن‌پرست و شجاع این طبقه از زمان صفویه بعد باعث خدمات شایانی باین کشور بوده است.

در سالهای اخیر که بر اثر مساعی شاهنشاه فقید در تمام شئون اجتماعی و ملی این کشور نظم و ترتیب نوینی مطابق با زمان و پیشرفت جهان راه یافته است، عشایر و ایلات شریف ایرانی توانسته‌اند با فراغ خاطر علاوه بر انجام خدمات محوله خود، دارای مردانی دانشمند و آشنا با اوضاع فعلی گیتی و تمدن نوین جهان باشند و مانند گذشته شخصیت‌های بزرگی از میان آنان طلوع کند که مایه امید بآینده ایران باشد.

در زمان شاهنشاه فقید اصول و پایه‌هایی بوجود آمده است که ما امروز موظفیم نیات خیر آن مرد بزرگ را پیروی کرده و در تحت توجهات اعلیحضرت همایون شاهنشاهی آنها را تعقیب و تکمیل کنیم از آن جمله توجهی بود که از طریق فرهنگ همواره نسبت بعلوم و تربیت اولاد ایلات و عشایر مبذول میداشت اوضاع چند سال اخیر پس از شهریور باعث وقفه و رکودی در بعضی از قسمت‌های اداری مملکت ماست که امروز ما ناگزیریم این موانع را یکی پس از دیگری مرتفع کرده بانجام آنها بکوشیم.

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چنانکه اغلب آقایان میدانند وزارت فرهنگ امسال مصمم شده است برای نشر و تعمیم فرهنگ و عملی شدن تعلیمات عمومی و اجباری در تمام کشور قسمتی از کوششهای خود را نیز در راه تربیت و تعلیم در میان ایلات و عشایر اختصاص دهد تا تمام طبقات و نقاط ایران بتوانند از این موضوع هر یک بسهم خود استفاده کنند اینک مجملاً اطلاعاتی از اقدامات گذشته و فعلی و تصمیمات وزارت فرهنگ را بعرض آقایان میرساند :

اقداماتی که تا کنون نسبت بقامیوس دبستان در نقاط عشایری شده بشرح زیر میباشد

آذربایجان

در ناحیه اهر در میان عشایر و تیره‌های ساکن قره اشبتین، خمارلو ، جانانلو و حسرتان چهار دبستان و در بخش خوی در نقاط عشایر نشین لیلوس ، پوشانلو ، قره قشلان، و سلطان احمد پنج دبستان و در ناحیه خلخال میان عشایر شاطرانلو ساکن گلستان يك دبستان و در ناحیه ماکو در میان عشیره جلالی ساکن آغگل يك دبستان . در ناحیه رضائیه در میان عشایر و تیره‌های ساکن بخش های گلوان ، سروکان ، موانه ، ملونه ، مستکان ، گل شیخان سین آباد، گورمیک، آغبلاغ، اشنویه، سلدوز ، چهارده دبستان . در ناحیه مهاباد در میان عشایر و تیره‌های دهبگری ، خانزاده ، ماهش و بیکزاده ساکن بخشهای شهر ویران ، بوکان ، و لاهیجان ده دبستان . در ناحیه اردبیل در بین عشایر و تیره‌های آراللو ، قوجه بیکلو ، حسنخانلو ، موران اجارودو طالش میکائیل لو ساکنین بخشهای گرمی ، انکوست و مغان هفت دبستان . در ناحیه خیاو در میان عشایر و تیره‌های عیسی لو حاج خواجه لو دو دبستان و جمعاً در تمام مناطق عشایری آذربایجان ۴۷ دبستان و ۶۱ آموزگار وجود دادو ۱۷۲۸ نفر از اطفال عشایر بتهصیل اشتغال دارند .

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خراسان

در ناحیه بجنورد در میان عشایر ترکمن و در ناحیه سرخس در میان عشایر بلوچ و در ناحیه تربت حیدریه در میان عشایر لانورائی، قرائی و تیموری ساکنین بخشهای محولات، رشتخوار و خواف هفت باب دبستان که جمعاً در نقاط عشایری خراسان ۱۲ آموزگار وجود دارد و تعداد ۱۶۰ نفر از اطفال عشایر در آنها به تحصیل مشغولند.

خوزستان

در ناحیه سوسنگرد دشت میشان در میان عشایر و تیره‌های ساکن آن در نقاط ابو جاموسه، ابوچلاج، رهیم، سیدی، مالکیه، خزامه، ذمار، جرگه سید علی، و وساک، مجریه، هویزه و کبان شانزده دبستان. در دز فول در ناحیه شوش یک دبستان در هفتکل اهواز در نقاط ایذه، قلعه تل، باغ ملک، گزین و دالان در میان عشایر و تیره‌های بختیاری و جانگی پنج دبستان و در خرمشهر در میان عشایر و تیره‌های فیلیه، محرزی، جفال، جدبه، بوزی، بنی کعب و گرگر ساکنین بخش شادکان پنج دبستان. جمعاً در میان تمام مناطق عشایری خوزستان ۲۷ دبستان و ۵۰ نفر آموزگار وجود دارد و تعداد ۱۵۹۹ نفر از اطفال عشایر به تحصیل اشتغال دارند.

دشت گرگان

در دشت گرگان در میان عشایر و تیره‌های جعفری و آتابای و کولان ساکنین بخشهای اوبد، سیچوال، خواجه نفس، نزار، پیچ پیکر، بناوز، گومیشان، گنبد، کردند کلاله، قوزچای، پهلویندژ، دازه، کردو خواند جمعاً ۲۰ باب دبستان و ۸۷ آموزگار وجود دارد و تعداد ۱۸۰۲ نفر از اطفال عشایر دشت گرگان به تحصیل مشغول میباشند.

ساوه

در ناحیه ساوه در میان عشایر و تیره‌های قرابکلو و شاهسون دو باب دبستان و دو نفر آموزگار وجود دارد و جمعاً تعداد ۶۰ نفر از اطفال عشایر به تحصیل اشتغال دارند.

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سیستان و بلوچستان

در ناحیه چاه بهار در میان عشایر و تیره‌های داشاری گچی ورزاده ، بزوار ، هوت ، سرگان ، میرمراذزائی ، در چاه بهار و نقاط طیس ، کنارک ، دشتیاری و سرکوب شش دبستان . در ناحیه ایرانشهر در میان عشایر و تیره‌های بامری ، عبداللهی ، بارکزائی ، بلوچ ورزاده ، ورزاده ، رئیس ، بلوچ ، باشنده ورزاده ، کدخدائی ، ملازهی ، میر ، بامری ، هوت ، ملک ، رئیس ، باشنده ، سعیدی ، ورزاده ، بلوچ ، در ایرانشهر و بمپورو نقاط دامن ، نیکشهر ، اسپکه ، سرباز ، قصر قند ، فتوح ، ابتر ، محمدآباد ، شهر وراز ، مسکوتان ، پیپ ، هیجان ، داسک ، و گویمرگ هفده دبستان . در ناحیه زاهدان و خاش در میان عشایر و تیره‌های ریگی ، ناروئی ، شه بخش ، ایرندگان و کردرخاش و نقاط میرجاوه ، نصرت آباد شورو ، سنگان ، ایرندگان ، گوشه ، چشمه ، گوهر کوه ، و پایید یازده دبستان .

در ناحیه سروان در میان عشایر و تیره‌های بارکزائی ، رئیس ، ملک زاده ، میرمراذزائی کرد زابلی ، گمشاد زائی و دهواری در مناطق و نقاط شهبستان ، ناهوک ، جالق ، زنگیان ، سیب ، زابلی ، کشت سوران ، بخشان ، محمدی ، و گله‌گان دوازده دبستان در زابل در میان عشایر و تیره‌های آذریان ، کلاتری ، براهوئی ، سارانی ، ناروئی ، صیادان ، شهریاری ، اوکاتی ، کیخا ، شهرکی ، میر ، پیچکه ، جهان تیغی و قجر در مناطق و نقاط بنجار (در پشت آب) ، سکوهه (در شیب آب) ، دوست محمد (در میان کنگی) ، قلعه نو (در شهرکی و ناروئی) ، سدکی (در شیب آب) ، گوری (در شهرکی و ناروئی) ادیمی (در پشت آب) ، شریف آباد (در هشت آب) ، داری (در شیب آب) ، نور محمد (در میان کنگی) ، دهنو (در شهرکی و ناروئی) ، حیدر آباد (در هشت آب) ، محمد آباد (در شیب آب) دهنو ، شهرکی (در شهرکی و ناروئی) ، خمک (در پشت آب) ، کلبعلی (در پشت آب) و بالاخانه بیست دبستان ، جمعاً در تمام مناطق عشایری سیستان و بلوچستان ۶۶ دبستان و ۱۱۷ آموزگار وجود دارد و ۳۴۰۰ نفر از اطفال عشایر بتحصیل اشتغال دارند .

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کرمانشاه

در ناحیه شاه آباد و کرمانشاه در میان عشایر و تیره‌های کلهر گیلان، باوندپور، سادات سامره، سنجابی، زنگنه، ساکنین بخشهای کمره، ماهیدشت، شیان، حسن آباد، چغاخزان، باریکه هرسم، کندهر، سیاه چغا، لر، وفائی، جوینزر، بدره، کفر اور، جمعاً ۱۶ دبستان.

در ناحیه ایلام در میان عشایر و تیره‌های، زرگوش، ملخطاری، باباها، ارگوازی، آبدانان، شیروان، ملکشاهی، ده بالا، بدره، پیچنوند، صیمره، شمس دینوند، ساکنین بخشهای مهران، صالح آباد، ارگوازی، آبدانان، شیروان، بدره، هندمینی، صیمره و چرد اول سیزده باب دبستان. که جمعاً در ناحیه شاه آباد و ایلام ۲۹ دبستان و ۳۴ آموزگار وجود دارد و تعداد ۶۹۷ نفر از اطفال عشایر به تحصیل مشغولند.

قزوین

در ناحیه قزوین در میان عشایر و تیره‌های ساکن قاقازان و کپاپه پنج باب دبستان و ۶ نفر آموزگار وجود دارد و تعداد ۵۶۰ نفر از اولاد عشایر به تحصیل اشتغال دارند.

گیلان

در ناحیه لنگرود در میان عشایر و تیره صوفی یک دبستان و در میان عشایر و تیره‌های ساکن رضوانده، ماسال، هشتپر، خطبه سرا، اسالم، جوکندان، خوشابر، هره دشت، حویق، جوهر، ایزنه، شیر آباد، اروجان، نوکنده، اولم شاندرمن، بی تم شاندرمن، خشک رودبار، خودبچر پاسال و دیک سرا ۵۲ باب دبستان.

جمعاً در تمام مناطق عشایری گیلان ۵۳ باب دبستان و ۵۷ نفر آموزگار وجود دارد و تعداد ۱۷۰۶ نفر از اطفال عشایر به تحصیل اشتغال دارند.

همچنین در سایر مناطق عشایری کردستان و فارس و لرستان مدارسسی تا این تاریخ تأسیس شده که از لحاظ جلوگیری از تطویل کلام بذکر همین اندازه قناعت و ضمن

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توسعه امور فرهنگی سایر نقاط عشایر نشین برای مناطق فارس و کردستان و لرستان نیز که از قسمتهای بر جمعیت عشایری میباشد تصمیمهای لازمی گرفته شده که ضمن برنامه عمومی امور آموزش عشایر برفع نقایص و تکمیل آنها و همچنین ایجاد مدارس جدید از سال تحصیلی جاری اقدام خواهد گردید.

ضمناً علاوه بر تأسیسات و تشکیلاتی که تاکنون از لحاظ ایجاد دبستان در مناطق عشایر نشین کشور بعمل آمده طرحی در دست اقدام است که مدارس سیاری جهت طوایفی که در فصول مختلف تغییر محل میدهند و بیلاق و قشلاق مینمایند ایجاد شود که تشکیلات آموزشی همراه ایل باشد تا از این لحاظ وقفه‌ای در امور تحصیلی دانش آموزان حاصل نگردد و برای این منظور برنامه‌های مخصوصی برای مدارس ثابت و سیار عشایری در نظر گرفته شده است که از لحاظ آداب و سنن و رسوم اجتماعی عرطایفه کاملاً مناسب میباشد و در این برنامه‌ها مخصوصاً بقسمت کشاورزی و تربیت دام نیز فوق العاده اهمیت داده شده است و ضمناً برای اینکه آموزگاران که در این مدارس سیار به تعلیم دانش آموزان اشغال خواهند ورزید از هر لحاظ صلاحیت این امر را داشته باشند در نظر است که از بین افراد تحصیل کرده هر ایل و طایفه انتخاب شوند که علاوه بر آشنائی به لهجه محلی بسائر رسوم زندگانی طایفه‌ای خود آشنا باشند و وزارت فرهنگ امیدوار است که روسا و متنفذین هر ایل در راه پیشرفت این منظور مقدس از هر گونه همکاری و تشریک مساعی مضایقه نمایند.

علاوه بر ایجاد اینگونه مدارس سیار و تکمیل نواقص دبستانهای ثابت در مراکز ایلهائی که در یک ناحیه متمرکز هستند یازده دارالتربیه شبانه روزی در نقاط اردبیل، کردستان، خرم آباد، دشت میشان، زاهدان، گرگان، رضائیه، کرمانشاهان، بیبهان، فارس و قوچان، برای اولاد عشایر قریباً افتتاح خواهد شد تا در این دارالتربیه‌ها اولاد عشایر را بطور شبانه‌روزی قبول و کلیه حوائج ضروری دانش آموزان را از قبیل لباس و خوراک و لوازم تحصیلی تأمین و بعداً نیز پس از پایان تحصیلات از همین فارغ التحصیلان برای تدریس در سایر مناطق عشایری استفاده شود که از لحاظ استخدام مشمول مقررات

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استخدامی باشند و حقوق و سایر مزایای آنها تأمین گردد . ساختمان بعضی از این دارالتربیه ها تمام و بقیه در دست انجام میباشد که امیدوار است در سال تحصیلی آینده نسبت بافتتاح آنها اقدام شود و در تنظیم برنامه‌های این دارالتربیه ها هم کاملاً دقت شده که از هر لحاظ مناسب با وضع جغرافیائی و طرز زندگی و سایر مقتضیات محلی باشد. البته بطوریکه کلیه افراد این کشور اطلاع دارند در زمان سلطنت شاهنشاه فقید رضاشاه کبیر در تمام امور کشور جنبش و هیجان خاصی که کلیه آنها بدست توانای آن شاهنشاه وطن دوست ایجاد شده بود مشهود گردید که اقدام بتأسیس این قبیل آموزشگاه‌ها نیز از نیات اصلاح طلبانه آن قائد عظیم الشان فقید بود که متأسفانه دست طبیعت و اختلالهای سیاسی کلیه ما ایرانیان را از داشتن چنین نعمت بزرگ و رهبر توانائی محروم داشته و بسیاری از تصمیمات و اقدامات ترقی خواهانه شاهنشاه کبیر را جریان جنگ جهانی از هم گسیخته گرداند اینک که بایاری خداوند متعال کم کم آبهای رفته بجوی باز میگردد و کشور ما آرامش قبلی خود را تجدید مینماید امیدواریم که تحت توجهات شاهنشاه جوان بخت ایران محمد رضاشاه پهلوی که دلسوز ترین فرد ایران و فرزند و الاتبار رشیدترین و فداکارترین و میهن پرست ترین مرد ایران رضاشاه کبیر میباشد بسوی ترقی و تعالی پیش رویم و بساعت آرامش و شادی روح اعلی حضرت فقید رضاشاه کبیر گردیم .

پذیرائی وزارت فرهنگ از سران ایلات و عشایر

طبق دعوتی که از طرف وزارت فرهنگ از سران عشایر و ایلات ایران بعمل آمده بود صبح روز شنبه ۲۳ ر ۲۹ ساعت ۸ - کلیه سران عشایر که بمناسبت تشییع جنازه شاهنشاه فقید رضا شاه کبیر بتهران آمده بودند بسرپرستی آقای دکتر محمد مکری رئیس اداره تعلیمات ایلات و عشایر وزارت فرهنگ بمحل موزه مردم شناسی راهنمایی شدند در موقع بازدید آقایان کارمندان موزه کلیه قسمت‌ها را برای ایشان توضیح دادند ساعت ۹ - کلیه سران عشایر موزه مردم شناسی را ترک و بموزه باستان شناسی راهنمایی شدند و در آنجا نیز توضیحات لازم راجع بآثار باستان بوسیله راهنمایان و کارمندان موزه موزبور داده شد و بی اندازه این آثار که نمونه تاریخ و تمدن قدیم ایران است مورد توجه سران عشایر واقع گردید و یکساعت در قسمت‌های مختلف موزه بتماشای آثار مجدد و عظمت ایران باستان مشغول بودند پس از بازدید موزه در ساعت ۱۰ کلیه سران عشایر بباشگاه دانشگاه راهنمایی شدند و ضمن برنامه‌ای که قبلاً تنظیم شده بود از طرف وزارت فرهنگ پذیرائی صمیمانه‌ای از کلیه سران عشایر بعمل آمد همچنین طبق آگهی‌هایی که بدستور جناب آقای وزیر فرهنگ بدیوارها نصب شده بود سران عشایر در دفتر مخصوصی تقاضاهایی را که از وزارت فرهنگ راجع به تکمیل نواقص مدارس عشایری داشتند با ذکر نام و محل سکونت عشیره خود ثبت نمودند و در ساعت ۱۱ - پس از صرف چای و شربنی بترتیبی که آمده بودند با اتومبیل‌های مخصوص باسایشگاه خود مراجعت نمودند. در باشگاه دانشگاه آقای وحید معاون وزارت فرهنگ و سایر رؤسای ادارات وزارت فرهنگ از میهمانان پذیرائی مینمودند. در خاتمه آقایان سران عشایر از توجهات مخصوص بندگان اعلی حضرت همایونی و جناب آقای کیهان وزیر فرهنگ و جناب آقای وحید معاون آن وزارت خانه اظهار سپاسگزاری و قدر دانی نمودند



Asghar Khan Sanjabi one of the leaders of the Sanjabi tribe



Abdollah Khan Dezli, head of Oraman/hawraman Dezli (tribe)



Rasheed Agha Bahrami, one of the chieftains of Ghlakhani Gowran tribe



Chieftains of Hawraman Lahvan, Hawraman Razaab & Hawraman Dezli



حسن خان رزابی رئیس اورامان رزاب (نفر سمت چپ) عباس خاندانی از عشایر کرمان (سمت راست)

Hassan Khan Razaabi, head of Hawraman Razaab (L), Abbas Khandani, a tribesman from Kerman (R)



آقای سید فتح الله حیدری از رؤساء ایل گوران

Mr. Seyyed Fatollah Heydari one of the leaders of the Gowran tribe



رؤساء ایلات سنجابی و کلهر و گوران با آقای دکتر کریم خان سنجابی استاد
دانشگاه تهران (تفراول از سمت راست)

Chieftains of Sanjabi, Kalhor & Gowran tribes with Dr. Karim Sanjabi, Tehran University professor (first right)



Farajollah Beig-Koomaasi, leader of the Koomaasi tribe



توفیق بیگ لہونی از رؤساء اورامان لہون

Towfeegh Beig Lahwani one of the leaders of Hawraman Lahwan tribe



پاشا خان یاسمی رئیس ایل گوران

Pasha Khan Yasami, leader of the Gowran tribe



یکی از سران عشایر

One of the tribal leaders



آقای سروان محمد امین بیگ لہونی رئیس اورامان

Captain Mohammad Amin Beig Lahwani, chief of the Hawraman tribe



اکبر خان اللہیاری سنجابی

Akbar Khan Allahyaari Sanjabi



یکی از سران عشایر بختیاری در موقع سخنرانی

One of the Bakhtiari chieftains making a speech



عده‌ای از سران عشایر

Some of the tribal leaders



جمعی از سران عشایر

A group of tribal leaders



عده‌ای از سران عشایر تراکمه گرگان

A group of Turkman tribal leaders from the Gorgan area



عده‌ای از سران عشایر رضائیه

A group of Tribal leaders from Rezaiyeh



(سمت راست) خواجه وردی خان رئیس عشیره تراکمه خراسان (سمت چپ)
آقای عباس خاندانی امیران عشایر کرمان

*Khorasan province Turkman chieftain Khajeh Werdi khan (R)
with Mr. Abbas Khandani, a chieftain from Kerman*



عدهای از سران عشایر شاهسون آذربایجان

A number of Shahsavan chieftains from Azarbaijan



عدهای از سران عشایر

A number of tribal leaders



رؤساء ایلات سنجابی و اورامان و کلہرو گوران

Heads of Sanjabi, Hawraman, Kalhor & Gowran tribes



رؤساء ایل گوران

Heads of the Gowran tribe



رؤساء ایلات سنجابی و کلہرو گوران با آقای دکتر کریم خان سنجابی (نفر دوم از سمت راست)

Heads of Sanjabi, Kalhor & Gowran tribes with Dr. Karim Sanjabi (second right)



دسته‌ای از سران عشایر

A group of tribal leaders



سران عشایر گیلان

Heads of tribes from the Gilan province



سه نفر از آقایان سران عشایر

Three of the tribal leaders



رؤساء ایلات کرمانشاه و کردستان

Tribal leaders of Kermanshah and Kordestan



رؤساء ایلات گوران و سنجابی و اورامان

Leaders of Gowran, Sanjabi & Hawraman tribes



رؤساء ایل سنجابی

Leaders of the Sanjabi tribe



Leaders of Sanjabi, Gowran & Hawraman tribes



Leaders of Gowran and Hawraman tribes



Left to right: 1- Asghar Khan Sanjabi, 2- Dr. Karim Sanjabi, 3- Akbar Khan Allahyaari Sanjabi



Asghar Khan Sanjabi and Akbar Khan Allahyaari Sanjabi



Akbar Khan Allahyaari one of the heads of Allahyaari Khani (Sanjabi) tribes



عده‌ای از سران عشایر گیلان

A number of tribal leaders from the Gilan province



یکی از سران عشایر در حین تیراندازی

A tribal leader at a shooting practice




عده‌ای از سران عشایر گرگان و کرمانشاه

A number of chieftains of Gorgan and Kermanshah



عده‌ای از سران عشایر ترکمان گرجان

Leaders of Turkman tribes of Gorgan



هده‌ی ازروئسای عشایر کرمان

A number of tribal leaders of Kerman



سران عشایر رضاییه

Tribal leaders from Rezaiyeh



سه نفر از سران عشایر گیلان

Three of tribal leaders from Gilan



عده‌ای از سران عشایر خراسان

A number of tribal leaders from Khorasan province



جمعی از سران عشایر باتفاق عده‌ای از رؤساء وزارت فرهنگ

A group of tribal leaders with heads of the Ministry of Culture



جمعی از سران عشایر باتفاق جناب آقای وحید معاون وزارت فرهنگ

A group of tribal leaders with Mr. Vaheed, the deputy Minister of Culture



Some tribal leaders at the Ministry of Culture reception




Tribal leaders at the Ministry of Culture reception at the University Club



صاحب آقای وحید معاون وزارت فرهنگ بایکی از سران عشایر صمیمانه صحبت مینمایند

Deputy Minister of Culture, Mr. Vaheed has a warm chat with a chieftain



رؤسای عشایر در بندر اتمه وزارت فرهنگ در محوطه دانشگاه

Tribal leaders at the Ministry of Culture reception at university grounds



جمعی از سران عشایر

A group of tribal leaders




جمعی از سران عشایر کرد رضاییه

A group of Kurdish chieftains from Rezaiyeh




یکمده از رؤساء عشایر در دانشگاه در هنگام پذیرایی وزارت فرهنگ از سران عشایر

A group of tribal leaders at the Ministry of Culture reception at (Tehran) university



جمعی از سران عشایر هنگام تشییع

Tribal leaders at the funeral



منظره دیگری از رؤسای عشایر در جلسه پذیرائی وزارت فرهنگ

Another photo of the tribal leaders at the Ministry of Culture reception



جمعی از سران عشایر در پذیرائی وزارت فرهنگ در محوطه باشگاه دانشگاه

A group of tribal leaders at the Ministry of Culture reception at University Club



سران عشایر در دانشگاه تهران در جلسه پذیرایی وزارت فرهنگ

Tribal leaders in Tehran University at the Ministry of Culture reception



عده‌ای از رؤساء عشایر در محوطه دانشگاه در جلسه پذیرایی وزارت فرهنگ از سران عشایر

Tribal leaders at the Ministry of Culture reception on university grounds



جمعی از سران عشایر باتفاق جناب آقای وحید معاون وزارت فرهنگ و آقای
 و کتر محمد مکرری رئیس اداره تعلیمات ایلات و عشایر

*A number of tribal leaders with Deputy Minister of Culture, Mr. Vaheed
 and Dr. Mohammad Mokri, head of the Tribal Education Office*



جمعی از سران عشایر باتفاق جناب آقای وحید معاون وزارت فرهنگ و آقای دکتر فرهنگ
 و دکتر مکرری رئیس اداره تعلیمات ایلات و عشایر و آقای سرهنگ کافی سرپرست نظامی عشایر

*A number of tribal leaders with Deputy Minister of Culture, Mr. Vaheed,
 Dr. Farahmand, and Dr. Mokri, head of the Tribal education Office, and
 colonel Kaafi, Tribal Military Superintendent*

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رؤسای مشایر آذربایجان که برای تسبیح جنازه بتهران آمدند

شماره	نام	نام خانوادگی	طایفه
۱	آقای امیراصلان	عیسی لو	عیسی لو
۲	« حاتم	گیلکو	گیلکو
۳	« فرض الله	طالش میکائیلو	طالش میکائیلو
۴	« حسین	وطن دوست	الارلو
۵	« میر عبدالحسین	منصوری	خلیفه لو
۶	« کریم	زند قوجه بیگلر	قوجه بیگلر
۷	« میر کریم	فرزانه	سادات ارنجی
۸	« امیر خزعالی	یورتچی	یورتچی
۹	« فرمان	شجاعی	رضا بیگ لو
۱۰	« بیوک	امیر فتحی	گرمی
۱۱	« حسین پاشا	امیر احمدی	
۱۲	« کریم	صواتی	کوزه کنانلو
۱۳	« نصرت	حاجی علیلو	حاجی علیلو
۱۴	« میر مصطفی خان	احمدی	حسن بیگ لو
۱۵	« اسدالله	محمد خانلو	محمد خانلو
۱۶	« کریم	سلطان	گرمی
۱۷	« ایاز	حلیمانلو	حلیمانلو
۱۸	« غلامرضا	امیر اسکندری	شاطرانلو
۱۹	« بهرام	اینانلو	اینانلو
۲۰	« جهشید	امیر پور	شاطرانلو

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بقیه رؤسای عشایر آذربایجان

شماره	نام	نام خانوادگی	نام طایفه
۲۱	آقای همایون	فولادی	فولادلو
۲۲	« عمر »	جلالی	جلالی
۲۳	« عبدالله »	شیخکانلو	میلان
۲۴	« حیدر »	فیروزی	حیدرانلو
۲۵	« عشرت »	احمدی	-
۲۶	« رشید »	جهانگیری	هوکی مندان
۲۷	« موسی »	زرزا	زرزا
۲۸	« قادر »	رسولی	هوکی مندان
۲۹	« نوری بیگ »	عباس نژاد	بیگ زاده
۳۰	« محمد عزیز »	امیر عشایری	مامش
۳۱	« محمد امین »	امینی	پیران
۳۲	« پاشا »	امیر فلاح	قره پاپاخ
۳۳	« عبدالله »	بایزیدی	منگور
۳۴	« ابراهیم »	علی یار	دهبکری
۳۵	« عبدالله »	انوشیروانی	فیض الله بیگی
۳۶	« ممند »	سالاری	آلان
۳۷	« بایزید »	عزیزی	گورک مهاباد
۳۸	« علی »	عباسی	عباسی
۳۹	« ابراهیم »	قهرمان	دهبکری
۴۰	« محمد »	جوانمردی	گورک سقز

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بقیه رؤسای عشایر آذربایجان

شماره	نام	نام خانوادگی	نام طایفه
۴۱	آقای حاجی حسین	وکیل	وکیلی
۴۲	«بازید»	کریمی	دهبکری
۴۳	«رشید»	فاتحی	فیض اله بیگی
۴۴	«محمود»	ایلخانی زاده	دهبکری
۴۵	«جهانگیر»	دری	دری
۴۶	«نجات الله»	نجات اللهی	گروس
۴۷	«سید عبدالله»	آل گیلانی	سادات
۴۸	«حسن»	بریاچی	سوسنی
۴۹	«مظفر»	جیبی	تیلکوه
۵۰	«عبدالله»	قادری	مامش
۵۱	«عبدالله»	ایلخانی زاده	دهبکری
۵۲	«جعفر»	کریمی	دهبکری

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رؤسای عشایر لرستان که برای تشییع جنازه پتهران آمدند

شماره	نام	نام خانوادگی	نام طایفه
۱	آقای عبدالمجید	بنانی	حسنوند
۲	« خیرالله »	مظفری	کاکاوند
۳	« محمد حسین »	غضنفری	امرائی
۴	« صید والی »	منظمی	حسنوند
۵	« غلامرضا »	اکبری	یوسفوند
۶	« اسدالله »	سالاری	کر معلی
۷	« یدالله »	جهانگیری	میر بیگ
۸	« علی اکبر »	کاظمی	امرائی
۹	« داراب »	مرادی	پیرانوند
۱۰	« عزیزالله »	شپهوند	—
۱۱	« نصرت الله »	اعظمی	—
۱۲	« غلامرضا »	همایونی	—
۱۳	« مرتضی »	اعظمی	—
۱۴	« حاج سید مهدی »	خدائی	قائدرحمت
۱۵	« علیرضا »	غضنفری	امرائی
۱۶	« اللهیار »	عباسی	گراوند
۱۷	« امامقلی »	منصوری	کونانی
۱۸	« حیاتقلی »	خسروی	گراوند
۱۹	« اکبر »	پورسرتیب	سگوند
۲۰	« اجلقلی »	مرادی	بابی

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بقیه رؤسای عشایر لرستان

ماره	نام	نام خانوادگی	نام طایفه
۲۱	آقای عبدالرضا	خادمی	
۲۲	« بهادر	طولابی	طولابی
۲۳	« رضا	قلاوند	قلاوند
۲۴	« حاج صید محمد	جعفری	پاپی
۲۵	« میرزا محمد	تیمور پور	میر
۲۶	« میر جمشید	هاشمی	--
۲۷	« پرویز	بهاروند	بهاروند
۲۸	« میر صید محمد	دیر گوند	میردیر گوند
۲۹	« علیمراد	آقامیرزائی جودکی	جودکی
۳۰	« رحیم	نصیری	--
۳۱	« میر شیر محمد	میردیر گوند	دیر گوند
۳۲	« مرتضی	قیاسوند	قیاسوند
۳۳	« نصیر	بهاروند	بهاروند
۳۴	« میر رستم	میر دیر گوند	میردیر گوند
۳۵	« میر عیسی	هاشمی	میردیر گوند
۳۶	« میرزا	بازگیر	بازگیر
۳۷	« ابراهیم	حسنی	حسنوند
۳۸	« محمد حسین	فرخی	عبدالوند میوند
۳۹	« بهرام	ضرغامی	بسحاقی
۴۰	« جعفر قالی	عبدالوند	میوند

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بقیه روسای عشایر لرستان

شماره	نام	نام خانوادگی	نام طایفه
۴۱	آقای عبدالمعبور	یار احمدی	یار احمد باجلوند
۴۲	« علی	داور	بیرانوند
۴۳	« شاهپور	فرهادی	--

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روسای عشایر فارس که برای تشییع جنازه بتهران آمدند

شماره	نام	نام خانوادگی	نام قبیله
۱	آقای علی	قشقایی	قشقایی
۲	« امیر حسین	قشقایی	قشقایی
۳	« فتح اله	حیات داودی	حیات داودی
۴	« حسینقلی	رستم	رستم
۵	« الیاس	کشکولی	کشکولی
۶	« جهانگیر	کشکولی	—
۷	« فربدون	کشکولی	—
۸	« امیر تیمور	شش بلوکی	—
۹	« جعفر قلی	پناه پور	دره شوری
۱۰	« امان الله	فارسی	فارسمیدان
۱۱	« امیر	بهارلو	بهار لو
۱۲	« حسنعلی	ضرغامی	باصری
۱۳	« حبیب الله	معتضدی	—
۱۴	« امیر حسین	ستوده	کشکولی
۱۵	« ولی	کیانی	بکش
۱۶	« شاپور	جاوید	جاوید
۱۷	« حمد الله	صمصامی	جاوید
۱۸	« محمد حسین	طاهری	بویر احمد علیا
۱۹	« محمد حسن	دره شوری	دره شوری
۲۰	« باباخان	عیلامی	دشن زیاری

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بقیه رؤسای عشایر فارس

شماره	نام	نام خانوادگی	نام طایفه
۲۱	آقای ملک منصور	شبانکاره	شبانکاره
۲۲	« رئیس عالی	تنگستانی	تنگستان
۲۳	« شیخ جبار	منصوری	بنادر ثلاث
۲۴	« امیر قای	قشقایی	خوانین قشقایی

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رؤسای عشایر کرمان که برای تشییع جنازه بتهران آمدند

شماره	نام	نام خانوادگی	طایفه
۱	آقای عیدو	ریگی	ریگی بلوچستان
۲	« محمدرضا	پودلی	براهوئی
۳	« نظر	ایرانی	ناروئی زابل
۴	« مهیم	مهیمی	عرب رودبار
۵	« محمدحسین	ناروئی	ناروئی زابل
۶	« زمان	ناروئی	ناروئی زابل
۷	« زمان	بامری	بامری
۸	« مهرالله	ریگی	ریگی زاهدان
۹	« علی	نقدی	تیرانی نبت
۱۰	« حسین	سازانی	سازانی
۱۱	« یوسف	سنجری	جنبالبارزی
۱۲	« محمد	مالکی	عرب رودبار
۱۳	« درویش	در آگاهی	در آگاهی
۱۴	« غلامحسین	ابوسعیدی	مهنی
۱۵	« مرادعلی	محمدی	ساردوئی
۱۶	« کلبعلی	امیری	قزائی
۱۷	« ناصر	افشار جهانشاهی	افشار
۱۸	« پرویز	ایرانی	ناروئی
۱۹	« نورمحمد	کرد	کرد
۲۰	« مجید	ریگی	ریگی

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رؤسای عشایر کرمان

شماره	نام	نام خانوادگی	نام طایفه
۲۱	آقای محمد عمر	بار کزائی	بار کزائی
۲۲	«عباس	خاندانی	—
۲۳	«مهراب	شهنوازی	شهنوازی
۲۴	«محمد شاه	میر مرادزائی	مرادزائی
۲۵	«مهراب	نعمت‌اللمهی	نعمت‌اللمهی

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رؤسای عشایر خراسان

شماره	نام	نام خانوادگی	نام طایفه
۱	آقای امیر	کلای	تیموری
۲	«منوچهر	شادلو	شادلو
۳	«تاج محمد	بهادری	زعفرانلو
۴	«محمد	قزائی	قزائی
۵	«محمود	صارم	باچوانلو
۶	«مرتضی	عظیمی	خاوری
۷	«سلیمان	روشنی	میلانلو
۸	«علی	پیچرانلو	پیچرانلو
۹	«امیر حسین	نگهبان	نگهبان
۱۰	«اسدالله	اسد خان	بلوچ
۱۱	«محمد رضا	خزاعی	عرب
۱۲	«رضا	فرهادی	توپکانلو
۱۳	«دردی خان	دولتی	تراکمه

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رؤسای عشایر اصفهان که برای تشییع جنازه بتهران آمدند

شماره	نام	نام خانوادگی	نام قبیله
۱	آقای محمد جواد	سالار شجاعی	چهار لنگ
۲	« محمد علی	مردانی	—
۳	« چراغعلی	شجاعی	—
۴	« داراب	قوام پور	فلارسه دهستان
۵	« ناصر	کریمی	استکی چهار لنگ
۶	« فتحعلی	نامداری	محمد صالح
۷	« فرج الله	زمانی	طایفه استکی
۸	« محمود	محمودی	جانکی سه دهستان
۹	« سیف الله	جلیل پور	« «
۱۰	« عبدالله	اسد پور	طایفه جلیلی

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رؤسای عشایر خوزستان که بمناسبت تشییع جنازه بتهران آمدند

شماره	نام	نام خانوادگی	نام طایفه
۱	آقای مولا نصر الله	مولائی	هویره
۲	« شیخ صید الله	براک	باوی
۳	« شیخ سرتیب	سیاحی	بنتی طرف دشت میشان
۴	« شیخ سعدون	جاسمی	زرگان
۵	« سید یوسف	لطیفی	نپوهاشم و کارون
۶	« سید کریم	نعمتی	نپوهاشم و کارون
۷	« میر جابر	راشدی	هندی جان
۸	« میر مراد	راشدی	جراحی
۹	« شیخ سلطان	محمود	حمید
۱۰	« شیخ طعیمه	حسین	خسوجی
۱۱	« شیخ معجد	زرگانی	عنافچه
۱۲	« شیخ صالح	سرخه	شوش
۱۳	« عبدالله	ضرغام پور	بویر احمد سیروس
۱۴	« خسرو	بویر احمدی	بویر احمد سیروس
۱۵	« محمد علی	خلیلی	بهمتی احمدی
۱۶	« اسکندر	چراهی	چرام
۱۷	« ملک منصور	باستی	باست و بابوئی
۱۸	« ضرغام	آریائی	بویر احمد گرمسیر
۱۹	« نصیر بهادر	نامرادی	نامرادی بویر احمد
۲۰	« ولی	پناهی	قائدگیوی بویر احمد

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رؤسای عشایر خوزستان

شماره	نام	نام خانوادگی	نام طایفه
۲۱	آقای اسدالله	ضرغامی	طیبی گرهسیر
۲۲	« محمد حسین	رحیم خانی	سکوند
۲۳	« سیف الله	فعلی	سکوند شوش
۲۴	« عباسقلی	یزدان بناه	بهمنی مهمدی
۲۵	« فرج الله	کرد زنگنه	کرد زنگنه جانکی
۲۶	« فرح الله	رحمانی	بهمنی جانکی
۲۷	« ولی	قیصری	بهمنی مهمدی
۲۸	« فرح الله	کیانی	چهارلنگ جانکی

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رؤسای عشایر گرگان که برای تشییع جنازه بتهران آمدند

شماره	نام	نام خانوادگی	نام طایفه
۱	آقای حینق	جرجانی	داز آتابای
۲	« ساری	بخشینی	کسلخه
۳	« محمد	شرعی	جعفر بای
۴	« ملا قربان	امیری	—
۵	« حاجی قربان	دری	خزینی
۶	« طایلی	ساری خانی	—
۷	« صوفی	کم	—
۸	« انامراد	شمالی	—
۹	« حاجی ملا داود	قوری چای	قوچق
۱۰	« حاج ملاحسینقلی	حنقی	—
۱۱	« حاج قلیچ دردی	اسکندر نژاد	قان یخمز
۱۲	« اراز قلیچ	ایکدری	ایکدر
۱۳	« حاج ارتق قلیچ	آق آتابای	آق آتابای
۱۴	« حاج آی محمد	آتابور	—
۱۵	« نادر	نادرزاده	کوکلان
۱۶	« ایلخانی	مرادی	قرق کوکلان
۱۷	« نصرالله	میر فندرسکی	فندرسک
۱۸	« نصرالله	قبادی	سواد کوه
۱۹	« عبدالحسین	قبادی	سواد کوه
۲۰	« عبدالعظیم	زاهدی	—

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روئسای عشایر گرگان

شماره	نام	نام خانوادگی	نام طایفه
۲۱	آقای رضا	زاهدی	—
۲۲	« اسدالله »	داود نژاد	—
۲۳	« سالار مسعود »	هزار جریبی	هزار جریب
۲۴	« غلامرضا »	اسپهبدی	سواد کوه
۲۵	« فرج الله »	عمران پور	بندی
۲۶	« ابوالحسن »	افضلی	آمل
۲۷	« محمدعلی »	امیری	—
۲۸	« محمدتقی »	مکری	کرد مازندران

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روئسای عشایر رشت که برای تشییع جنازه پتهران آمدند

شماره	نام	نام خانوادگی	نام طایفه
۱	آقای حاج یونس	آقاخانی	کیلان
۲	« وجیه الله »	آشجعی	اسالم
۳	« عبدالعزیز »	امیری	طالش
۴	« سیف الدین »	امینی	اسالم
۵	« عزیز الله »	جوانبخت	عمارلو
۶	« قنبرخان »	چهاردهی	لاهیجان
۷	« علی بیگ »	حسینی	آستارا
۸	« بهادر »	خزاعی	کچور
۹	« کاظم »	زال زر	چالوس
۱۰	« سلیمان پاشاخان »	ساسانی	طالش دولاب
۱۱	« حسینقلی »	سالارمشکوه	قاسم آباد
۱۲	« امان الله »	صوفی	املش
۱۳	« علینقی »	عضدی دیلمی	سیاهکل
۱۴	« حاجی خان »	کلانتری	رودبار
۱۵	« اسمعیل »	کیا	چالوس
۱۶	« علیقلی »	میر رئیس	رودسر
۱۷	« عزیز الله »	هیار	چالوس
۱۸	« جواد »	نیکنام	شهبسوار
۱۹	« ناصرقلی »	یزدانی	کلاردشت
۲۰	« حسام الدین »	مجدیدی	طالش

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رؤسای عشایر کردستان که برای تشییع جنازه به تهران آمدند

شماره	نام	نام خانوادگی	طایفه
۱	آقای حسین بیک	رزانی	مصطفی سلطانی
۲	« محمد	حیدری کانی سافانی	حیدری بیک
۳	« عبدالله	وله‌زیری	وله‌زیری
۴	« فرج بیک	زنوزی	کماسی
۵	« محمد علی بیک	ازادوار طفلی	بهرام بیک
۶	« شیخ احمد	رشه دهی	کهنه پوش
۷	« محمد علی	فیضه مرادی	مراد گورانی
۸	« یحیی	امین	کاکوند
۹	« حبیب الله بیک	رشیدی	مندمی
۱۰	« محمد سفید	قمری	قمری
۱۱	« مهدی بیک	احمدی	کاملی
۱۲	« مجید	سلیمی	چوخه رشی
۱۳	« حسن	اقبالی	کاکوند
۱۴	« عبدالله	دزلی	بهرام بیک
۱۵	« حاج عبدالله	قلعه‌چی	بهرام بیک

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رؤسای هشایر کرمانشاه که برای تشییع جنازه بتهران آمدند

شماره	نام	نام خانوادگی	نام قبیله
۱	آقای کریم	داودیان	کلهر باوندپور
۲	« قاسم	اعظمی	بنی امامی
۳	« اکبر	الله یاری	الله یار خانی
۴	« محمد امین بیک	لهونی	اوراهان خانی
۵	« عزت بیک	زره تن	—
۶	« توفیق بیک	لهونی	—
۷	« قادر بیک	رستمی	—
۸	« رستم بیک	و کیلی	—
۹	« اصغر	بختیار سنجابی	—
۱۰	« پاشا	یاسمی	—
۱۱	« سیدفتح الله	حیدری	—
۱۲	« رشید	بهرامی	قلخانگی
۱۳	« فتاح بیک	امجدی	ولایبکی
۱۴	« امین الله	اکبری	کلهر

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بقیه رؤسای هشایر که برای تشییع جنازه بتهران آمدند

شماره	نام	نام خانوادگی	محل
۱	آقای شیخ عبدالحمین	شیخ المشایخ	دریای جنوب
۲	« عبدالعزیز	فاصلی	«
۳	« حاج علی	فیصلی	«
۴	« عبدالرزاق	کعبی	«
۵	« شیخ ظهراب	رابعی	«
۶	« حاج حمید	دریس	«
۷	« شیخ جابر	کعبی	آبادان
۸	« محمدعلی	صمصامی	ساوه



His Excellency, Dr. Shamseddin Jazayeri, Minister of Culture

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همن میهنان و عشایر میهن پرست ایران

این مجموعه که بمناسبت تشییع جنازه شاهنشاه فقید اعلیحضرت رضاشاه کبیر و یاد بود اجتماع شما سران عشایر میهن پرست ایران در تهران باهر جناب آقای مسعود کیهان وزیر محترم سابق فرهنگ آغاز گردید اینک بمنوان طلیمه انتشارات اداره تعلیمات ایلات و عشایر بشما تقدیم میشود و امیدوار است که به پیروی از نیت ترقی خواهانه اعلیحضرت همایون شاهنشاهی محمدرضاشاه پهلوی که همیشه همشان مصروف پیشرفت در کلیه امور کشور و رفاه هم میهنان عزیز است شما نیز به پیروی از سنت دیرین خود که فداکارترین و شجاعترین افراد کشور بوده اید، در راه عظمت و حفظ استقلال ایران عزیز کوشا و ساعی باشید و با همکاری و تشریک مساهلی صمیمانه خود حس میهن پرستی و شهادت دوستی را در میان افراد خود تقویت و دین خود را به میهن عزیز ادا نمائید و این اداره نیز که اخیراً بنام شما و برای شما تاسیس شده امیدوار است بتواند به پیروی از نیت شاهنشاه محبوب و مسائل پیشرفت امور فرهنگی شما را بنحو احسن و اکمل انجام دهد.

اینک که خوشبختانه جناب آقای دکتر شمس الدین جزایری بوزارت فرهنگ منصوب شده اند دستورات مفیدی نسبت باموزش عمومی در بین اطفال شما صادر کرده اند که امید است با کمک و همراهی خود شما این موضوع مقدس در کلیه نقاط عشایر نشین به بهترین وجهی صورت عمل بگیرد و برنامه های مفیدی که متناسب اوضاع محلی و شغل عمومی عشایر از لحاظ دامپروری و کشاورزی تدوین گردیده است بمرحله اجراء گذارده شود.

رئیس اداره تعلیمات ایلات و عشایر

دکتر محمد طبری

تهران مرداد ۱۳۲۹

بایان

Meet the Author

For the last four decades, Badi Badiozamani has been concentrating his efforts in the United States on two parallel tracks. First, the preservation and sustainability of the Persian culture among the Iranian diaspora; second, the introduction and expansion of general knowledge about this humanistic culture.

In 1991, when President George H. W. Bush ordered the U.S. military to repel Iraqi occupying forces out of Kuwait, Badiozamani, along with a group of concerned Iranians, attended meetings at the White House to ask U.S. authorities to call the Persian Gulf only by its proper name in their reports.



During the administration of George W. Bush, when the likelihood of a military campaign against Iran had increased, Badiozamani authored *Iran And America: Rekindling A Love Lost*, in which he provided the history of the relations between the two countries, starting in 1830, when for the first time in history, two Americans set foot in Iran. A brief history of Iran was provided and contributions of Iran and Iranians to world civilization were enumerated. This was done with the hope of supporting prevention of a likely military attack on the country. Badiozamani, at his own expense, mailed 500 copies of the book to U.S. statesmen, from the President to Senators and members of Congress. Additionally, he utilized any opportunity in international conferences throughout the world to give a copy to high-level politicians and U.S. military commanders.

During President Obama's Presidency, Badiozamani once again stood in defense of the everlasting name of the Persian Gulf by collecting tens of thousands of signatures on an online petition to be sent to the White House.

Badiozamani obtained Norooz congratulatory messages from various U.S. Presidents and Governors for the Iranian diaspora. He was also appointed to serve on various California and city of San Diego advisory boards.

In 2003, taking advantage of a special Governor recall election in California, Badiozamani made history by becoming the first Iranian-American to run for Governor. In his campaign throughout California and on TV and radio interviews, he strived to show a positive image of Iran and Iranians to the American audiences. CNN followed him on the campaign and broadcast a special segment about him throughout the world. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ahZl26m918>

He said that he had no illusions about overcoming the financial and political strength of some of his competitors, such as Arnold Schwarzenegger, whom he had challenged on CNN by saying, "Arnold is two months older than I am; he is twice as tall; has twice as much muscle, but I challenge him to debate on any issue at any time with half my brain tied behind my back!" He achieved both of his objectives in the campaign: portraying a good image of Iranians for Americans and showing to American-born Iranians that they should not be apprehensive about running for various political offices. Badiozamani takes pride in the fact that seven generations of his ancestors have all been educated and were writers.



Respects the Shah, but does not kiss his hand.



With President of Costa Rica, Laura Chinchilla



With U.S. President, George Bush



With Guatemala National Palace staff



Dominica Prime Minister



Antigua & Barbuda PM



San Diego Mayor and Cyrus cylinder



With General Abizaid, CENTCOM Commander



At CNN



Zulu tribesmen in South Africa



With the United Nations staff in South Africa



China



China



Afghanistan



Afghanistan



Kyrgyzstan



India



Panama



Panama



Dubai



Syria



Germany



Vietnam



Lorestan



Bushehr Naval Base



Bishop McKinney, U.S.



Guantanamo Bay, Cuba



Kordestan



Professor Amnon Netzer, founder of Iranian Studies at Hebrew University of Jerusalem



Professor Peter Avery of Cambridge University



Speaking at Guatemala Palace



Entrance to ancient Mithraic temple in Rome



بدیع بدیع الزمانی
Badi Badiozamani



عبدالحمید و عالیہ محی بدیع الزمانی
Abdolhameed and Alieh (Mohi) Badiozamani



میرزا عبدالمجید خان مجد الممالک (مجد فرہی) و نجیبہ
Abdolmajeed Majdolmamaalek (Maid Farrahi) and Najibeh



میرزا شکرالله خان فخرالکتاب نویسنده کتاب تاریخ و جغرافیای کردستان
Mirza Shokrollah Khan Fakhrolkottab, author of Kordestan History & Geography

میرزا عبدالله (عرفان)
Mirza Abdollah (Erfan)

آقا مرتضی قلی
Agha Morteza Gholi

آقا امامقلی
Agha Emamgholi
ملا مصطفی (از کردهای نهاوند و خرم آباد فی لی)
Molla Mostafa (of Kurds of Nahavad & Khorramabad Fayli)

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
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Ash Mahony

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- Proof of extortion and bribery between a king and a foreign government
- The attitude of British statemen regarding the rise of a soldier called Reza Khan
- The political chess game played by Reza Khan vs. British and Russia pertaining to Anglo-Persian Oil Company
- How the British Consul encouraged local armed rebellion against the central government of Iran
- A tribal leader, Khazal, says he can serve only one master, the British Government!
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- And much more...



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
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